Theory of mind and moral cognition: exploring the connections
Abstract
It is widely recognized that people sometimes use theory-of-mind judgments in moral cognition. A series of recent studies shows that the connection can also work in the opposite direction: moral judgments can sometimes be used in theory-of-mind cognition. Thus, there appear to be cases in which people's moral judgments actually serve as input to the process underlying their application of theory-of-mind concepts.
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Moral cognition is influenced by whether or not an agent's action is perceived as intentional versus accidental.
“moral cognition is influenced by whether or not an agent’s action is perceived as intentional versus accidental”
From Parsing the neural correlates of moral cognition: ALE meta-analysis on morality, theory of mind, and empathy (2012) · cites this paper as Knobe 2005
Theory of mind and moral judgment are interrelated.
“The foci of the studies differ but converge on the overall expectation that theory of mind and moral judgment are interrelated.”
From The accidental transgressor: Morally-relevant theory of mind (2011) · cites this paper as Knobe, 2005
Accumulated research with adults has revealed a strong relationship between theory of mind competence and moral judgment.
“accumulated research with adults has revealed a strong relationship between theory of mind competence and moral judgment (Knobe, 2005; Pettit & Knobe, 2009)”
From The accidental transgressor: Morally-relevant theory of mind (2011) · cites this paper as Knobe, 2005
Leslie, Knobe and colleagues have conducted research on the Side Effect Effect, which suggests that moral judgment may influence theory of mind in important ways.
“Leslie, Knobe and colleagues have conducted research on the Side Effect Effect, which suggests that moral judgment may influence theory of mind in important ways (Knobe, 2005; Leslie, et al., 2006; Pettit & Knobe, 2009).”
From The accidental transgressor: Morally-relevant theory of mind (2011) · cites this paper as Knobe, 2005
Cites
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Knobe, J. (2004) · Analysis · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8284.2004.00481.x · Cited by 187 · see citing works
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Nadelhoffer, T. (2004) · Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0091241 · Cited by 112 · see citing works
Intention, intentional action and moral considerations
Knobe, J. (2004) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/64.2.181 · Cited by 109 · see citing works
Self-citationIntentional Action and Intending: Recent Empirical Studies
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Young, L., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., & Saxe, R. (2007) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0701408104 · Cited by 625 · see citing works
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- Authors
- Knobe, J.
- Affiliations
- Princeton University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Knobe, Joshua
- ORCID
- Knobe, Joshua
- Venue
- Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2005-08
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 357-359
- ISSN
- 1364-6613 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2003894124
- Cited by
- 186
- References
- 12
- Citations by year
- 2026: 3 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 10 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 12 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 11
- FWCI
- 3.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- Locations
- Trends in Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Emotions and Moral Behavior
- Keywords
- theory of mind, moral cognition, moral judgment, social cognition, metacognition, moral reasoning
- MeSH terms
- Cognition, Humans, Judgment, Models, Psychological, Morals
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