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Can you believe it? Illusionism and the illusion meta-problem

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Kammerer, François · 2018 · Philosophical Psychology

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Illusionism about consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Embracing illusionism presents the theoretical advantage that one does not need to explain how consciousness arises from purely physical brains anymore, but only to explain why consciousness seems to exist while it does not. As Keith Frankish puts it, illusionism replaces the “hard problem of consciousness” with the “illusion problem.” However, a satisfying version of illusionism has to explain not only why the illusion of consciousness arises, but also why it arises with its particular strength: Notably, why we are so deeply reluctant to recognize the illusory nature of consciousness. Explaining our strong intuitive resistance to illusionism means solving what I call the “illusion meta-problem,” which I think is a part of the illusion problem. In this paper, I argue that current versions of illusionism are unable to solve the illusion meta-problem. I focus on two of the most promising recent illusionist theories of consciousness, and I show why they fail to explain the peculiar reluctance we encounter whenever we try to accept that consciousness is an illusion.

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Citations

Cites

Show all 34 references

Research works printed but not linked: 10

  1. Chalmers D., 1995, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2, 200
  2. Dennett D., 1988, Consciousness in modern science, 226
  3. Kammerer F., 2016, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23, 123
  4. 10.1111/papq.1983.64.issue-4 · doi:10.1111/papq.1983.64.issue-4
  5. Loar B., 1997, The nature of consciousness, 597
  6. Pereboom D., 2009, Appearance, reality, and the good: Themes from the philosophy of Robert M. Adams, 156
  7. 10.1093/acprof:oso/978019976403001.0001 · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/978019976403001.0001
  8. Prinz J., 2016, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23, 186
  9. Putnam H., 1975, Philosophical papers, 1, 237
  10. Rey G., 1995, Conscious experience, 123

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Kammerer, F.
Affiliations
Sorbonne Université (FR)
Corresponding author
Kammerer, François
Venue
Philosophical Psychology
Published
2017-10-25
Volume
31
Issue
1
Pages
44-67
ISSN
  • 0951-5089 (ISSN-L)
  • 1465-394X
OpenAlex
W2766068915
Cited by
80
References
35
Citations by year
2026: 30 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 30 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 1
FWCI
2.14
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
other-oa
Locations
  • Philosophical Psychology (publishedVersion)
  • Digital Access to Libraries (Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), l'Université de Namur (UNamur) and the Université Saint-Louis (USL-B)) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
Keywords
illusionism, phenomenal consciousness, hard problem of consciousness, theory of consciousness

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Kammerer, F. (2018). Can you believe it? Illusionism and the illusion meta-problem. Philosophical Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2017.1388361

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