The DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?
Open accessAbstract
Incompatibilists believe free will is impossible if determinism is true, and they often claim that this view is supported by ordinary intuitions. We challenge the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive to most laypersons and discuss the significance of this challenge to the free will debate. After explaining why incompatibilists should want their view to accord with pretheoretical intuitions, we suggest that determining whether incompatibilism is in fact intuitive calls for empirical testing. We then present the results of our studies, which put significant pressure on the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive. Finally, we consider and respond to several potential objections to our approach.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory
(1996) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.34-2091 · Cited by 4,147
The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays
Frankfurt, H. G. (1988) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511818172 · Cited by 2,634
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
Frankfurt, H. G. (1969) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2023833 · Cited by 2,405
Pereboom, D. (2001) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511498824 · Cited by 1,519
From metaphysics to ethics: a defence of conceptual analysis
(1999) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.36-3262 · Cited by 1,469
Kane, R. (1999) · doi:10.1093/0195126564.001.0001 · Cited by 1,316
The Possibility of Practical Reason
Velleman, J. D. (2000) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198238256.001.0001 · Cited by 1,241
The importance of what we care about
Frankfurt, H. (1982) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/bf00484902 · Cited by 1,097
Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language
Knobe, J. (2003) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/63.3.190 · Cited by 1,046
Wolf, S. (2005) · Personal Autonomy · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511614194.012 · Cited by 834
Cited by
Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility
Nahmias, E., Morris, S., Nadelhoffer, T., & Turner, J. (2005) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515080500264180 · Cited by 526
Self-citationThe FAD–Plus: Measuring Lay Beliefs Regarding Free Will and Related Constructs
Paulhus, D. L., & Carey, J. M. (2011) · Journal of Personality Assessment · doi:10.1080/00223891.2010.528483 · Cited by 336
THE RISE AND FALL OF EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY
Kauppinen, A. (2007) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869790701305871 · Cited by 324
Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility
Roskies, A. (2006) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.07.011 · Cited by 284
Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal?
SARKISSIAN, H., CHATTERJEE, A., DE BRIGARD, F., KNOBE, J., NICHOLS, S., & SIRKER, S. (2010) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01393.x · Cited by 283
Metadata
- Authors
- NAHMIAS, E., MORRIS, S. G., NADELHOFFER, T., & TURNER, J.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2006-07
- Volume
- 73
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 28-53
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- 1933-1592
- OpenAlex
- W2168381209
- Cited by
- 328
- References
- 57
- FWCI
- 5.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Is Incompatibilism Intuitive? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00603.x
- The paper
- NAHMIAS, E., MORRIS, S. G., NADELHOFFER, T., & TURNER, J. (2006). Is Incompatibilism Intuitive? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00603.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.