The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rapid responding increases belief bias: Evidence for the dual-process theory of reasoning
Abstract
In this study, we examine the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning under both standard presentation and in a condition where participants are required to respond within 10 seconds. As predicted, the requirement for rapid responding increased the amount of belief bias observed on the task and reduced the number of logically correct decisions, both effects being substantial and statistically significant. These findings were predicted by the dual-process account of reasoning, which posits that fast heuristic processes, responsible for belief bias, compete with slower analytic processes that can lead to correct logical decisions. Requiring rapid responding thus differentially inhibits the operation of analytic reasoning processes, leading to the results observed.
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Citations
Cites
The empirical case for two systems of reasoning.
Sloman, S. A. (1996) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037//0033-2909.119.1.3 · Cited by 3,848
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
In two minds: dual-process accounts of reasoning
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2003) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2003.08.012 · Cited by 1,569
Self-citationWho Is Rational?: Studies of individual Differences in Reasoning
Stanovich, K. E. (1999) · Cited by 1,114
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On the conflict between logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning
Evans, J. S. B. T., Barston, J. L., & Pollard, P. (1983) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/bf03196976 · Cited by 840
Self-citationReasoning independently of prior belief and individual differences in actively open-minded thinking.
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (1997) · Journal of Educational Psychology · doi:10.1037//0022-0663.89.2.342 · Cited by 729
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Goel, V., & Dolan, R. J. (2003) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(02)00185-3 · Cited by 442 · cited 1×
“In support of this, it has been shown that participants high in general intelligence are more able to resist belief biases (Stanovich & West, 1997) and that logical and belief-based responding are neurologically differentiated (Goel & Dolan, 2003).”
BackgroundOn belief bias in syllogistic reasoning.
Klauer, K. C., Musch, J., & Naumer, B. (2000) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037//0033-295x.107.4.852 · Cited by 283
Matching Bias in Conditional Reasoning: Do We Understand it After 25 Years?
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Self-citation
Cited by
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 · Cited by 5,137
Self-citationDual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612460685 · Cited by 4,271
Self-citationSocial heuristics shape intuitive cooperation
Rand, D. G., Peysakhovich, A., Kraft-Todd, G. T., Newman, G. E., Wurzbacher, O., Nowak, M. A., & Greene, J. D. (2014) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms4677 · Cited by 720
Intuition, reason, and metacognition
Thompson, V. A., Prowse Turner, J. A., & Pennycook, G. (2011) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2011.06.001 · Cited by 703
Two Is Not Always Better Than One: A Critical Evaluation of Two-System Theories
Keren, G., & Schul, Y. (2009) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1745-6924.2009.01164.x · Cited by 691
Metadata
- Authors
- Evans, J. S. B. T., & Curtis-Holmes, J.
- Venue
- Thinking & Reasoning
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2005-09
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 382-389
- ISSN
- 1354-6783 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0708
- OpenAlex
- W2128299237
- Cited by
- 418
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 4.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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