Intentional action: Controversies, data, and core hypotheses
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article reviews some recent empirical work on lay judgments about what agents do intentionally and what they intend in various stories and explores its bearing on the philosophical project of providing a conceptual analysis of intentional action. The article is a case study of the potential bearing of empirical studies of a variety of folk concepts on philosophical efforts to analyze those concepts and vice versa. Topics examined include double effect; the influence of moral considerations on judgments about what is done intentionally and about what is intended; the influence of considerations of luck, skill, and causal deviance on judgments about what agents do intentionally; what interesting properties all cases of intentional action might share; and the debate between proponents of, respectively, "the Simple View" of the connection between intentional action and intention and "the Single Phenomenon View" of that connection. A substantial body of literature is devoted to the project of analyzing intentional action [1] . In this article, I explore the bearing on that project of some recent empirical work on lay judgments about what is done intentionally and about what is intended. This article may reasonably be regarded as a case study of the potential bearing of empirical studies of a range of folk concepts on philosophical efforts to analyze those concepts and, likewise, of the potential bearing of attempted philosophical analyses of folk concepts on empirical studies of those concepts.
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Citations
Cites
Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language
Knobe, J. (2003) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/63.3.190 · Cited by 1,046
Cited by
Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language
Knobe, J. (2003) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/63.3.190 · Cited by 1,046
Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility
Nahmias, E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T., & Turner, J. (2005) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515080500264180 · Cited by 526
The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk Psychology
Knobe, J. (2006) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-004-4510-0 · Cited by 311
Intuitions about consciousness: experimental studies
Knobe, J., & Prinz, J. (2008) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-007-9066-y · Cited by 227
“…suggests that, although some aspects of folk psychology may indeed be best understood as tools for prediction and explanation, others are best understood in terms of their role in facilitating moral judgment (e.g., Cushman 2006; Knobe 2005, forthcoming; Leslie, et al. 2006; McCann 2005; Mele 2003).”
BackgroundTheory of mind and moral cognition: exploring the connections
Knobe, J. (2005) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.06.011 · Cited by 186
Metadata
- Authors
- Mele, A. R.
- Venue
- Philosophical Psychology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2003-06
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 325-340
- ISSN
- 0951-5089 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-394X
- OpenAlex
- W2081042923
- Cited by
- 61
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 1.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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