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Moral intuitions: Are philosophers experts?
Open accessAbstract
Psychologists and experimental philosophers have reported findings showing that in some cases ordinary people's moral intuitions are affected by factors of dubious relevance to the truth of the intuition. Some defend the use of intuition as evidence in ethics by arguing that philosophers are the experts in this area, and philosophers’ moral intuitions are both different from those of ordinary people and more reliable. We conducted two experiments indicating that philosophers and non-philosophers do indeed sometimes have different moral intuitions, but challenging the notion that philosophers have better or more reliable intuitions.
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Cites
Situational Salience and Cultural Differences in the Correspondence Bias and Actor-Observer Bias
Choi, I., & Nisbett, R. E. (1998) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167298249003 · Cited by 392
Cited by
Philosophers’ biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection
Schwitzgebel, E., & Cushman, F. (2015) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2015.04.015 · Cited by 314
Sauer, H. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108529181 · Cited by 72
Lay beliefs in moral expertise
Schmittat, S. M., & Burgmer, P. (2020) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2020.1719053 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Tobia, K., Buckwalter, W., & Stich, S.
- Venue
- Philosophical Psychology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2013-10
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 629-638
- ISSN
- 0951-5089 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-394X
- OpenAlex
- W3123067009
- Cited by
- 218
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 5.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Tobia, K., Buckwalter, W., & Stich, S. (2013). Moral intuitions: Are philosophers experts? Philosophical Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2012.696327
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