Hempel's Paradox and Wason's Selection Task: Logical and Psychological Puzzles of Confirmation
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Hempel's paradox of the ravens has to do with the question of what constitutes confirmation from a logical point of view; Wason's selection task has been used extensively to investigate how people go about attempting to confirm or disconfirm conditional claims. This paper presents an argument that the paradox is resolved, and that people's typical performance in the selection task can be explained, by consideration of what constitutes an effective strategy for seeking evidence of the tenability of universal or conditional claims in everyday life.
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Citations
Cites
Cosmides, L. (1989) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(89)90023-1 · Cited by 2,471
Wason, P. C. (1968) · Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1080/14640746808400161 · Cited by 1,476 · cited 2×
“About 20 years after Hempel first described his paradox, Peter Wason (1966, 1968) invented a task for use in the study of conditional reasoning, and reported the results of an initial experiment that stimulated a host of subsequent studies D ow nl oa de d B y: [C D L Jo ur na ls A cc ou nt ] A t: 20 :5 1 5 A ug us t 2…”
Background
Cited by
Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises
Nickerson, R. S. (1998) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175 · Cited by 7,267
Self-citationHeuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
(2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098 · Cited by 2,192
Metadata
- Authors
- Nickerson, R. S.
- Venue
- Thinking & Reasoning
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 1996-05
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-31
- ISSN
- 1354-6783 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0708
- OpenAlex
- W2122853852
- Cited by
- 138
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 7.21
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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