“Sleights of mind”: Delusions, defences, and self-deception
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Two different modes of theorising about delusions are explored. On the one hand is the motivational approach, which regards delusions as serving a defensive, palliative, even potentially adaptive function. On the other, is the cognitive deficit approach, which conceptualises delusions as explicitly pathological, involving abnormalities in ordinary cognitive processes. The former approach, prominently exemplified by the psychoanalytic tradition, was predominant historically, but has been challenged in recent years by the latter. Some grievances against psychoanalytic theory are briefly discussed, and it is argued that although the reasons for psychoanalysis falling into scientific disrepute are partly justified, the psychodynamic notion that motivation has access to the mechanisms of belief formation is of potentially crucial theoretical utility. A variety of possible syntheses of the two theoretical modes are therefore explored, in the belief that the most comprehensive account of delusions will involve a theoretical unification of both styles of explanation. Along the way, an attempt is made to locate the notions delusion, defence, and self-deception in a shared theoretical space.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The cognitive neuropsychology of schizophrenia
(1993) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.31-0601 · Cited by 1,901
A cognitive model of the positive symptoms of psychosis
GARETY, P. A., KUIPERS, E., FOWLER, D., FREEMAN, D., & BEBBINGTON, P. E. (2001) · Psychological Medicine · doi:10.1017/s0033291701003312 · Cited by 1,546
A cognitive model of persecutory delusions
Freeman, D., Garety, P. A., Kuipers, E., Fowler, D., & Bebbington, P. E. (2002) · British Journal of Clinical Psychology · doi:10.1348/014466502760387461 · Cited by 888
Probabilistic judgements in deluded and non-deluded subjects
Huq, S. F., Garety, P. A., & Hemsley, D. R. (1988) · The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A · doi:10.1080/14640748808402300 · Cited by 596
Ramachandran, V. S. (1996) · Medical Hypotheses · doi:10.1016/s0306-9877(96)90215-7 · Cited by 190
Cited by
The epistemic innocence of motivated delusions
Bortolotti, L. (2015) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.10.005 · Cited by 136
“[McKay et al., 2005, p. 315] Delusions are generally accepted to be beliefs which (a) are held with great conviction; (b) defy rational counter-argument; (c) and would be dismissed as false or bizarre by members of the same socio-cultural group.”
InfluentialThe Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs
Bortolotti, L. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198863984.001.0001 · Cited by 127
Larsen, E. M., Donaldson, K. R., Liew, M., & Mohanty, A. (2020) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/mb65f · Cited by 71
Models of misbelief: integrating motivational and deficit theories of delusions
McKay, R., Langdon, R., & Coltheart, M. (2007) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2007.01.003 · Cited by 66
Self-citationThe doxastic shear pin: Delusions as errors of learning and memory
Fineberg, S. K., & Corlett, P. R. (2016) · Cognitive Neuropsychiatry · doi:10.1080/13546805.2015.1136206 · Cited by 48
Metadata
- Authors
- McKay, R., Langdon, R., & Coltheart, M.
- Venue
- Cognitive Neuropsychiatry
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2005-08
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 305-326
- ISSN
- 1354-6805 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0619
- OpenAlex
- W2002153631
- Cited by
- 205
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 45.99
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: “Sleights of mind”: Delusions, defences, and self-deception. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/13546800444000074
- The paper
- McKay, R., Langdon, R., & Coltheart, M. (2005). “Sleights of mind”: Delusions, defences, and self-deception. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry. https://doi.org/10.1080/13546800444000074
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.