The DOI matches its Crossref record; 144 of the 144 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How neuroscience will change our view on consciousness
Abstract
Is there consciousness in machines? Or in animals? What happens to consciousness when we are asleep, or in vegetative state? These are just a few examples of the many questions about consciousness that are troubling scientists and laypersons alike. Moreover, these questions share a striking feature: They seem to have been around forever, yet neither science nor philosophy has been able to provide an answer. Why is that? In my view, the main reason is that the study of consciousness is dominated by what we know from introspection and behavior. This has fooled us into thinking that we know what we are conscious of. The scientific equivalent of this is Global Workspace theory. But in fact we don't know what we are conscious of, as I will explain from a simple experiment in visual perception. Once we acknowledge that, it is clear that we need other evidence about the presence or absence of a conscious sensation than introspection or behavior. Assuming the brain has something to do with it, I will demonstrate how arguments from neuroscience, together with theoretical and ontological arguments, can help us resolve what the exact nature of our conscious sensation is. It turns out that we see much more than we think, and that Global Workspace theory is all about access but not about seeing. The exercise is an example of how neuroscience will move us away from psychological intuitions about consciousness, and hence depict a notion of consciousness that may go against our deepest conviction: "My consciousness is mine, and mine alone." It's not.
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In the citing paper
“However, there is strong evidence that consciousness can be dissociated from a variety of cognitive functions [22].”
From Dissociating Artificial Intelligence from Artificial Consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [22]
In the citing paper
“Consequently, at present, examples of theories that arguably meet the two criteria include recurrent processing theory (RPT) [ 24 -26], GWT [ 22,23,27,28], higher-order theories (HOT) [ 29 -31], and attention schema theory (AST) [ 32,33].”
From Identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems (2026) · cites this paper as [25]
In the citing paper
“Wakefulness, instead, is likely to be interrupted by sensory inputs, behavioral requirements, or “reset” signals147.”
From Consciousness and sleep (2024) · cites this paper as [147]
Citations
Cites
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“Attentional selection (in one way or another; Egeth & Yantis, 1997) may resolve this competition (Desimone, 1998; Desimone & Duncan, 1995).”
Journal of Consciousness Studies
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“We know that grouping and binding exist in working memory, and there is a strong tendency to believe they depend on attention (Luck & Vogel, 1997 ; Treisman, 1996 ).”
The information available in brief visual presentations
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“Instead of asking subjects what they saw, Sperling (1960) used a cue to point at the location of items that had to be reported.”
Distributed and overlapping representations of faces and objects in ventral temporal cortex
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“This aspect of seeing the face is not captured by the feedforward activation of the face selective cell, but may be perfectly accounted for by recurrent interactions between face selective neurons and neurons that encode shape, color, etc. (Haxby et al., 2001).”
Deciding advantageously before knowing the advantageous strategy
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, D., & Damasio, A. R. (1997) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.275.5304.1293 · Cited by 3,547 · cited 1×
“…4 not only dissociates consciousness from attention and cognitive control, but may also explain why we can both consciously and unconsciously categorize stimuli (Reder, Park, & Kieffaber, 2009), or even perform unconscious reasoning and inference (Bechara et al., 1997; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006).”
Dynamic predictions: Oscillations and synchrony in top–down processing
Engel, A. K., Fries, P., & Singer, W. (2001) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/35094565 · Cited by 3,454 · cited 1×
“The role of neural synchrony, whether of an oscillatory nature or not, is still controversial, but much evidence supports the idea that synchronous firing is important for feature binding and conscious perception (Engel, Fries, & Singer, 2001 ; Engel & Singer, 2001 ; Singer, 1999 ; Uhlhaas et al, 2009 ).”
A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness
O'Regan, J. K., & Noë, A. (2001) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x01000115 · Cited by 3,126 · cited 2×
“We may think we see a full and detailed image of what is in front of our eyes, but we take in only a small subset of the information (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; O’Regan & Noe, 2001).”
The role of the medial frontal cortex in cognitive control
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Neuronal Synchrony: A Versatile Code for the Definition of Relations?
Singer, W. (1999) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/s0896-6273(00)80821-1 · Cited by 2,581 · cited 3×
“In a conscious percept, the loose set of elements that make up a scene are typically grouped into coherent surfaces and objects (Nakayama & Shimojo, 1992; Serences & Yantis, 2006; Singer, 1999).”
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Cited by
Integrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate
Tononi, G., Boly, M., Massimini, M., & Koch, C. (2016) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn.2016.44 · Cited by 1,727
Conscious Processing and the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis
Mashour, G. A., Roelfsema, P., Changeux, J.-P., & Dehaene, S. (2020) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2020.01.026 · Cited by 1,164
“The RPT of consciousness (Lamme, 2006, 2010) also shares with the GNW the postulate that, given a hierarchically ordered neurocognitive architecture, feedforward processing is not sufficient for conscious processing, whereas feedback from higher-order to lower-order areas is critical.”
BackgroundSeth, A. K., & Bayne, T. (2022) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4 · Cited by 880
Understanding the Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness
Brown, R., Lau, H., & LeDoux, J. E. (2019) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2019.06.009 · Cited by 573
“First-order local recurrency view [1,6,78,87] No No No No No Minimal”
BackgroundNo-Report Paradigms: Extracting the True Neural Correlates of Consciousness
Tsuchiya, N., Wilke, M., Frässle, S., & Lamme, V. A. F. (2015) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.10.002 · Cited by 551
“Lamme (2010) How neuroscience will change our view on consciousness.”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Lamme, V. A. F.
- Affiliations
- University of Amsterdam (NL)
- Corresponding author
- Lamme, Victor A. F.
- ORCID
- Lamme, Victor A. F.
- Venue
- Cognitive Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2010-08-18
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 204-220
- ISSN
- 1758-8928 (ISSN-L)
- 1758-8936
- OpenAlex
- W2080624414
- Cited by
- 487
- References
- 144
- Citations by year
- 2026: 43 · 2025: 39 · 2024: 68 · 2023: 35 · 2022: 37 · 2021: 29 · 2020: 35 · 2019: 16 · 2018: 36 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 24 · 2015: 20 · 2014: 29 · 2013: 21 · 2012: 18
- FWCI
- 22.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cognitive Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (publishedVersion)
- UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- consciousness, global workspace theory, self-reflection, visual perception, access consciousness, artificial consciousness, animal consciousness, sleep, vegetative state, ontology of consciousness
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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