Self-recognition, theory-of-mind, and self-awareness: What side are you on?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A fashionable view in comparative psychology states that primates possess self-awareness because they exhibit mirror self-recognition (MSR), which in turn makes it possible to infer mental states in others ("theory-of-mind"; ToM). In cognitive neuroscience, an increasingly popular position holds that the right hemisphere represents the centre of self-awareness because MSR and ToM tasks presumably increase activity in that hemisphere. These two claims are critically assessed here as follows: (1) MSR should not be equated with full-blown self-awareness, as it most probably only requires kinaesthetic self-knowledge and does not involve access to one's mental events; (2) ToM and self-awareness are fairly independent and should also not be taken as equivalent notions; (3) MSR and ToM tasks engage medial and left brain areas; (4) other self-awareness tasks besides MSR and ToM tasks (e.g., self-description, autobiography) mostly recruit medial and left brain areas; (5) and recent neuropsychological evidence implies that inner speech (produced by the left hemisphere) plays a significant role in self-referential activity. The main conclusions reached based on this analysis are that (a) organisms that display MSR most probably do not possess introspective self-awareness, and (b) self-related processes most likely engage a distributed network of brain regions situated in both hemispheres.
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Cites
Self-referential processing in our brain—A meta-analysis of imaging studies on the self
Northoff, G., Heinzel, A., de Greck, M., Bermpohl, F., Dobrowolny, H., & Panksepp, J. (2006) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2005.12.002 · Cited by 2,792
Development and neurophysiology of mentalizing
Frith, U., & Frith, C. D. (2003) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2002.1218 · Cited by 2,306 · cited 2×
“Primitive forms of ToM emerge at around 18 months of age; an implicit understanding of mental states exists at 2 years of age (Frith & Frith, 2003).”
Functional imaging of ‘theory of mind’
Gallagher, H. L., & Frith, C. D. (2003) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(02)00025-6 · Cited by 2,092 · cited 1×
“ToM consists in attributing mental states such as goals, intentions, beliefs, desires, thoughts, and feelings to other social agents (Gallagher & Frith, 2003).”
Gallup, G. G. (1970) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.167.3914.86 · Cited by 1,794
Trapnell, P. D., & Campbell, J. D. (1999) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.76.2.284 · Cited by 1,646 · cited 1×
“In addition, in humans, self-awareness is made up of two tendencies (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999): self-reflection, which constitutes an authentic curiosity about the self, and self-rumination, which represents anxious attention paid to the self.”
Finding the self? An event-related fMRI study
Kelley, W. M., Macrae, C. N., Wyland, C. L., Caglar, S., Inati, S., & Heatherton, T. F. (2002) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/08989290260138672 · Cited by 1,606 · cited 2×
“In a standard ''personality trait'' experiment (e.g., Kelley et al., 2002), volunteers must decide if adjectives describe themselves (self condition) or a well-known person (other condition), or if adjectives are printed in capitals or lowercase letters (control condition).”
The functional neuroanatomy of autobiographical memory: a meta-analysis
Svoboda, E., McKinnon, M. C., & Levine, B. (2006) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.05.023 · Cited by 1,274 · cited 1×
“In contrast another meta-analysis of the functional neuroanatomy of autobiographical memory (Svoboda, McKinnon, & Levine, 2006 ) “… found a left -lateralised network, including select regions in the frontal, temporal and posterior cortices, as well as the cerebellum and a number of subcortical structures” (p.”
Milligan, K., Astington, J. W., & Dack, L. A. (2007) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01018.x · Cited by 1,248
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology
Rice, T. K., & Wallace, D. (2008) · Encyclopedia of Special Education · doi:10.1002/9780470373699.speced1159 · Cited by 1,174
"Theory of Mind" in Schizophrenia: A Review of the Literature
Brune, M. (2005) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/schbul/sbi002 · Cited by 1,044 · cited 1×
“ToM deficits are well documented in autism (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 2001) and schizophrenia (e.g., Brune, 2005); these deficits are increasingly being associated with brain dysfunction, most likely located in the more anterior region of the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (Amodio & Frith, 2006).”
Cited by
The nature of visual self-recognition
Suddendorf, T., & Butler, D. L. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.01.004 · Cited by 186
Evolution of consciousness: Phylogeny, ontogeny, and emergence from general anesthesia
Mashour, G. A., & Alkire, M. T. (2013) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1301188110 · Cited by 144
Mirror self-recognition and self-identification
Boyle, A. (2018) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.1111/phpr.12370 · Cited by 23
“Gallup has been extensively criticised for assuming that self-awareness is an all or nothing phenomenon, failing to consider alternative explanations, and not providing substantive arguments for his interpretation (see, for instance, Heyes, 1994; Mitchell, 1993, 1997; Morin, 2011; Savanah, 2013).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Morin, A.
- Venue
- Laterality
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2010-11-03
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 367-383
- ISSN
- 1357-650X (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0678
- OpenAlex
- W2085133085
- Cited by
- 52
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 3.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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