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How neuroscience will change our view on consciousness

Lamme, Victor A. F. · 2010 · Cognitive Neuroscience

Abstract

Is there consciousness in machines? Or in animals? What happens to consciousness when we are asleep, or in vegetative state? These are just a few examples of the many questions about consciousness that are troubling scientists and laypersons alike. Moreover, these questions share a striking feature: They seem to have been around forever, yet neither science nor philosophy has been able to provide an answer. Why is that? In my view, the main reason is that the study of consciousness is dominated by what we know from introspection and behavior. This has fooled us into thinking that we know what we are conscious of. The scientific equivalent of this is Global Workspace theory. But in fact we don't know what we are conscious of, as I will explain from a simple experiment in visual perception. Once we acknowledge that, it is clear that we need other evidence about the presence or absence of a conscious sensation than introspection or behavior. Assuming the brain has something to do with it, I will demonstrate how arguments from neuroscience, together with theoretical and ontological arguments, can help us resolve what the exact nature of our conscious sensation is. It turns out that we see much more than we think, and that Global Workspace theory is all about access but not about seeing. The exercise is an example of how neuroscience will move us away from psychological intuitions about consciousness, and hence depict a notion of consciousness that may go against our deepest conviction: "My consciousness is mine, and mine alone." It's not.

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Crossref · 10.1080/17588921003731586

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Citations

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Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. Camprodon J. A., Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
  2. Dennett D., 1988, Consciousness in modern science
  3. 10.1037/0096-1523.20.2.357 · DOI · Paper page
  4. Wolfe J. M., 1999, Fleeting memories

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Lamme, V. A. F.
Affiliations
University of Amsterdam (NL)
Corresponding author
Lamme, Victor A. F.
Venue
Cognitive Neuroscience
Published
2010-08-18
Volume
1
Issue
3
Pages
204-220
ISSN
  • 1758-8928 (ISSN-L)
  • 1758-8936
OpenAlex
W2080624414
Cited by
487
References
144
Citations by year
2026: 43 · 2025: 39 · 2024: 68 · 2023: 35 · 2022: 37 · 2021: 29 · 2020: 35 · 2019: 16 · 2018: 36 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 24 · 2015: 20 · 2014: 29 · 2013: 21 · 2012: 18
FWCI
22.61
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Cognitive Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (publishedVersion)
  • UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
consciousness, global workspace theory, self-reflection, visual perception, access consciousness, artificial consciousness, animal consciousness, sleep, vegetative state, ontology of consciousness

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: How neuroscience will change our view on consciousness. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/17588921003731586
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Lamme, V. A. F. (2010). How neuroscience will change our view on consciousness. Cognitive Neuroscience. https://doi.org/10.1080/17588921003731586

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