Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace
Abstract
It is widely believed that cyberspace is offense dominant because of technical characteristics that undermine deterrence and defense. This argument mistakes the ease of deception on the Internet for a categorical ease of attack. As intelligence agencies have long known, deception is a double-edged sword. Covert attackers must exercise restraint against complex targets in order to avoid compromises resulting in mission failure or retaliation. More importantly, defenders can also employ deceptive concealment and ruses to confuse or ensnare aggressors. Indeed, deception can reinvigorate traditional strategies of deterrence and defense against cyber threats, as computer security practitioners have already discovered. The strategy of deception has other important implications: as deterrence became foundational in the nuclear era, deception should rise in prominence in a world that increasingly depends on technology to mediate interaction.
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Offense is not necessarily cheaper in the cyber domain.
“Gartzke & Lindsay (2015) further argue that offense is not even necessarily cheaper in the cyber domain.”
From Do Emerging Military Technologies Matter for International Politics? (2020) · cites this paper as Gartzke & Lindsay 2015
Advances in attribution limit the deception advantages for cyber attackers, while defenders can also use deception to try to entrap attackers, both defeating an attack and identifying the attacker.
“More generally, advances in attribution limit the deception advantages for cyber attackers, while defenders can also use deception to try to entrap attackers-both defeating an attack and identifying the attacker (Gartzke & Lindsay 2015).”
From Do Emerging Military Technologies Matter for International Politics? (2020) · cites this paper as Gartzke & Lindsay 2015
The need for cyber attacks to stay covert in situations short of war imposes operational limitations, while defenders can use concealment and spoofing to deceive attackers.
“The need for attacks to stay covert in situations short of war imposes operational limitations, while defenders can use forms of concealment and spoofing to try to deceive attackers.”
From Do Emerging Military Technologies Matter for International Politics? (2020) · cites this paper as Gartzke & Lindsay 2015
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Reassessing coercion theory through the lens of the space domain
Lonergan, E., & Jensen, B. M. (2026) · Contemporary Security Policy · doi:10.1080/13523260.2026.2722398 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Explication of Online Infidelity in Virtual Romantic Relationships
Oliullah, M., & Murtuza, H. (2026) · The Family Journal · doi:10.1177/10664807261448229 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“Digital tools make hiding these actions easier through private messages, hidden accounts, and fake names, creating many layers of secrecy that can be hard to uncover (Gartzke & Lindsay, 2015; Hancock, 2012).”
Observing the unobservable: Wargaming cyber deterrence
Reddie, A., Goldblum, B., Armenta, M., Booth, R., Lakkaraju, K., Letchford, J., Reinhardt, J., & Schnell, M. L. (2026) · International Interactions · doi:10.1080/03050629.2026.2626499 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“…1983; Harknett 1996; Wirtz 2018; Gerson 2009; Goodman 2010; Morgan 2010; Crosston 2011; Fischerkeller and Harknett 2017; Harknett and Nye 2017; Brantly 2018; Tor 2017; Lupovici 2016; Wilner 2020; Libicki 2018; Gartzke and Lindsay 2015; Gomez and Winger 2024; Vićić, Baram, and Gartzke 2025).”
Lonergan, E. (2025) · The Journal of Strategic Studies · doi:10.1080/01402390.2025.2531792 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Great Power Cyberpolitics and Global Cyberhegemony
Akdağ, Y. (2025) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592725000040 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“Several realist theoretical frameworks have informed the intricate dynamics of state-to-state cyberse-curity relations over the last few decades (Choucri 2012; Gartzke and Lindsay 2015, 316; Saltzman 2013).”
InfluentialAkoto, W. (2024) · Business and Politics · doi:10.1017/bap.2024.22 · Cited by 2
Whyte, C. (2023) · Comparative Strategy · doi:10.1080/01495933.2022.2158031 · Cited by 2
The Promise and Perils of Allied Offensive Cyber Operations
Lonergan, E., & Montgomery, M. (2022) · International Conference on Cyber Conflict · doi:10.23919/cycon55549.2022.9811090 · Cited by 2
“38 Therefore, even if NATO policy seeks to draw a clear distinction between offensive cyber operations during conflict and defensive operations in routine competition, it will need to consider how to define a role for some forms of defensive activities that are more proactive in nature (and may be…”
Background
- Authors
- Gartzke, E., & Lindsay, J. R.
- Venue
- Security Studies
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2015-04-03
- Volume
- 24
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 316-348
- ISSN
- 0963-6412 (ISSN-L)
- 1556-1852
- OpenAlex
- W1576087156
- Cited by
- 287
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 38 · 2025: 46 · 2024: 57 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 46 · 2021: 26 · 2020: 24 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 13 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 1
- FWCI
- 52.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Security Studies (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Intelligence, Security, War Strategy
- Keywords
- cyber deception, cyber deterrence, cyber defense, offensive cyber operations, stealthy attacks, cybersecurity strategy, cybersecurity
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