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Cited by 94Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare StudiesInternational Relations and Foreign PolicyInformation and Cyber Security

What’s in a Name? Metaphors and Cybersecurity

Branch, Jordan·2021·International Organization
DOI 10.1017/s002081832000051x
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Abstract

Abstract For more than a decade, the United States military has conceptualized and discussed the Internet and related systems as “cyberspace,” understood as a “domain” of conflict like land, sea, air, and outer space. How and why did this concept become entrenched in US doctrine? What are its effects? Focusing on the emergence and consolidation of this terminology, I make three arguments about the role of language in cybersecurity policy. First, I propose a new, politically consequential category of metaphor:foundational metaphors,implied by using particular labels rather than stated outright. These metaphors support specific ways to understand complex issues, provide discursive resources to some arguments over others, and shape policy contestation and outcomes. Second, I present a detailed empirical study of US military strategy and doctrine that traces the emergence and consolidation of terminology built on the “cyberspace domain.” This concept supported implicit metaphorical correspondences between the Internet and physical space, yielding specific analogies and arguments for understanding the Internet and its effects. Third, I focus on the rhetorical effects of this terminology to reveal two important institutional consequences: this language has been essential to expanding the military's role in cybersecurity, and specific interests within the Department of Defense have used this framework to support the creation of US Cyber Command. These linguistic effects in the United States also have implications for how other states approach cybersecurity, for how international law is applied to cyber operations, and for how International Relations understands language and technological change.

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  • Empirical and theoretical research into cyber-conflict, public opinion, and international security is burgeoning, yet the field lacks conceptual agreement about key terms.

    “Empirical and theoretical research into cyber-conflict, public opinion, and international security is burgeoning, yet the field suffers from an absence of conceptual agreement about key terms (Branch 2021).”

    From Public Opinion and Cyberterrorism (2023) · cites this paper as Branch 2021

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Authors
Branch, J.
Corresponding author
Branch, Jordan
ORCID
Branch, Jordan
Venue
International Organization
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
2020-09-24
Volume
75
Issue
1
Pages
39-70
ISSN
  • 0020-8183 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-5088
DOI
10.1017/s002081832000051x
OpenAlex
W3088886092
Cited by
94
References
141
Citations by year
2026: 23 · 2025: 17 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 27 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 2
FWCI
39.71
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified)
Locations
  • International Organization (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies
  • Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › International Relations and Foreign Policy
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
Keywords
cyberspace, military doctrine, cybersecurity policy, US military strategy, terminology, Department of Defense, cyber operations, international law, cyber conflict, rhetorical effect

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