Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 328

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?

Open access
NAHMIAS, Eddy, MORRIS, STEPHEN G., NADELHOFFER, Thomas, TURNER, Jason·2006·Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Abstract

Incompatibilists believe free will is impossible if determinism is true, and they often claim that this view is supported by ordinary intuitions. We challenge the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive to most laypersons and discuss the significance of this challenge to the free will debate. After explaining why incompatibilists should want their view to accord with pretheoretical intuitions, we suggest that determining whether incompatibilism is in fact intuitive calls for empirical testing. We then present the results of our studies, which put significant pressure on the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive. Finally, we consider and respond to several potential objections to our approach.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00603.x

Cites

57 of 57 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 57 references

Cited by

See all 328

Metadata

Authors
NAHMIAS, E., MORRIS, S. G., NADELHOFFER, T., & TURNER, J.
Venue
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2006-07
Volume
73
Issue
1
Pages
28-53
ISSN
  • 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
  • 1933-1592
OpenAlex
W2168381209
Cited by
328
References
57
FWCI
5.22
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Is Incompatibilism Intuitive? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00603.x
The paper
NAHMIAS, E., MORRIS, S. G., NADELHOFFER, T., & TURNER, J. (2006). Is Incompatibilism Intuitive? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00603.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.