Can you believe it? Illusionism and the illusion meta-problem
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Illusionism about consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Embracing illusionism presents the theoretical advantage that one does not need to explain how consciousness arises from purely physical brains anymore, but only to explain why consciousness seems to exist while it does not. As Keith Frankish puts it, illusionism replaces the “hard problem of consciousness” with the “illusion problem.” However, a satisfying version of illusionism has to explain not only why the illusion of consciousness arises, but also why it arises with its particular strength: Notably, why we are so deeply reluctant to recognize the illusory nature of consciousness. Explaining our strong intuitive resistance to illusionism means solving what I call the “illusion meta-problem,” which I think is a part of the illusion problem. In this paper, I argue that current versions of illusionism are unable to solve the illusion meta-problem. I focus on two of the most promising recent illusionist theories of consciousness, and I show why they fail to explain the peculiar reluctance we encounter whenever we try to accept that consciousness is an illusion.
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Cites
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Cited by
The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI
Birch, J. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.001.0001 · Cited by 236
The illusion of conscious experience
Kammerer, F. (2019) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-018-02071-y · Cited by 123
“I call it the “illusion metaproblem” (Kammerer 2018a), and I think that it constitutes the hardest aspect of the illusion problem.5 While the illusion problem is the general problem of explaining how the illusion of phenomenality arises, the illusion meta-problem concerns the explanation of its…”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationDefining consciousness and denying its existence. Sailing between Charybdis and Scylla
Kammerer, F. (2025) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-025-02285-0 · Cited by 38
“Against this, there are plausible cases where we cannot check the accuracy of rep - resentations and yet do not intuit their infallibility (Kammerer, 2018a; for counter-objections, see Pereboom, 2019).”
Self-citationHow You Know You’re Conscious: Illusionism and Knowledge of Things
Duncan, M. (2021) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-021-00590-1 · Cited by 30
“Another problem is called the “resistance problem” (see Chalmers 2018; Kammerer 2018, 2019; Frankish 2016; Levine 2019).”
BackgroundDoes the Explanatory Gap Rest on a Fallacy?
Kammerer, F. (2018) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-018-0424-1 · Cited by 23
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kammerer, F.
- Affiliations
- Sorbonne Université (FR)
- Corresponding author
- Kammerer, François
- ORCID
- Kammerer, François
- Venue
- Philosophical Psychology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2017-10-25
- Volume
- 31
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 44-67
- ISSN
- 0951-5089 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-394X
- OpenAlex
- W2766068915
- Cited by
- 80
- References
- 35
- Citations by year
- 2026: 30 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 30 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 2.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hdl.handle.net
- Licence
- other-oa
- Locations
- Philosophical Psychology (publishedVersion)
- Digital Access to Libraries (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), l'Université de Namur (UNamur) and the Université Saint-Louis (USL-B)) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- illusionism, phenomenal consciousness, hard problem of consciousness, theory of consciousness
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