The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Pragmatic Aspects of the Base-rate Fallacy
Abstract
An investigation was made of the role played by verbal structure in the problems used to study the base-rate fallacy, which has traditionally been attributed to the role of heuristics (e.g. causality, specificity). It was hypothesized that elements of the verbal form of text problems led to a misunderstanding of the question or the specific information, rendering obscure the independence of the sets of data (specific information is obtained independently from the base rate). Nine texts were presented to various groups of subjects: four were taken from Tversky and Kahneman (1980) and used as controls; five were obtained by modifying the verbal form of the original in order to reveal or conceal the links between the sets of data. The percentage of base-rate fallacies was greatly reduced with texts in which the independence of the data was clear, regardless of the causality and specificity of the information they contained (which was not changed). This result suggests that there is a need to consider the rules of natural language in order to move towards a better understanding of observed phenomena.
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Cites
Weighted kappa: nominal scale agreement provision for scaled disagreement or partial credit
Cohen, J. (1968) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/h0026256 · Cited by 8,736
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
(1982) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477 · Cited by 8,240
On the psychology of prediction.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0034747 · Cited by 6,202
Evidential impact of base rates
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1982) · Judgment under Uncertainty · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477.011 · Cited by 591
Cited by
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
(2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098 · Cited by 2,192
Support theory: a nonextensional representation of subjective probability
Tversky, A., & Koehler, D. J. (1994) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.101.4.547 · Cited by 1,167
Metadata
- Authors
- Macchi, L.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1995-02
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 188-207
- ISSN
- 0272-4987 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0740
- OpenAlex
- W2223493367
- Cited by
- 158
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 12.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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