The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Performance Management, High-Powered Incentives, and Environmental Policies in China
Abstract
China has a highly centralized bureaucracy that is no longer strictly monitored by political loyalty but by governance performance (e.g., economic growth), rewarded with promotion and monetary incentives. In the early 2000s, environmental criteria were added to this system. As part of this effort, a high-powered performance management system was introduced in 2006. It held high-level provincial officials, who are part of the nomenklatura, personally responsible for meeting specific emissions targets. Using data from China Statistics Yearbooks and several official news archives, the empirical results indicate that the implementation of the new performance management system reduced emissions only for air pollutants, which are the most publicly visible among the targeted pollutants. Water pollution, which is less visible but also a mandated target, was unaffected. Emissions of soot, an untargeted pollutant, were also unaffected. The findings imply that, even in centrally managed systems like China, compliance with a high-stakes reward for measured performance is not universal.
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Citations
Cites
Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J.-S. (2009) · doi:10.1515/9781400829828 · Cited by 9,467
Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion
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Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms
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KING, G., PAN, J., & ROBERTS, M. E. (2013) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055413000014 · Cited by 2,415 · cited 1×
“Grassroots activism is not a daily watchdog for political and administrative accountability in the area of pollution control and environmental protection in China, especially when the pollutant is invisible (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013).”
BackgroundThe New Economics of Organization
Moe, T. M. (1984) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2110997 · Cited by 1,974
WHAT’S MEASURED IS WHAT MATTERS: TARGETS AND GAMING IN THE ENGLISH PUBLIC HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
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Does school accountability lead to improved student performance?
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“…have been extensively examined in the U.S. and Europe using the theoretical perspective of performance management (e.g., Bohte and Meier 2000; Hanushek and Raymond 2004; 2005; Heinrich 2002; 2004; Heinrich and Choi 2007; Podgursky and Springer 2007; 2011), little research has been undertaken…”
BackgroundEnvironment, health, and human capital
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Cited by
Jia, K., & Chen, S. (2019) · Journal of Environmental Management · doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2019.05.114 · Cited by 275
Metadata
- Authors
- Liang, J., & Langbein, L.
- Venue
- International Public Management Journal
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2015-07-03
- Volume
- 18
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 346-385
- ISSN
- 1096-7494 (ISSN-L)
- 1559-3169
- OpenAlex
- W2206797994
- Cited by
- 178
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 54.52
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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