The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Owner as Manager, Extended Horizons and the Family Firm
Abstract
Previous work on firm ownership structure suggests that organizations in which ownership and control are combined may be undervalued relative to the market investment rule because decision makers have an incentive to forgo investment projects that managers in firms with specialized ownership find profitable. However, the specialization of ownership and decision-making functions may result in substantial agency costs. This paper shows that these tradeoffs may not exist in family firms. The extended horizons characteristic of family businesses may provide the necessary incentives for decision makers to invest according to the market rule while limiting agency costs that arise when ownership and control are separated. Family ties, loyalty, insurance, and stability are expected to be effective in lengthening the horizons of managers and in providing the incentives for family managers to make efficient investments in the family business.
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Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
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Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
Filders, R. (1992) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/0169-2070(92)90130-2 · Cited by 16,165
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Fama, E. F. (1980) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260866 · Cited by 10,466
Journal of Economic Literature
(2019) · AEA Papers and Proceedings · doi:10.1257/pandp.109.633 · Cited by 7,468
Journal of Small Business Management
(2020) · Journal of Small Business Management · doi:10.1111/(issn)1540-627x · Cited by 6,641
Agency Problems and Residual Claims
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467038 · Cited by 4,827
A Theory of Social Interactions
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The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm
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Cited by
Corporate immunity to the COVID-19 pandemic
Ding, W., Levine, R., Lin, C., & Xie, W. (2021) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.03.005 · Cited by 1,484
Family Involvement, Family Influence, and Family–Centered Non–Economic Goals in Small Firms
Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H., Pearson, A. W., & Barnett, T. (2012) · Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6520.2010.00407.x · Cited by 1,248
Zellweger, T. M., Kellermanns, F. W., Chrisman, J. J., & Chua, J. H. (2012) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1110.0665 · Cited by 832
Ownership structure and risk in publicly held and privately owned banks
Barry, T. A., Lepetit, L., & Tarazi, A. (2011) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.10.004 · Cited by 426
Entrepreneurial families and family firms
Nordqvist, M., & Melin, L. (2010) · Entrepreneurship & Regional Development · doi:10.1080/08985621003726119 · Cited by 392
Metadata
- Authors
- James, H. S.
- Venue
- International Journal of the Economics of Business
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 1999-02-01
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 41-55
- ISSN
- 1357-1516 (ISSN-L)
- 1466-1829
- OpenAlex
- W1987708961
- Cited by
- 961
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 5.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
