After objectivity: an empirical study of moral judgment
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper develops an empirical argument that the rejection of moral objectivity leaves important features of moral judgment intact. In each of five reported experiments, a number of participants endorsed a nonobjectivist claim about a canonical moral violation. In four of these experiments, participants were also given a standard measure of moral judgment, the moral/conventional task. In all four studies, participants who respond as nonobjectivists about canonical moral violations still treat such violations in typical ways on the moral/conventional task. In particular, participants who give moral nonobjectivist responses still draw a clear distinction between canonical moral and conventional violations. Thus there is some reason to think that many of the central characteristics of moral judgment are preserved in the absence of a commitment to moral objectivity.
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Citations
Cites
A cognitive developmental approach to morality: investigating the psychopath
Blair, R. (1995) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(95)00676-p · Cited by 1,529 · cited 3×
“The scenarios and questions were drawn from the literature (e.g. Blair, 1995; Nichols, 2002).”
BackgroundMethodAdvertisement for a Semantics for Psychology
Block, N., & Philosophy Documentation Center (1986) · Midwest Studies in Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1987.tb00558.x · Cited by 775
Cited by
The Emotional Construction of Morals
Prinz, J. (2009) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199571543.001.0001 · Cited by 679
Sentimental Rules: On the Natural Foundations of Moral Judgement
Nichols, S. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0195169344.001.0001 · Cited by 515
Self-citationThe Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches
LUDWIG, K. (2007) · Midwest Studies in Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00160.x · Cited by 384
NAHMIAS, E., MORRIS, S. G., NADELHOFFER, T., & TURNER, J. (2006) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00603.x · Cited by 328
SARKISSIAN, H., PARK, J., TIEN, D., WRIGHT, J. C., & KNOBE, J. (2011) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01428.x · Cited by 184
Metadata
- Authors
- Nichols, S.
- Venue
- Philosophical Psychology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2004-03
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 3-26
- ISSN
- 0951-5089 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-394X
- OpenAlex
- W2103966073
- Cited by
- 152
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 3.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Nichols, S. (2004). After objectivity: an empirical study of moral judgment. Philosophical Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1080/0951508042000202354
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.