Concepts in context: Processing mental state concepts with internal or external focus involves different neural systems
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
According to embodied cognition theories, concepts are contextually situated and grounded in neural systems that produce experiential states. This view predicts that processing mental state concepts recruits neural regions associated with different aspects of experience depending on the context in which people understand a concept. This neuroimaging study tested this prediction using a set of sentences that described emotional (e.g., fear, joy) and nonemotional (e.g., thinking, hunger) mental states with internal focus (i.e., focusing on bodily sensations and introspection) or external focus (i.e., focusing on expression and action). Consistent with our predictions, data suggested that the inferior frontal gyrus, a region associated with action representation, was engaged more by external than internal sentences. By contrast, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, a region associated with the generation of internal states, was engaged more by internal emotion sentences than external sentence categories. Similar patterns emerged when we examined the relationship between neural activity and independent ratings of sentence focus. Furthermore, ratings of emotion were associated with activation in the medial prefrontal cortex, whereas ratings of activity were associated with activation in the inferior frontal gyrus. These results suggest that mental state concepts are represented in a dynamic way, using context-relevant interoceptive and sensorimotor resources.
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Citations
Cites
How do you feel — now? The anterior insula and human awareness
(Bud) Craig, A. D. (2009) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2555 · Cited by 6,657 · cited 3×
“…medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC)), because previous work has shown that these regions are associated with the generation of internal sensations (Craig, 2009; Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 2011; Medford & Critchley, 2010), self-reflection (Northoff et al., 2006;Wagner, Haxby, & Heatherton, 2012),…”
BackgroundResultEmotional processing in anterior cingulate and medial prefrontal cortex
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“Because the vmPFC plays an important role in the representation and the generation of internal states (Etkin et al., 2011; Medford & Critchley, 2010), this finding supports our prediction that representing internal aspects of mental state concepts involves internal simulation.”
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“One account of this process is forwarded by theories of embodied cognition (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2009; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005).”
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“Note, however, that this difference likely reflects a matter of degree and not a matter of neural separation (see also Barrett & Satpute, 2013; Pessoa, 2008).”
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Both of Us Disgusted in My Insula
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Cited by
The theory of constructed emotion: an active inference account of interoception and categorization
Barrett, L. F. (2016) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsw154 · Cited by 1,426
“…in rodents (Furlong et al., 2010; McNally et al., 2011; Li and McNally, 2014) Emotion concepts are embodied Human neuroimaging: task-related data (Oosterwijk et al., 2012, 2015) Multimodal summaries of emotion concepts are represented in the default mode network Human neuroimaging:…”
The theory of constructed emotion: an active inference account of interoception and categorization
Barrett, L. F. (2017) · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience · doi:10.1093/scan/nsx060 · Cited by 1,009
“…in rodents (Furlong et al., 2010; McNally et al., 2011; Li and McNally, 2014) Emotion concepts are embodied Human neuroimaging: task-related data (Oosterwijk et al., 2012, 2015) Multimodal summaries of emotion concepts are represented in the default mode network Human neuroimaging:…”
Bio-behavioral synchrony promotes the development of conceptualized emotions
Atzil, S., & Gendron, M. (2017) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.07.009 · Cited by 120
Gendron, M., Mesquita, B., & Barrett, L. F. (2020) · Culture, Mind, and Brain · doi:10.1017/9781108695374.010 · Cited by 20
Metadata
- Authors
- Oosterwijk, S., Mackey, S., Wilson-Mendenhall, C., Winkielman, P., & Paulus, M. P.
- Venue
- Social Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2015-03-09
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 294-307
- ISSN
- 1747-0919 (ISSN-L)
- 1747-0927
- OpenAlex
- W2033008398
- Cited by
- 57
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 6.78
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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