Autonomous Tax Administration in Sub-Saharan Africa: the Case of the Uganda Revenue Authority
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
According to standard New Public Management propositions a (semi) autonomous revenue authority is a remedy for many problems that plague the public sector, such as multiple layers of principals and agent, Byzantine rules, low pay, and poor and distorted incentives, which all contribute to unfair and inefficient revenue collection. The Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), established in 1991, is the oldest of its kind in sub-Saharan Africa. The analyses presented in this article indicate that URA autonomy initially increased but later declined. Paradoxically, real autonomy attracts political and bureaucratic attention that may, in turn, undermine it. Thus the decline in the URA's autonomy has come both from below, with the loss of the agency's legitimacy from the perspective of taxpayers, and from above, with a loss of formal and informal authority vis-à-vis the Ministry of Finance and state elites. The President's role in the decline of URA autonomy has been especially significant. That of donors has been ambiguous—strengthening the agency's autonomy in some respects, weakening it in others. In addition, autonomy has been eroded as a consequence of declining staff motivation and clientelistic personnel practices. Revenue collection has suffered as a result.
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Citations
Cites
Revenue authorities: are they the right vehicle for improved tax administration?
Devas, N., Delay, S., & Hubbard, M. (2001) · Public Administration and Development · doi:10.1002/pad.174 · Cited by 76
Cited by
Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries: Capacity and Consent
(2008) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511490897 · Cited by 581
States at Work: Dynamics of African Bureaucracies
Bierschenk, T., & Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. (2014) · BRILL eBooks · doi:10.1163/9789004264960 · Cited by 379
Revenue authorities and public authority in sub-Saharan Africa
Fjeldstad, O.-H., & Moore, M. (2009) · The Journal of Modern African Studies · doi:10.1017/s0022278x08003637 · Cited by 128
Corruption in Tax Administration: Lessons from Institutional Reforms in Uganda
Fjeldstad, O.-H. (2006) · International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption · doi:10.4337/9781847203106.00027 · Cited by 124
Taxation and State Building: Towards a Governance Focused Tax Reform Agenda
Prichard, W. (2010) · IDS Working Papers · doi:10.1111/j.2040-0209.2010.00341_2.x · Cited by 114
Metadata
- Authors
- Therkildsen, O.
- Venue
- Forum for Development Studies
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2004-06
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 59-88
- ISSN
- 0803-9410 (ISSN-L)
- 1891-1765
- OpenAlex
- W2153133045
- Cited by
- 53
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 9.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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