The DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Philosophers’ biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection
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Citations
Cites
Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences
Muller, K. (1989) · Technometrics · doi:10.1080/00401706.1989.10488618 · Cited by 99,167
Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences
(1990) · Computers, Environment and Urban Systems · doi:10.1016/0198-9715(90)90050-4 · Cited by 65,269
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7455683 · Cited by 18,497
(2011) · Cited by 14,317
Nudge: improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness
(2008) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-0977 · Cited by 11,572
Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making
Frederick, S. (2005) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533005775196732 · Cited by 5,256
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning
Holyoak, K. J., & Morrison, B. (2005) · Cited by 2,132
Kuhn, D. (1991) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511571350 · Cited by 2,094
Baron, J. (2023) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009263672 · Cited by 1,422
Cited by
The Moral Psychology of Artificial Intelligence
Bonnefon, J.-F., Rahwan, I., & Shariff, A. (2024) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-030123-113559 · Cited by 151
Exploring the psychology of LLMs’ moral and legal reasoning
Almeida, G. F. C. F., Nunes, J. L., Engelmann, N., Wiegmann, A., & Araújo, M. D. (2024) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2024.104145 · Cited by 70
De Cruz, H. (2018) · doi:10.1017/9781108557849 · Cited by 24
Lay beliefs in moral expertise
Schmittat, S. M., & Burgmer, P. (2020) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2020.1719053 · Cited by 5
Metadata
- Authors
- Schwitzgebel, E., & Cushman, F.
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2015-08
- Volume
- 141
- Pages
- 127-137
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2163349776
- Cited by
- 314
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 16.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Schwitzgebel, E., & Cushman, F. (2015). Philosophers’ biased judgments persist despite training, expertise and reflection. Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.04.015
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.