The DOI matches its Crossref record; 47 of the 47 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corporate lobbying in the European Union: the logic of access
Open accessAbstract
The complexity and diversity of European interest politics is exemplified by the multitude of channels and targets that private actors use to lobby in the EU multi-level system. The aim of this article is to investigate the logic behind the apparent ad hoc lobbying behaviour of private interests. A theoretical framework is developed in order to explain the access of business interests to the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The degree of access to these institutions is explained in terms of a theory of demand and supply of access goods. Access goods concern information that is crucial in the EU policy-making process. In order to gain access to an EU institution, business interests have to provide the access good(s) demanded by that institution. Organizational form is introduced as the innovative unit of analysis. It follows that associative business action is unconventionally studied in relation to two other organizational forms: individual company action and thirdparty representation.
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Cited by
Researching Interest Group Politics in Europe and Elsewhere: Much We Study, Little We Know?
Beyers, J., Eising, R., & Maloney, W. (2008) · West European Politics · doi:10.1080/01402380802370443 · Cited by 452
Bouwen, P. (2004) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00157.x · Cited by 432
Self-citationIn search of El Dorado: The elusive financial returns on corporate political investments
Hadani, M., & Schuler, D. A. (2013) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2006 · Cited by 391
Empirical and theoretical studies in EU lobbying
Coen, D. (2007) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/13501760701243731 · Cited by 365
den Hond, F., Rehbein, K. A., de Bakker, F. G. A., & Lankveld, H. K. (2014) · Journal of Management Studies · doi:10.1111/joms.12063 · Cited by 343
Metadata
- Authors
- Bouwen, P.
- Venue
- Journal of European Public Policy
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2002-01
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 365-390
- ISSN
- 1350-1763 (ISSN-L)
- 1466-4429
- OpenAlex
- W2002316709
- Cited by
- 724
- References
- 47
- FWCI
- 46.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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