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Moral intuitions: Are philosophers experts?

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Tobia, Kevin, Buckwalter, Wesley, Stich, Stephen · 2013 · Philosophical Psychology

Abstract

Psychologists and experimental philosophers have reported findings showing that in some cases ordinary people's moral intuitions are affected by factors of dubious relevance to the truth of the intuition. Some defend the use of intuition as evidence in ethics by arguing that philosophers are the experts in this area, and philosophers’ moral intuitions are both different from those of ordinary people and more reliable. We conducted two experiments indicating that philosophers and non-philosophers do indeed sometimes have different moral intuitions, but challenging the notion that philosophers have better or more reliable intuitions.

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Metadata

Authors
Tobia, K., Buckwalter, W., & Stich, S.
Venue
Philosophical Psychology
Published
2013-10
Volume
26
Issue
5
Pages
629-638
ISSN
  • 0951-5089 (ISSN-L)
  • 1465-394X
OpenAlex
W3123067009
Cited by
218
References
1
FWCI
5.22
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Moral intuitions: Are philosophers experts? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/09515089.2012.696327
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Tobia, K., Buckwalter, W., & Stich, S. (2013). Moral intuitions: Are philosophers experts? Philosophical Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2012.696327

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