The DOI matches its Crossref record; 57 of the 57 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness
Abstract
Consciousness presents a problem. There are excellent reasons for believing that materialism, or physicalism, is the correct metaphysical view of our world, yet it is extremely difficult to see how conscious experiences, or qualia, can be incorporated into the materialist framework. Both aspects of the problem are defended. First, a positive argument for materialism is given, with responses to dualist objections. Second, objections are presented to most materialist attempts to explain consciousness – in particular, higher‐order theories, representationalism, and eliminativism. Finally, it is argued that to make genuine progress on this problem we need to delve deeper into the question of our cognitive access to our own experience. Thus the problems of intentionality and consciousness are not as separable as has often been thought.
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Cites
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Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience
Block, N. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07002786 · Cited by 1,146
Quality-space theory in olfaction
Young, B. D., Keller, A., & Rosenthal, D. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00001 · Cited by 579
Art and Intention: A Philosophical Study
Livingston, P. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199278067.001.0001 · Cited by 276
Millière, R. (2017) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2017.00245 · Cited by 206
Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness
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Metadata
- Authors
- Levine, J.
- Publisher
- Oxford University PressNew York
- Published
- 2001-01-18
- OpenAlex
- W4243871421
- Cited by
- 470
- References
- 57
- FWCI
- 9.72
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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