The Curious Incident of the Photo that was Accused of Being False: Issues of Domain Specificity in Development, Autism, and Brain Imaging
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We resume an exchange of ideas with Uta Frith that started before the turn of the century. The curious incident responsible for this exchange was the finding that children with autism fail tests of false belief, while they pass Zaitchik's (1990) photograph task (Leekam & Perner, 1991). This finding led to the conclusion that children with autism have a domain-specific impairment in Theory of Mind (mental representations), because the photograph task and the false-belief task are structurally equivalent except for the nonmental character of photographs. In this paper we argue that the false-belief task and the false-photograph task are not structurally equivalent and are not empirically associated. Instead a truly structurally equivalent task is the false-sign task. Performance on this task is strongly associated with the false-belief task. A version of this task, the misleading-signal task, also poses severe problems for children with autism (Bowler, Briskman, Gurvidi, & Fornells-Ambrojo, 2005). These new findings therefore challenge the earlier interpretation of a domain-specific difficulty in inferring mental states and suggest that children with autism also have difficulty understanding misleading nonmental objects. Brain imaging data using false-belief, “false”-photo, and false-sign scenarios provide further supporting evidence for our conclusions.
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Citations
Cites
Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind” ?
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Saxe, R., & Kanwisher, N. (2003) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/s1053-8119(03)00230-1 · Cited by 2,316 · cited 5×
“Rebecca Saxe and her colleagues have used the contrast between false-belief vignettes and photo vignettes for narrowing down the brain areas specifically involved in processing false beliefs ( Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Saxe & Powell, 2006; Saxe & Wexler, 2005).”
BackgroundInfluentialDevelopment and neurophysiology of mentalizing
Frith, U., & Frith, C. D. (2003) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2002.1218 · Cited by 2,306 · cited 4×
“In contrast, theory-of-mind studies that do not involve such a contrast (marked by circles W) tend to activate more ventrally in the area described by Chris Frith and Uta Frith (C. D. Frith & Frith, 1999; U. Frith & Frith, 2003 ) as the pSTS.”
BackgroundInfluentialInteracting Minds--A Biological Basis
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Uniquely human social cognition
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“For a similar argument that different brain regions can be identified for different functional allegiances, see also Saxe (2006) and Blakemore (2008 this issue).”
BackgroundIt's the Thought That Counts: Specific Brain Regions for One Component of Theory of Mind
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Cited by
Fractionating theory of mind: a meta-analysis of functional brain imaging studies
Schurz, M., Radua, J., Aichhorn, M., Richlan, F., & Perner, J. (2014) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.01.009 · Cited by 1,656
Self-citationThe social brain in psychiatric and neurological disorders
Kennedy, D. P., & Adolphs, R. (2012) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2012.09.006 · Cited by 791
Schurz, M., Radua, J., Tholen, M. G., Maliske, L., Margulies, D. S., Mars, R. B., Sallet, J., & Kanske, P. (2021) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/bul0000303 · Cited by 619
What is “theory of mind”? Concepts, cognitive processes and individual differences
Apperly, I. A. (2012) · Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1080/17470218.2012.676055 · Cited by 368
From infants’ to children's appreciation of belief
Perner, J., & Roessler, J. (2012) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2012.08.004 · Cited by 300
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Metadata
- Authors
- Perner, J., & Leekam, S.
- Venue
- Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2008-01
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 76-89
- ISSN
- 0033-555X (ISSN-L)
- 1747-0218
- 1747-0226
- OpenAlex
- W1980099067
- Cited by
- 111
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 12.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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