Conscious Processing and the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis
Open accessAbstract
We review the central tenets and neuroanatomical basis of the global neuronal workspace (GNW) hypothesis, which attempts to account for the main scientific observations regarding the elementary mechanisms of conscious processing in the human brain. The GNW proposes that, in the conscious state, a non-linear network ignition associated with recurrent processing amplifies and sustains a neural representation, allowing the corresponding information to be globally accessed by local processors. We examine the GNW hypothesis in light of recent data that contrast brain activity evoked by either conscious or nonconscious contents, as well as during conscious or non-conscious states, particularly general anesthesia. We also discuss the relationship between the intertwined concepts of conscious processing, attention, and working memory.
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TL;DR
This review presents the global neuronal workspace hypothesis, arguing that conscious access arises when information triggers non-linear ignition and recurrent broadcasting across distributed cortical networks. It surveys supporting evidence from simulations, electrophysiology, imaging, anesthesia, disorders of consciousness, sleep, and development, while noting unresolved debates and comparisons with other theories.
Key findings
- The GNW proposes that conscious access depends on sudden ignition of workspace neurons, with recurrent loops amplifying and sustaining representations for global access; prefrontal and parietal hubs are important but not the exclusive site of conscious access.
- Empirical work reports a late divergence around 200–300 ms after stimulus onset between consciously perceived and unperceived trials, often linked to the P300/late-positive component, while early sensory processing can persist without awareness. Studies across visual, auditory, and tactile modalities, plus no-report monkey prefrontal recordings, support ignition; weak stimuli may fail at V1-to-V4 or V4-to-prefrontal stages.
- Anesthesia, disorders of consciousness, and sleep are associated with disrupted long-range frontoparietal connectivity, reduced dynamic repertoire, and loss of late ignition/P3, while short-latency processing can remain. Thalamic or prefrontal stimulation may restore aspects of consciousness in some cases.
- Attention and working memory overlap with GNW functions; conscious working memory is proposed to involve globally distributed persistent firing, whereas activity-silent or local memories remain unconscious until reinstated. Comparisons with IIT, RPT, and HOT note shared and divergent claims.
Methods
- Narrative review of the GNW’s central tenets, neuroanatomical basis, simulations, and empirical evidence; no new primary data are reported.
- Synthesizes computational models (Stroop, masking/inattention, macaque connectome, laminar connectivity) and human/nonhuman studies using EEG/MEG/fMRI, intracranial recordings, anesthesia, lesions, sleep, and development.
- Main analysis is conceptual integration and comparison with other theories, including discussion of causal interventions and future directions.
Limitations
- Stated: unresolved controversy over whether the P300/late positive or earlier N2/VAN indexes awareness versus post-perceptual processes; no-report paradigms have not resolved this.
- Stated: difficulty experimentally adjudicating among GNW, IIT, RPT, and HOT because of shared predictions and coarse tools; many findings are correlational, causal evidence is limited, and lesion heterogeneity plus possible covert consciousness complicate inferences from disorders of consciousness.
- Evident: as a review, it is selective and narrative rather than systematic, and some claims about development, self-consciousness, and working memory are presented as hypotheses or untested.
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Cites
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Claims the paper makes
120 of 228 cited sources checked · 59 supported · 3 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Noel et al. (2018) found that sudden late ignition was the only clear signature common to auditory, visual, and audiovisual conditions in human EEG.
“They found that sudden late ignition was the only clear signature common to all three conditions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Noel et al., 2018 source
- Premisecitation
Tracer studies in non-human primates show that these areas are connected as a high-efficiency cortical core with high-density connectivity.
“Recent tracer studies in non-human primates indicate that these areas indeed connect together as a “high-efficiency cortical core” with high-density connectivity (Markov et al., 2013) (Figure 1C).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Markov et al., 2013 source
- Premisecitation
The GNW activates non-linearly in an event called ignition, marked by sudden, coherent, exclusive activation of a subset of workspace neurons coding the current conscious content while the rest are inhibited.
“Ignition is characterized by the sudden, coherent, and exclusive activation of a subset of workspace neurons coding for the current conscious content, with the remainder of the workspace neurons being inhibited.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Dehaene et al., 2003 source
- Premisecitation
Recent evidence in rodents shows that persistence of neuronal firing rates for working memory storage is not purely cortical but relies on interactions with subcortical structures including thalamus and cerebellar nuclei.
“Recent evidence in rodents demonstrated that the persistence of neuronal firing rates for working memory storage is not a purely cortical phenomenon but instead relies on the interactions with subcortical structures, including the thalamus (Guo et al., 2017) and cerebellar nuclei (Gao et al., 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 2 sources checked - Interpretationcitation
The widespread presence of working-memory effects is important for the large diversity of contents that can enter working memory.
“Its widespread presence is important for the large diversity of contents that can enter into working memory (Christophel et al., 2017).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Christophel et al., 2017 source
- Premisecitation
Working memory effects on neuronal firing rates occur in many cortical areas, from primary sensory cortices coding elementary sensory features to frontal cortex coding abstract aspects, object categories, motor intentions, and task instructions.
“The effects of working memory on neuronal firing rates occur in many cortical areas (Christophel et al., 2017), ranging from primary sensory cortices that code for the memories of elementary sensory features”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Christophel et al., 2017 source
- Premisecitation
GNW models share many features with models for attention and working memory, which also require interactions between neurons in widespread networks.
“Indeed, GNW models (Dehaene et al., 2003) share many features with models for attention and working memory (Hamker, 2005), which also require interactions between neurons in widespread networks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked - Premisecitation
In studies instructing subjects to attend to a location and presenting consciously perceived or subliminal stimuli, neuronal correlates of attention and conscious perception differed when assessed with fMRI or MEG.
“In these studies, the neuronal correlates of attention and conscious perception differed if assessed with fMRI (Watanabe et al., 2011) or MEG (Wyart et al., 2012; Wyart and Tallon-Baudry, 2008).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 3 sources checked - Interpretationreasoning
The subcortical findings support the involvement of deep cortical layer neurons in the global neuronal workspace.
“provide support for the involvement of neurons in the deep cortical layers in the GNW as hypothesized in the original GNW paper (Dehaene et al., 1998).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Dehaene et al., 1998 source
The Theoretical Premises describe layer 5 neurons as part of reciprocal connections that help stabilize workspace activity, supporting a role for deep-layer neurons. But the paper places the long-range connectivity defining workspace neurons primarily in layers 2 and 3; it does not identify deep-layer neurons themselves as the principal workspace population. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Persistent-activity reverberatory loops involve not only corticocortical connections but also subcortical regions, especially the thalamus and cerebellar nuclei.
“recent experimental evidence indicates that the reverberatory loops for persistent neuronal activity not only involve corticocortical interactions but also loop through subcortical regions with an important role for the thalamus and cerebellar nuclei (Gao et al., 2018; Guo et al., 2017).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 2 sources checked- cites Gao et al., 2018 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
- cites Guo et al., 2017 source
The Discussion and Abstract support a role for a recurrent cortex–thalamus loop in maintaining persistent activity. The Discussion also identifies input from deep cerebellar nuclei to the thalamus, but says the roles of those more complex loops remain unresolved; it does not establish an important role for cerebellar nuclei in maintaining persistent activity. The supplied passages have no page numbers. (LLM, conf=0.88)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Medial temporal neurons code for associations, i.e., transitions between specific working memories.
“Medial temporal neurons code for associations, i.e., the transitions between specific working memories (Ison et al., 2015; Sakai and Miyashita, 1991).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Ison et al., 2015 source
The Abstract reports that human medial temporal lobe neurons became selective for newly learned associations between specific person and place pictures. The paper frames this as episodic-memory formation; it does not establish that the associations are transitions between specific working memories (Abstract; Discussion, page unavailable). (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Sakai and Miyashita, 1991 source
- Interpretationcitation
Attended memory items can activate subsequent memory states to retrieve an association or as part of a cognitive routine, such as when a mental image is transformed during mental rotation.
“Attended memory items csan activate subsequent memory states in order to retrieve an association or as part of a cognitive routine when, for example, a mental image is transformed during mental rotation (genuinely meriting the name “working” memory) (Zylberberg et al., 2011).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Zylberberg et al., 2011 source
The ‘Single decision making by evidence accumulation’ section says stored information is used by subsequent operations, and the Opinion section describes a remembered color guiding the next step of a visual routine. These passages support sequential use of working-memory contents, but our copy does not describe retrieving an association or transforming a mental image during mental rotation. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Just across the threshold of lost responsiveness, there can still be fragments of experience or disconnected states of conscious processing.
“On the other end of the spectrum, just across the threshold of lost responsiveness (Sanders et al., 2012), there can still be fragments of experience or disconnected states of conscious processing (Huang et al., 2018b; Ní Mhuircheartaigh et al., 2013).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
Interactions between these brain structures enable distinct attractor states for maintaining different items in memory.
“The interactions between these brain structures enable distinct attractor states for the maintenance of different items in memory (Inagaki et al., 2019).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Inagaki et al., 2019 source
The Abstract (p. 2) links discrete activity endpoints to two movement directions in a mouse short-term-memory task. The Discussion (p. 11) proposes that attractor dynamics arise within an ALM–thalamus loop, but does not establish that interactions between the structures enable states for maintaining different items in memory generally. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Simulations indicate that spontaneous activity patterns already present during anesthesia may undergo a sudden phase transition toward a vastly more diverse and dynamic repertoire of states in the awake state.
“Simulations indicate that the spontaneous activity patterns already present during anesthesia may undergo a sudden phase transition toward a vastly more diverse and dynamic repertoire of states in the awake state (Hansen et al., 2015).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Hansen et al., 2015 source
The Discussion reports that a small model change enabled a richer repertoire of dynamical modes and switching between functional-connectivity states. The paper does not establish that patterns present during anesthesia undergo a sudden phase transition into a more diverse awake-state repertoire; its simulations concern resting-state connectivity, not an anesthesia-to-wake comparison. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
The relation between persistent firing, ignition, and conscious awareness is supported by a study in which consciously reportable masked visual stimuli elicited concept cell responses in medial temporal lobe, whereas subliminal stimuli did not.
“The relation between persistent firing, ignition, and conscious awareness is supported by a study that measured the activation of concept cells in the medial temporal lobe during shortly presented visual stimuli that were followed by a mask (Quiroga et al., 2008). Stimuli that could be consciously reported elicited a response from concept cells, whereas stimuli that remained subliminal did not.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Quiroga et al., 2008 source
Split into 2 atoms — 1 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
The finding that anesthetics affect feedback connectivity has been replicated across species, from monkey to ferret, rodent, and Drosophila.
“In addition to human investigations, this finding has been replicated across species, from monkey (Papadopoulou et al., 2019) to ferret (Wollstadt et al., 2017), rodent (Imas et al., 2005), and Drosophila (in which a higher-order nucleus was the source of feedback) (Cohen et al., 2018).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
Some accessory memory items outside the focus of attention are also coded with persistent activity in medial temporal lobe and prefrontal cortex.
“Some of these accessory memory items are also coded with persistent activity in the medial temporal lobe (Kornblith et al., 2017) and prefrontal cortex (Warden and Miller, 2010).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 2 sources checked- cites Kornblith et al., 2017 source
- cites Warden and Miller, 2010 source
The Results (‘Proportion of object selectivity in different tasks’; page unavailable) report that some prefrontal neurons encoded both objects during a two-object memory delay, supporting persistent coding of multiple items in prefrontal cortex. The paper does not establish that either item was outside the focus of attention or was an accessory item. The medial-temporal-lobe portion of the citing sentence is attributed to a different citation, not to Warden and Miller. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Frontal-parietal networks are metabolically depressed, disrupted, or functionally disconnected by all major classes of general anesthetics.
“Frontal-parietal networks are of particular importance in this regard and have been found to be metabolically depressed, disrupted, or functionally disconnected by all major classes of general anesthetics (Hudetz and Mashour, 2016).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Hudetz and Mashour, 2016 source
- Premisecitation
Routine administration of general anesthesia for surgery is associated with dream states and other disconnected states of conscious processing.
“Indeed, even the routine administration of general anesthesia for surgery is associated with dream states and other disconnected states of conscious processing (Leslie et al., 2007; Sanders et al., 2016).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked - Interpretationcitation
Working memory items outside the focus of attention are coded by weaker persistent firing within local processors or by activity-silent synaptic mechanisms.
“Working memory items that fall outside the focus of attention are coded by weaker persistent firing within local processors or by activity-silent synaptic mechanisms (Trübutschek et al., 2017).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Trübutschek et al., 2017 source
The Discussion section, ‘A theoretical framework for “activity-silent” working memory’ (page not provided), proposes maintenance through short-term changes in synaptic weights, supporting the activity-silent alternative. It does not characterize the items as outside the focus of attention or support weaker persistent firing within local processors; instead, it reports that target-related activity was not continuously sustained. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Several lines of evidence suggest that anesthetics preferentially affect feedback connectivity originating in frontal cortex, as predicted by GNW theory.
“Several lines of evidence also suggest that anesthetics preferentially affect feedback connectivity originating in the frontal cortex, as might be predicted by the GNW theory (Lee et al., 2013; Moon et al., 2015).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 2 sources checked - Premisecitation
Recent work in non-human primates demonstrates that functional relationships between critical GNW nodes-prefrontal, posterior parietal, and cingulate cortices-are stereotypically altered during propofol, sevoflurane, and ketamine anesthesia.
“Recent work in non-human primates demonstrates that the functional relationships between critical nodes in the GNW—such as prefrontal, posterior parietal, and cingulate cortices—are stereotypically altered during propofol, sevoflurane, and ketamine anesthesia (Barttfeld et al., 2015; Uhrig et al., 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 2 sources checked- cites Barttfeld et al., 2015 source
The Results (page unavailable) report altered functional correlations in macaques under propofol sedation, including connections involving prefrontal and cingulate regions. The Propofol Anesthesia methods (page unavailable) describe only propofol conditions; this source does not establish the claimed alterations during sevoflurane or ketamine anesthesia. The other citation in the sentence is not assessed here. (LLM, conf=0.89)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Uhrig et al., 2018 source
- Premisecitation
Basic science studies of neural spike activity focusing on visual-evoked potentials confirmed the preferential susceptibility of long-latency potentials to anesthesia.
“This has been explicitly confirmed in more detailed basic science studies of neural spike activity, with a specific focus on visual-evoked potentials (Hudetz et al., 2009).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Hudetz et al., 2009 source
The Discussion (Mechanism anesthesia) reports that desflurane attenuated the long-latency neuronal response to flash while initial visual-cortex reactivity persisted. But the Discussion (Early response to flash) distinguishes the study’s intracortical unit recordings from visual-evoked potentials; the study does not establish preferential suppression of the potentials themselves. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Reversal of anesthesia by pharmacological cortical stimulation does not restore electroencephalographic measures of functional connectivity.
“Of note, reversal of anesthesia by pharmacological stimulation of the cortex does not restore electroencephalographic measures of functional connectivity (Pal et al., 2019), which may relate to site of stimulation or technique of neural recording.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Pal et al., 2019 source
- Premisecitation
A reduction in the length and complexity of response to stimulation distinguished vegetative state patients from minimally conscious state patients or healthy controls.
“One key study demonstrated a reduction in the length and complexity of response to stimulation that distinguished patients with a diagnosis of vegetative state from those in a minimally conscious state or healthy controls (Casali et al., 2013).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Casali et al., 2013 source
The section ‘PCI discriminates the level of consciousness in brain-injured patients’ reports significantly lower complexity-index values in vegetative-state patients than in minimally conscious patients; the Discussion also compares those values with healthy awake subjects. Our copy does not report that the duration or length of the stimulation response itself distinguished the patient groups. Its description of a ‘short-lasting response’ concerns healthy subjects during NREM sleep, not vegetative-state patients. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Higher-order theories generally posit a central role for the prefrontal cortex in consciousness.
“Higher-order theories (HOTs) (Lau and Rosenthal, 2011) are similar to the GNW in that they generally posit a central role for the prefrontal cortex in consciousness (Brown et al., 2019).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked - Premisecitation
The reduction identified by the perturbational complexity index was consistent across pathologic unconsciousness, sleep, and general anesthesia.
“Remarkably, this reduction, identified by the perturbational complexity index, was consistent across pathologic unconsciousness, sleep, and general anesthesia.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Casali et al., 2013 source
- Premisecitation
Approximations of Φ show an inverse correlation with global modularity during depressed levels of consciousness, consistent with GNW.
“Indeed, approximations of Φ show an inverse correlation with global modularity during depressed levels of consciousness (Kim et al., 2018), which is also consistent with the GNW hypothesis.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Kim et al., 2018 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Recent animal studies demonstrate reversal of the anesthetized state with central thalamus stimulation, leading to return of functional corticocortical connectivity.
“This is consistent with recent animal studies demonstrating the reversal of the anesthetized state with stimulation of the central thalamus (Donoghue et al., 2019; Redinbaugh et al., 2020), leading to a return of functional corticocortical connectivity.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 2 sources checked- cites Donoghue et al., 2019 source
The paper reports that central-thalamus stimulation produced behavioral and cortical signs of wakefulness in propofol-anesthetized non-human primates (stimulation findings, Fig. 4). It also analyzes corticocortical coherence in awake versus unconscious states (Fig. 3), but our copy does not show that corticocortical connectivity returned during stimulation. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Redinbaugh et al., 2020 source
- Premisecitation
Work in mice shows that nicotinic cholinergic receptors in the prefrontal cortex regulate ultraslow fluctuations across consciousness and anesthesia.
“This finding complements work in mice showing that nicotinic cholinergic receptors in the prefrontal cortex regulate ultraslow fluctuations across consciousness and anesthesia (Koukouli et al., 2016).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Koukouli et al., 2016 source
- Premisecitation
Long-range functional connectivity in networks supporting GNW is consistently depressed during deep anesthesia and pathologic states of unconsciousness.
“Recent fMRI data also suggest that long-range functional connectivity in networks supporting the GNW is consistently depressed during deep anesthesia and pathologic states of unconsciousness (Demertzi et al., 2019; Huang et al., 2018a).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Demertzi et al., 2019 source
The Introduction (page unavailable) reports disrupted long-range cortical correlations during anesthesia and relates widespread brain interactions to Global Neuronal Workspace theory. The Results (page unavailable, Fig. 3) report that complex coordination became uniformly less prevalent under propofol anesthesia and that low coordination was more prevalent in unresponsive patients. The paper does not specifically identify or measure connectivity within networks supporting the GNW, so that network-specific part of the claim is not established. (LLM, conf=0.83)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Huang et al., 2018a
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
In rats anesthetized with sevoflurane, cholinergic manipulation of the medial prefrontal cortex, but not two posterior parietal cortex areas, restored wakefulness despite continuous anesthetic.
“In rats anesthetized with clinically relevant concentrations of sevoflurane anesthesia, cholinergic manipulation of the medial prefrontal cortex—but not two areas of the posterior parietal cortex—was sufficient to restore wakefulness despite continuous administration of the general anesthetic (Pal et al., 2018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Pal et al., 2018 source
The Results report that carbachol stimulation of prefrontal prelimbic cortex produced wake-like behavior during continuous, clinically relevant sevoflurane exposure, whereas stimulation of the two tested parietal regions did not. But the parietal Results section identifies those regions as the posterior parietal cortex and the medial parietal association cortex—not two areas of the posterior parietal cortex. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
In agreement with GNW, the first approximately 200 ms of sensory processing are largely preserved, though weakened, during stage 1 and stage 2 sleep.
“In agreement with the GNW hypothesis, the first ∼200 ms of sensory processing have been found to be largely preserved, though weakened, during stage 1 and stage 2 sleep.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Strauss et al., 2015 source
- Interpretationcitation
Because GNW relies on highly distributed neurons, focal lesions are unlikely to cause complete loss of consciousness similar to coma or anesthesia, except in severe bilateral damage.
“Because the GNW relies on a highly distributed set of neurons, focal lesions are unlikely to lead to a complete loss of consciousness similar to coma or anesthesia, except the most severe cases of bilateral damage (for discussion, see Odegaard et al., 2017).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Odegaard et al., 2017 source
The section on how PFC lesions affect subjective perception (page unavailable) says PFC neuronal coding is distributed and that disrupting perceptual experience may require damage across large regions. The Abstract (page unavailable) reports that near-complete bilateral PFC lesions can abolish normal conscious interaction. The paper does not equate that condition with coma or anesthesia, or explicitly make the claim about the GNW as a whole. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Reductions of low-frequency activity in the posterior hot zone were associated with dreaming during REM and non-REM sleep.
“Recent data suggest that reductions of low-frequency activity in posterior confluence of the sensory and association cortex (the so-called “hot zone” of consciousness) were associated with dreaming during rapid-eye-movement (REM) sleep and non-REM sleep (Siclari et al., 2017).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Siclari et al., 2017 source
- Premisecitation
Lucid dreaming is associated with further increased gamma activity and coherence in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex relative to REM sleep, approaching waking levels.
“Lucid dreaming is associated with further increased gamma activity and coherence in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex relative to REM sleep, approaching levels consistent with waking (Voss et al., 2009).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Voss et al., 2009 source
The Abstract reports higher-than-REM gamma activity in lucid dreaming, strongest in frontal and frontolateral regions, and overall coherence similar to waking and higher than REM. But the regional differences section says the EEG data cannot test whether the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is reactivated, and it does not establish a gamma-specific coherence increase there. (LLM, conf=0.91)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
Transcranial direct current stimulation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is associated with enhanced lucidity during REM sleep.
“Another study showed that transcranial direct current stimulation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is associated with enhanced lucidity during REM sleep (analogous to the above-cited studies of minimal conscious access (Stumbrys et al., 2013).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Stumbrys et al., 2013 source
The Abstract and §3.2 report higher self-rated dream lucidity after DLPFC tDCS during REM sleep. But the Abstract describes the effect as weak, and the post-hoc analysis (§3.3) found increased lucidity only among frequent lucid dreamers; the citing sentence omits that limitation. (LLM, conf=0.88)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
In all age groups, event-related potentials revealed a late non-linear slow wave shifting from weak and delayed in 5-month-olds (around 900 ms) to more sustained and faster in older infants (around 750 ms versus approximately 300 ms in adults).
“In all age groups, event-related potentials revealed a late non-linear slow wave that shifted from a weak and delayed response in 5-month-olds (starting around 900 ms) to a more sustained and faster response in older infants (around 750 ms as compared to ∼300 ms in adults) (Kouider et al., 2013).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Kouider et al., 2013 source
- Premisecitation
Direct empirical tests of GNW against other theories of consciousness using the same dataset are emerging.
“Furthermore, direct empirical tests of the GNW to other theories of consciousness using the same dataset are emerging (e.g., Noel et al., 2019).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Noel et al., 2019 source
- Premisecitation
Only limited self-representation abilities are found in non-human primates, such as a rudimentary capacity for mirror self-recognition.
“Correspondingly, only limited self-representation abilities are found in non-human primates, such as a rudimentary capacity to acquire mirror self-recognition (Chang et al., 2017; Mashour and Alkire, 2013b).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Chang et al., 2017 source
The Abstract reports that rhesus monkeys acquired mirror self-recognition after training, supporting the example of a capacity to acquire it. The Significance section also says that bodily self-consciousness may be more widespread than previously thought; it does not characterize non-human primates’ self-representation abilities generally as limited or their acquired mirror self-recognition as rudimentary. No page numbers are available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.83)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Mashour and Alkire, 2013b
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
Self-referential processing primarily involves a paralimbic network of medial prefrontal/anterior cingulate and medial parietal/posterior cingulate cortices, as well as the lateral temporoparietal junction.
“It primarily involves the mobilization of a paralimbic network of medial prefrontal cortex/anterior cingulate and medial parietal/posterior cingulate cortices (see Rømer Thomsen et al., 2013 and Tang et al., 2016), as well as the lateral temporoparietal junction (Kelly et al., 2014; Vogeley et al., 2001).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
A core set of brain areas involved in self-referential processing has been identified through neuroimaging studies using various modalities.
“A core set of brain areas involved in self-referential processing has been identified through neuroimaging studies using various modalities (Lou et al., 2017; Posner et al., 2007).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 2 sources checked- cites Lou et al., 2017 source
- cites Posner et al., 2007 source
The Abstract and ‘Self-Regulation and the ACC’ section describe imaging evidence linking the anterior cingulate to self-regulation and report its activation during theory-of-mind tasks. They do not identify a core set of areas for self-referential processing or establish that such a set was found using various neuroimaging modalities. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.78)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisecitation
An electrophysiological signature of conscious processing homologous to adult ignition was recorded in 5-, 12-, and 15-month-old babies using a masked-faces paradigm.
“An electrophysiological signature of conscious processing—homologous to ignition in adults—was recorded in 5-, 12-, and 15-month-old human babies using a masked-faces paradigm.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Kouider et al., 2013 source
- Premisecitation
Properties of conscious processing emerge progressively during fetal and postnatal life rather than all at once.
“All of the properties of conscious processing that were detailed above do not appear all at once but emerge progressively during fetal and postnatal life, which is why it appears useful to distinguish a few nested levels with the development of the human brain, behavior, and consciousness (Barresi and Moore, 1996; Casey et al., 2005; Changeux, 2006; Dehaene-Lambertz and Spelke, 2015; Dehaene and C”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 3 sources checked - Interpretationcitation
The brain connectome becomes progressively integrated within a constantly evolving GNW architecture.
“In other words, the brain connectome becomes progressively integrated within a constantly evolving GNW architecture (Changeux, 2017; Collin and van den Heuvel, 2013).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Changeux, 2017 source
The Global Neuronal Workspace section (p. 10) describes long-range connections established before and after birth that constitute the GNW, with further myelination at successive postnatal stages. This supports progressive development of an integrated network, but the paper does not establish that the entire connectome is integrated within a GNW architecture that is constantly evolving; it presents the GNW as a model. (LLM, conf=0.81)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Collin and van den Heuvel, 2013 source
- Interpretationcitation
Recent work in healthy humans supports the hypothesis that visual consciousness is mediated in higher-order brain areas anterior to the visual cortex.
“Recent work in healthy humans supports the hypothesis that visual consciousness is mediated in higher-order brain areas that are anterior to the visual cortex (e.g., Liu et al., 2019).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Liu et al., 2019 source
- Interpretationcitation
Conscious access is not exclusively a cortical phenomenon.
“These recent findings imply that conscious access is not a purely cortical phenomenon”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
The global neuronal workspace implements a process for broadcasting information to make it available to distributed cortical processors.
“The GNW implements a process for broadcasting information in order to make it available to distributed cortical processors (Figure 3).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Attention establishes relationships between features represented in different brain areas and binds them into coherent representations.
“An important role of attention is to establish relationships between features represented in different brain areas and bind them into coherent representations (Treisman and Gelade, 1980).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Treisman and Gelade, 1980 source
- Interpretationnone given
Interactions between cortical processors occur long after a sensory stimulus is gone to enable mental operations in working memory.
“Interactions between cortical processors also take place long after a sensory stimulus is gone in order to enable mental operations in working memory.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The flow of information across distributed processors has many commonalities with attention and working memory.
“The flow of information across distributed processors has many commonalities with two interrelated cognitive functions that are central topics in neuroscience and psychology: attention and working memory.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationnone given
Recurrent loops can sustain a signal, allowing it to be maintained in working memory.
“Second, recurrent loops can sustain a signal, e.g., such that it could be maintained in working memory.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
SDT and GNW are not independent theories; the psychological constructs of SDT map onto specific pre-stimulus and post-stimulus states of GNW neuronal activity.
“Thus, the SDT and GNW are not independent theories. Rather, the psychological constructs of SDT map onto specific pre-stimulus and post-stimulus states of GNW neuronal activity.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
In the visual modality, spread of enhanced neuronal activity through corticocortical connections enables binding operations that establish relations between visual features.
“In the visual modality, the spread of enhanced neuronal activity through the network of corticocortical connections enables binding operations, which establish the relations between visual features.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationnone given
Recurrent connections can amplify a signal through recurrent excitation, making it available to other cortical processors.
“First, recurrent connections can help amplify a signal through recurrent excitation, thereby making it available for other cortical processors.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Failures of figure-ground perception are associated with a lack of recurrent interactions between V1 and higher brain regions.
“In contrast, the delayed figural response enhancement was absent on missed trials, implying that failures of figure-ground perception are associated with a lack of recurrent interactions between V1 and higher brain regions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Attention is object based: selection of one feature of a perceptual object in one brain region causes co-selection of other features of the same object in different brain regions.
“Attention is object based, which means that the attentional selection of one feature of a perceptual object, represented in one brain region, causes the co-selection of other features of the same object, represented in different brain regions (Duncan et al., 1997; O’Craven et al., 1999; Reynolds and Chelazzi, 2004; Roelfsema, 2006; Roelfsema and Houtkamp, 2011; Zylberberg et al., 2011).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
Persistent neuronal activity allows the nervous system to bridge the time between sensory stimuli, task instructions, and actions that need to take place later.
“Persistent neuronal activity allows the nervous system to bridge the time between sensory stimuli, task instructions, and actions that need to take place at a later point in time (Fuster, 1997).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Fuster, 1997 source
- Interpretationcitation
For tasks requiring fine-grained visual information processing, conscious perception may critically depend on recurrent loops involving V1.
“However, the situation may differ for tasks that rely on fine-grained visual information processing and that may critically depend on recurrent loops involving V1.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
In determining a shape at a cued location, activity spreads in the opposite direction from regions representing the cue location to regions representing the cued shape.
“Another example is the determination of a shape at a cued location. In this case, activity spreads in the opposite direction from regions that represent the location of the cue to the brain regions that represent the cued shape (Everling et al., 2002; Moran and Desimone, 1985).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Premisecitation
One multimodal neuroimaging study of propofol revealed functional disconnection of dorsal anterior insular cortex from both dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and inferior parietal lobule.
“One multimodal neuroimaging study of propofol revealed a functional disconnection of the dorsal anterior insular cortex from both the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the inferior parietal lobule (Warnaby et al., 2016).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Warnaby et al., 2016 source
- Premisecitation
These functional disconnections occurred after loss of overt behavioral responsiveness but during a period of preserved evoked potentials suggestive of maintained primary sensory processing.
“Importantly, these functional disconnections occurred after loss of overt behavioral responsiveness but during a period of preserved evoked potentials suggestive of maintained primary sensory processing.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
During general anesthesia, disrupted temporal coordination and functional connectivity within GNW nodes prevent normal ignition pathways.
“Even assuming some degree of preserved functional architecture among nodes of the GNW during anesthesia (as in Figure 5), disruptions in the temporal coordination and functional connectivity within these nodes would prevent the normal pathways of ignition.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Some degree of functional architecture among GNW nodes is preserved during anesthesia.
- Interpretationreasoning
During general anesthesia, the anesthetic drug's pharmacological action, not normal spontaneous fluctuations or evoked potentials, defines the functional relationship between brain areas.
“In other words, during general anesthesia, it is the pharmacologic action of the anesthetic drug rather than the normal spontaneous fluctuations or evoked potentials that is defining the functional relationship between these different areas.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
Accumulating evidence indicates that GNW theory accounts for disruptions of conscious processing.
“Indeed, there has been accumulating evidence that the GNW theory accounts for disruptions of conscious processing.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
General anesthesia-induced disrupted connectivity and communication lead to loss of organized long-latency activity hypothesized to be mediated by the GNW.
“The disrupted connectivity and communication patterns induced by general anesthesia lead to the loss of organized long-latency activity that is hypothesized to be mediated by the GNW.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
If synaptic weights decay, they can be refreshed by reactivating the neuronal assembly.
“If the synaptic weights decay, they can be refreshed by reactivating the neuronal assembly.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
These findings are consistent with possible preservation of fragmented cortical representations that are not experienced because, without a functional GNW, they cannot be broadcast.
“These findings are consistent with the possible preservation of fragmented cortical representations that are not experienced because, without a functional GNW, they cannot be broadcast.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Activity-silent working memories remain unconscious until reinstated as globally distributed and sustained firing patterns.
“The latter remain unconscious until they are reinstated as globally distributed and sustained firing patterns.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
van Vugt et al. (2018) data indicate that ignition characterizes the transition of a weak sensory stimulus into the attended working memory state.
“The data of van Vugt et al. (2018) indicate that ignition characterizes the transition of a weak sensory stimulus into the attended working memory state.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites van Vugt et al. (2018) source
- Premisecitation
Correlated with this was functional disconnection of activity in EEG electrodes over dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and inferior parietal lobule, but not neighboring electrodes.
“Correlated with this was the functional disconnection of activity in EEG electrodes over the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the inferior parietal lobule, but not neighboring electrodes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Warnaby et al., 2016 source
- Premisenone given
In the wakeful resting state, cortical networks were characterized by ceaseless fluctuations in functional connectivity patterns significantly more diverse than the fixed anatomical connectivity matrix.
“In the wakeful resting state, cortical networks were characterized by ceaseless fluctuations in functional connectivity patterns significantly more diverse than the fixed anatomical connectivity matrix.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The spontaneous stream of consciousness is associated with a dynamic succession of a broad repertoire of activity states arising from the fixed anatomical scaffolding.
“This suggests that the spontaneous stream of consciousness is associated with a dynamic succession of a broad repertoire of activity states arising from the fixed anatomical scaffolding.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
At a neurophysiological level, the attended memory item is maintained as persistent firing of neurons across cortical and subcortical structures so that they can influence firing rates of other neurons.
“At a neurophysiological level, the attended memory item is maintained as the persistent firing of neurons across cortical and subcortical structures so that they can exert their influence on the firing rate of other neurons.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
General anesthesia with diverse agents induces functional disconnections between primary sensory (S1) and motor (M1) cortex, representing the frontal-parietal divide across the central sulcus.
“General anesthesia with diverse agents also induces functional disconnections between the primary sensory (S1) and motor (M1) cortex, which represents the frontal-parietal divide across the central sulcus.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
All three anesthetics drastically reduced the dynamic diversity of functional connectivity patterns, especially across GNW nodes, to more inflexible patterns that adhered to anatomical connectivity patterns.
“Crucially, all three anesthetics drastically reduced this dynamic diversity of functional connectivity patterns, especially across GNW nodes, to more inflexible patterns that “adhered” to anatomical connectivity patterns (Figure 5).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Disruption of conscious access is the primary therapeutic effect of general anesthesia.
“It can therefore be argued that disruption of conscious access is the primary therapeutic effect of general anesthesia.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
There is a cognitive continuum of possible phenomenology associated with general anesthesia, depending on the specific agent and dose.
“However, there is a cognitive continuum of possible phenomenology associated with general anesthesia, which depends on the specific agent and dose.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Despite diverse root causes, there is possibly a common proximate cause that disrupts the reverberant networks of the GNW posited to enable conscious access.
“Evidence now suggests that, despite a diversity of root causes, there is possibly a common proximate cause that disrupts the reverberant networks of the GNW that have been posited to enable conscious access (Mashour, 2013).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mashour, 2013
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
The phenomenology of REM sleep is arguably more consistent with the richness of waking conscious processing than the more impoverished dream states of non-REM sleep.
“This is notable because the phenomenology of REM sleep is arguably more consistent with the richness of waking conscious processing than the more phenomenologically impoverished dream states of non-REM sleep.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Study design and conductnone given
Those studies provide correlational rather than causal evidence.
“However, they provide correlational rather than causal evidence.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Isolated islands of metabolic and cognitive activity can occur in vegetative state or unresponsive wakefulness syndrome.
“First, it has long been recognized that there can be isolated islands of metabolic and cognitive activity in conditions such as the vegetative state (now often referred to as unresponsive wakefulness syndrome) (Schiff et al., 2002).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Schiff et al., 2002 source
- Interpretationcitation
Pathologic unconsciousness is not necessarily complete suppression of information processing but a network dysfunction that can create inhospitable conditions for global information exchange and broadcasting.
“In other words, pathologic unconsciousness is not necessarily a complete suppression of information processing but rather a network dysfunction that could create inhospitable conditions for global information exchange and broadcasting.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
External entrainment of low-gamma oscillations during REM sleep enhanced self-awareness and lucidity.
“In support of a causal role for this activity, one study found that external entrainment of low-gamma oscillations during REM sleep enhanced self-awareness and lucidity (Voss et al., 2014).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Voss et al., 2014 source
- Study design and conductreasoning
Given the relatively coarse-grained tools of basic and clinical neuroscience, it is difficult to adjudicate experimentally among the four related theories.
“Given the relatively coarse-grained tools of both basic and clinical neuroscience, it is difficult to adjudicate experimentally among these four related theories.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Mid-range and long-range weighted symbolic mutual information indexed levels of consciousness across vegetative state, minimally conscious state, and recovery of consciousness in 181 high-density EEG recordings.
“In one study of 181 recordings of high-density EEG in humans (Sitt et al., 2014), mid-range and long-range weighted symbolic mutual information (a measure of information sharing) indexed levels of consciousness across the vegetative state, minimally conscious state, and recovery of consciousness.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Sitt et al., 2014 source
- Interpretationnone given
IIT is framed at an abstract mathematical level and does not easily capture specific cognitive neuroscience phenomena such as masking, attentional blink, or psychological refractory period.
“IIT is framed at an abstract mathematical level and does not easily capture specific cognitive neuroscience phenomena, such as masking, attentional blink, or psychological refractory period.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Schiff et al. (2007) induced slow but long-term recovery of conscious processing in a patient with minimal conscious syndrome following central thalamus stimulation.
“A first positive result was reported by Schiff et al. (2007), who induced a slow but long-term recovery of conscious processing in a patient with minimal conscious syndrome following stimulation of the central thalamus (the nuclei of which target many high-level cortical regions, including the prefrontal cortex).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Schiff et al. (2007) source
- Interpretationnone given
Those studies reinforce the role of the frontal cortex and its associated long-distance fiber tracts in conscious perception and processing.
“Those studies therefore reinforce the role of the frontal cortex and its associated long-distance fiber tracts in conscious perception and processing.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationnone given
A small but growing set of studies have begun to demonstrate causal links between PFC ignition and conscious processing.
“Most importantly, a small but growing set of studies have begun to demonstrate causal links between PFC ignition and conscious processing.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The example of error awareness suggests that theorizing about self-consciousness may require only a minor extension of the standard GNW theory of sensory consciousness.
“Thus, the example of error awareness suggests that theorizing about self-consciousness may only require a minor extension of the standard GNW theory of sensory consciousness.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
GNW's main tenets-late ignition, metastable sustained activity, long-distance cortical projections, and top-down mobilization-have begun to receive extensive support from neuroimaging and electrophysiological studies in normal wakefulness, sleep, anesthesia, and disorders of consciousness.
“As reviewed above, its main tenets (late ignition, metastable sustained activity, long-distance cortical projections, top-down mobilization) have begun to receive extensive support from neuroimaging and electrophysiological studies in normal wakefulness, as well as other states, such as sleep, anesthesia, or disorders of consciousness.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Human behavior in many domains, such as language, mathematics, or theory of mind, is characterized by recursive or self-embedded representations.
“Human behavior, in many domains, such as language, mathematics, or theory of mind, is characterized by recursive or self-embedded representations (Dehaene et al., 2015; Hauser et al., 2002).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked - Interpretationreasoning
More than two decades after its original formulation, the GNW hypothesis remains robust.
“More than two decades after its original formulation, the GNW hypothesis remains robust.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- May combine two claims. 91
- The quote only partly states this claim. 9
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 37
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationIgnition has been demonstrated in neural firing: human concept cells in anterior temporal lobe fire after 300-400 ms to specific pictures and words, with stronger and longer firing when the stimulus is consciously perceived or recalled; monkey prefrontal neurons encode the current content of consciousness during binocular rivalry in a no-report paradigm.
“In humans, the so-called concept cells in the anterior temporal lobe, which fire after 300 to 400 ms to specific pictures and words such as “Bill Clinton” or “the World Trade Center,” do so with stronger and longer-lasting firing rates when the corresponding stimulus is consciously perceived”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim3 of 3 sources checked- cites Gelbard-Sagiv et al., 2018 source
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 1 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Kreiman et al., 2002 source
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 1 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Quiroga et al., 2008 source
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 1 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationUnseen subliminal stimuli can evoke long-lasting brain activations, sometimes over one second, but they do not evoke sudden ignition; instead they produce a slowing, decaying wave of activity.
“The difference, however, is that subliminal stimuli do not evoke a sudden ignition but rather a slowing, decaying wave of activity.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checkedMay combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
PremisecitationA recent modeling study confirmed that ignition emerges naturally in a network with reciprocal projections; simulations showed that when feedforward connections are balanced by local inhibition, stimuli elicit a stable cascade with late sudden ignition, and the feedforward signal must reach prefrontal cortex to activate a reverberant network involving posterior parietal cortex.
“The simulations showed that, if feedforward connections are carefully balanced by local inhibitory influences, incoming stimuli elicit a stable cascade of activity characterized by a late and sudden ignition.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe latency for conscious access can be delayed by much more than 300 ms when attention is distracted by a secondary task, and a retro-cue as late as 900 ms after a flashed stimulus can lead to retrospective conscious perception of an otherwise too-weak stimulus.
“The latency for conscious access can in fact be delayed by much more than 300 ms when attention is temporarily distracted by a secondary task (dual-task conditions)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 3 sources checked- cites Marti et al., 2012, 2015
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Sergent et al., 2013 source
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Thibault et al., 2016 source
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
InterpretationcitationConscious access is increasingly described in terms of system dynamics with distinct trajectories for seen and unseen trials; ignition is a sudden high-speed divergence of trajectories on consciously perceived trials, generating metastable states that contain detailed decodable information about the specific consciously seen stimulus.
“In this framework, ignition is seen as a sudden, high-speed divergence of the trajectories on trials reported as consciously perceived, generating a series of metastable activity states”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checked- cites Baria et al., 2017 source
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites He, 2018
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites King et al., 2016 source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThe global neuronal workspace hypothesis holds that conscious processing involves a non-linear network ignition with recurrent processing that amplifies and sustains a neural representation, making its information globally accessible to local processors.
“The GNW proposes that, in the conscious state, a non-linear network ignition associated with recurrent processing amplifies and sustains a neural representation, allowing the corresponding information to be globally accessed by local processors.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Dehaene et al., 1998 source
Theoretical Premises describes sudden, all-or-none activation of a globally interconnected workspace, and Computer Simulation describes mutually reinforcing connections that sustain activity and amplify processor responses. These support much of the paraphrase, though the paper does not call the process “network ignition.” Its Conclusions explicitly limit the model to features of effortful tasks rather than an exhaustive account of conscious processing, so the claim's generalization to the conscious state goes beyond this source. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationEarly perceptual processing in the first 200 ms can be fully preserved on trials without conscious perception, especially under inattention, whereas conscious appraisal correlates with late events lagging at least 200 ms, such as the P300 or late-positive component, which vanishes almost entirely under inattention or during sleep.
“The first 200 ms of brain activity, corresponding to early perceptual processing, can be fully preserved on trials without conscious perception, particularly under inattention conditions”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 3 sources checked- cites Marti and Dehaene, 2017 source
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Marti et al., 2015 source
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Sergent et al., 2005 source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationSimulations indicate that even without stimulation the GNW has continuous stochastic spontaneous activity, which matches the fluctuating fMRI and EEG functional connectivity seen in awake resting brains and its disappearance under anesthesia or in disorders of consciousness.
“simulations show that the GNW is subject to a continuous stream of stochastic spontaneous activity”
- Also stated in: § Central Tenets and Neuroanatomical Basis of the GNW Theory · plain
“This property of the model fits with the constant variations in fMRI and electroencephalogram (EEG) functional connectivity that are observed in the awake resting brain and that vanish during anesthesia or in patients with disorders of consciousness”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim3 of 3 sources checked- cites Dehaene and Changeux, 2005 source
Split into 2 atoms — 1 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Barttfeld et al., 2015 source
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Demertzi et al., 2019 source
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Also stated in: § Central Tenets and Neuroanatomical Basis of the GNW Theory · plain
May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
InterpretationcitationThe GNW theory can be combined with Bayesian inference, in which GNW neurons provide a compressed high-level model of the external world, top-down signals broadcast predictions, and bottom-up signals convey sensory input and either amplify predicted signals or measure prediction error, allowing the central model to be updated and achieving a coherent multisensory model.
“GNW neurons, lying at the top of a deep feedforward network, provide a compressed, high-level symbolic model of an aspect of the external world; top-down signals broadcast the predictions that this model makes to lower-level areas; and bottom-up signals convey sensory signals and may either amplify the signals predicted by top-down input”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 3 sources checked- cites Keller and Mrsic-Flogel, 2018 source
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Kersten et al., 2004 source
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Rao and Ballard, 1999 source
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationThe P300/late-positive component is the most consistent scalp-recorded correlate of conscious ignition across auditory and visual paradigms, but this proposal has been criticized because an earlier negative event (N2, N3, or VAN) peaking around 260 ms is also often observed; VAN has been suggested as the earliest electrophysiological correlate of visual awareness, and it remains unclear whether P
“This proposal received support but also criticism, because an earlier negative event (variably called N2, N3, or even “visual awareness negativity” [VAN]) peaking at ∼260 ms and with a total duration of ∼200 ms is also often observed when contrasting conscious to unconscious stimuli”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 3 sources checked- cites Dehaene and Changeux, 2011 source
Split into 2 atoms — 1 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Eklund and Wiens, 2018 source
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010 source
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationAbundant human neurophysiological and neuroimaging studies support the ignition concept, reporting a sudden divergence in brain activity around 200-300 ms after stimulus onset between conscious and nonconscious trials, with additional propagation toward prefrontal and parietal cortex on conscious trials, regardless of stimulus modality or paradigm.
“These investigations reported the existence of a sudden divergence in brain activity, around 200 to 300 ms after stimulus onset, between trials with or without conscious perception, with an intense propagation of additional activity, particularly toward the prefrontal and parietal cortex, on conscious trials”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Dehaene and Changeux, 2011 source
Section V identifies sudden, all-or-none ignition of prefronto-parietal networks as a measure of conscious access, supporting the reported divergence and propagation. Section IV places global ignition around 200–300 ms, but also says its timing may vary with the experimental paradigm; Section II reports a 300–500 ms window in one study. The claim’s ‘regardless of stimulus modality or paradigm’ qualification is therefore not supported. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationAdding layer-specific connectivity to simulations produces frequency-band-specific causality patterns-bottom-up gamma from supragranular layers and top-down alpha-beta from bottom layers-which have been observed empirically across the cortical hierarchy in humans and non-human primates.
“Addition of layer-specific connectivity in simulations (Mejias et al., 2016) leads to the emergence of frequency-band-specific patterns of causality (bottom-up gamma arising primarily in supragranular layers versus top-down alpha-beta arising primarily from bottom layers)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 3 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationIgnition can be triggered by an external stimulus, during a cognitive task, or can occur spontaneously and stochastically at rest.
“Ignition may be triggered by an external stimulus, as part of a cognitive task, or it may occur spontaneously and stochastically at rest.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Dehaene and Changeux, 2005 source
The Results sections “Spontaneous Ignition” and “Extinction of External Stimuli by Spontaneous Ignition” describe both stimulus-evoked ignition and ignition without external stimulation; the former also says spontaneous ignitions can visit assemblies in random order. The copy does not establish the separate claim that ignition is triggered as part of a cognitive task. It also describes the simulation as deterministic, so “stochastically” should be understood as describing its observed variability rather than a random simulation mechanism. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationThe framework predicts that global top-down signals related to working memory content depend on a conscious model, while some modular signals can persist non-consciously; this is supported by auditory mismatch negativity preserved in coma, sleep, or inattention while a later P3 to global sequence violation occurs only consciously, and by motor error-related negativity occurring only when the error
“This framework predicts that, while some signals within modular pathways may persist under non-conscious conditions, global top-down signals related to the content of working memory depend on the availability of a conscious model.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe GNW is not a localizationist account of conscious access, and conscious access is not posited to reside in a single node; rather the GNW acts as a distributed router, with prefrontal cortex playing a key but not exclusive role, and includes dorsolateral prefrontal and inferior parietal cortex along with other hubs.
“the GNW is not a localizationist theory of conscious access, nor is conscious access posited to exist solely in a given node of the GNW”
- Also stated in: § Central Tenets and Neuroanatomical Basis of the GNW Theory · plain
“Rather, the GNW acts as a distributed “router” associated with millions of neurons distributed in many brain regions through which information can be amplified, sustained, and made available to specialized sensory processors and thalamocortical loops.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 2 sources checked- cites Boly et al., 2017 source
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 0 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 2 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Odegaard et al., 2017 source
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Also stated in: § Central Tenets and Neuroanatomical Basis of the GNW Theory · plain
May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
PremisecitationSimulations of masking and inattention show an initial brief feedforward excitation via fast AMPA connections, followed by a second stage assumed to be mediated by slower NMDA feedback that amplifies inputs in a cascade, driving the stimulus-relevant network into a global, self-sustained, reverberating, or ignited state characterized by increased gamma-band corticothalamic oscillations and cross-1
“In a second stage, assumed to be mediated by the slower NMDA-mediated feedback connections, the advancing feedfor-ward wave amplified its own inputs in a cascading manner, quickly leading the whole stimulus-relevant network into a global, self-sustained, reverberating, or ignited state.”
- Also stated in: § Simulations of the Global Workspace · plain
“This ignition was characterized by an increased power of local corticothalamic oscillations in the gamma band and their synchrony across areas (Dehaene et al., 2003).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 2 sources checked- cites Dehaene and Changeux, 2005 source
Split into 2 atoms — 1 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Dehaene et al., 2003 source
Split into 2 atoms — 1 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- The authors state this as an assumption: The second stage of the simulation is mediated by slower NMDA-mediated feedback connections.
- Also stated in: § Simulations of the Global Workspace · plain
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationThe final result of attentional selection enters consciousness, where it can use the GNW to activate all features belonging to the same object even if represented in different cortical areas, allowing conscious perception to be occupied by coherent, multifeature, multimodal objects.
“Irrespective of the precise interpretation of these experiments, the final result of attentional selection enters consciousness, where it can use the GNW to activate all features that belong to the same object even if they are represented in different cortical areas (Roelfsema and Houtkamp, 2011), allowing conscious perception to be occupied by coherent, multifeature, and multimodal objects (”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Roelfsema and Houtkamp, 2011 source
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationRecurrent circuits permit ignition and persistent firing and can be local or involve neurons in different cortical areas; the GNW emphasizes long-range loops between cortical areas, with connections from layers II/III and V/VI, and effects of recurrent processing are most pronounced in layers II/III and V of monkey primary visual cortex, with corresponding laminar profiles in humans during
“Such recurrent circuits permit ignition and persistent neuronal firing and can either be built from local cortical circuits or include neurons in different cortical areas (Wang, 2001).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationIf subjects learn an ordered list of concepts, medial temporal lobe neurons tuned to an upcoming item activate, and similar prospective coding effects occur in monkey frontal cortex.
“For example, if subjects learn an ordered list of concepts, neurons in the medial temporal lobe start to activate if they are tuned to an upcoming item in the list (Reddy et al., 2015) and similar “prospective coding” effects have been observed in the frontal cortex of monkeys (Rainer et al., 1999).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checkedMay combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
Premisecitationvan Vugt et al. (2018) found that a minimum amount of activity must reach prefrontal cortex to elicit ignition, linking GNW to signal detection theory; the SDT threshold corresponds to the PFC ignition threshold, sensitivity depends on how efficiently the stimulus is propagated to PFC, and pre-stimulus brain-state markers predict sensitivity and false-alarm probability, with high false-alarm
“The van Vugt et al. (2018) results revealed that a minimum amount of activity needs to reach PFC before it elicits ignition, thereby establishing a relationship between the GNW and the classic signal detection theory (SDT)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThe delayed response enhancement in V1 during figure-ground perception is thought to be caused by feedback from higher visual areas to V1.
“This delayed response enhancement is thought to be caused by feedback from higher visual areas to V1 (Christophel et al., 2017; Klink et al., 2017; Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 3 sources checked- cites Christophel et al., 2017 source
The Different Levels of Abstraction section discusses a possible bias signal from prefrontal cortex to early visual cortex during working memory, not delayed V1 response enhancement during figure–ground perception. Searches for figure–ground perception and feedback from higher visual areas to V1 found no passage in our copy addressing that claim. (LLM, conf=0.75)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Klink et al., 2017 source
- cites Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000 source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationSeveral studies have dissociated attention from awareness, for example by showing that a subliminal cue can summon attention to a location and improve perception of stimuli there.
“Several studies have dissociated attention from awareness, for example, by demonstrating that attention can be summoned to a location by a subliminal cue so that the perception of stimuli at that location is improved (for reviews and discussions, see Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Dehaene and Changeux, 2011 source
In “Selective Attention versus Conscious Access” (section I; page unavailable), the review says conscious access must be distinguished from attention and describes them as separate processes. The passages retrieved do not establish the cited example: that a subliminal cue draws attention to a location and improves perception of stimuli there. (LLM, conf=0.78)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007 source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationConcept cells fire when concepts are held in working memory and become active when concepts are retrieved from long-term memory.
“A central finding is that concept cells fire when concepts are held in working memory (Kamiński et al., 2017; Kornblith et al., 2017) and become active when these concepts are retrieved from long-term memory (Gelbard-Sagiv et al., 2008).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim3 of 3 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationAttentional signals select information by amplifying its activity and reducing that of competing stimuli, whereas persistent neuronal activity keeps information online in working memory.
“Attentional signals select a particular piece of information by amplifying its activity and reducing that of other competing stimuli, whereas persistent neuronal activity keeps information online in working memory (Roelfsema, 2005; Roelfsema et al., 2000; Zylberberg et al., 2011).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 3 sources checked- cites Roelfsema, 2005 source
- cites Roelfsema et al., 2000 source
Sections 3.4.1 and 6.2 link attentional selection to enhanced neuronal firing, and section 3.5.2 describes a spatial signal that persists across a delay as a form of working memory. The paper also describes inhibition among competing object representations, but section 3.5.1 says it cannot distinguish active suppression of items losing relevance from passive decay. It therefore does not fully support the claim that attentional signals reduce competing stimuli’s activity. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Zylberberg et al., 2011 source
The ‘Single decision making by evidence accumulation’ section says sustained neuronal firing stores temporary, task-relevant information, and the ‘Opinion’ section describes attentional modulation as enhanced activity for selected visual information. The copy does not say that attention reduces the activity of competing stimuli; its discussion of mutual inhibition concerns competing productions instead. Page numbers were not provided for these passages. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationSimultaneous EEG and fMRI investigations in humans confirmed functional disconnection of prefrontal cortex from posterior cortex during propofol and sevoflurane anesthesia, with concomitant reduction of feedback connectivity identified using symbolic transfer entropy based on EEG.
“Simultaneous EEG and fMRI investigations in humans have confirmed the functional disconnection of the prefrontal cortex from the posterior cortex during propofol and sevoflurane anesthesia by fMRI, with a concomitant reduction of feedback connectivity identified using symbolic transfer entropy based on EEG signals (Jordan et al., 2013; Ranft et al., 2016).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe anesthetized brain is not just in a fixed state; recent observations found it to be more dynamic than previously considered, with metastable oscillations or connectivity patterns that appear to reflect intrinsic dynamics rather than pharmacokinetic instability or external stimuli.
“Still, it is important to note that the anesthetized brain is not just in a fixed state; recent observations found it to be more dynamic than previously considered, with metastable oscillations or connectivity patterns that appear to reflect intrinsic dynamics rather than pharmacokinetic instability or external stimuli (Hudson et al., 2014; Li et al., 2019; Vlisides et al., 2019).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 3 sources checked- cites Hudson et al., 2014 source
- cites Li et al., 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Vlisides et al., 2019 source
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationPersistent firing for accessory memory items is weaker than that of the attended item, which may explain why they are more difficult to detect with non-invasive methods such as fMRI and MEG.
“However, persistent firing for these items is weaker than that of the attended item (Konecky et al., 2017), which may explain why they are more difficult to pick up with non-invasive methods, such as fMRI and MEG (Stokes, 2015; Trübutschek et al., 2017; Trübutschek et al., 2018).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 3 sources checked- cites Konecky et al., 2017 source
- cites Stokes, 2015 source
- cites Trübutschek et al., 2017 source
The Results section (‘Contents of conscious and non-conscious working memory can be tracked transiently’; page not provided) reports that MEG tracked seen target locations but found no statistically significant decoding of unseen locations. This supports the narrower point that some memory contents are difficult to detect with MEG. The paper does not establish that weaker persistent firing in accessory items explains the difficulty, or address their detection with fMRI. (LLM, conf=0.83)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationMaintenance in working memory gives rise to MEG signatures similar to conscious ignition, supporting the view that conscious ignition is a first step leading to entry of information into working memory.
“Maintenance in working memory gave rise to similar MEG signatures as conscious ignition (Trübutschek et al., 2017), supporting the view that conscious ignition is a first step leading to the entry of information into working memory.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Trübutschek et al., 2017 source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationElectrocorticography during propofol and ketamine anesthesia in human and non-human primates reveals disrupted functional connectivity across S1 and M1 cortex, as well as altered beta oscillations typically associated with feedback processing.
“Electrocorticography during propofol (Malekmohammadi et al., 2018) and ketamine (Schroeder et al., 2016) anesthesia in human and non-human primates, respectively, reveals disrupted functional connectivity across the S1 and M1 cortex, as well as altered beta oscillations, which are typically associated with feedback processing (Bastos et al., 2015).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim3 of 3 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThis dynamic signature of conscious processing was initially discovered in fMRI studies of awake versus anesthetized monkeys and later found to generalize to humans in vegetative or minimally conscious states.
“This dynamic signature of conscious processing was initially discovered in fMRI studies of awake versus anesthetized monkeys (Barttfeld et al., 2015) and later found to generalize to humans in vegetative or minimally conscious states (Demertzi et al., 2019).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 2 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThe perturbational complexity index might be useful in stratifying patients with pathologic disorders of conscious access.
“Subsequent investigation revealed that the perturbational complexity index might be useful in stratifying patients with pathologic disorders of conscious access (Casarotto et al., 2016).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Casarotto et al., 2016 source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationSome surrogate measures of Φ have been successfully applied to altered levels of consciousness in humans and relate to network factors such as topological modularity or critical dynamics.
“Furthermore, some surrogate measures of Φ have been successfully applied to altered levels of consciousness in humans (Kim et al., 2018) and also shown to relate to network factors such as topological modularity (Kim et al., 2018) or critical dynamics (Kim and Lee, 2019).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 2 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationIIT's Φ cannot be easily computed from large-scale data, making the theory difficult to test.
“IIT’s Φ cannot be easily computed from large-scale data, making it difficult to test the theory (for attempts, see Oizumi et al., 2016 and Tajima et al., 2015).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 2 sources checked- cites Oizumi et al., 2016 source
- cites Tajima et al., 2015 source
The Introduction discusses challenges in characterizing brain-wide dynamics, and the Discussion relates the cross-embedding findings to theories of consciousness. Neither passage says that IIT’s Φ is difficult to compute from large-scale data or that this makes IIT difficult to test. Searches for Φ, integrated information, and computational difficulty found no passage addressing that specific claim. (LLM, conf=0.70)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationBecause lucid dreaming is considered a hybrid of REM sleep and waking, studies showing a causal role for the prefrontal cortex in lucid dreaming support a role for the prefrontal cortex in waking consciousness.
“Given that lucid dreaming is considered a hybrid of REM sleep and waking (Voss et al., 2009), studies demonstrating a causal role for the prefrontal cortex in lucid dreaming thus also support a role for the prefrontal cortex in waking consciousness.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Voss et al., 2009 source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationElectrical stimulation of the central thalamus reverses the anesthetized state in non-human primates and is associated with return of corticocortical connectivity.
“Indeed, electrical stimulation of the central thalamus has recently been shown to reverse the anesthetized state in non-human primates, in association with a return of corticocortical connectivity (Donoghue et al., 2019; Redinbaugh et al., 2020; J. Tasserie et al., 2019, Soc. Neurosci., conference).).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim2 of 3 sources checked- cites Donoghue et al., 2019 source
The Abstract (page not specified) reports that central-thalamus stimulation awakened propofol-anesthetized non-human primates and restored awake-like cortical activity. The paper discusses corticocortical coherence when comparing awake and unconscious states, but the passages on stimulation do not show that corticocortical connectivity returned during stimulation. (LLM, conf=0.88)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured - cites Redinbaugh et al., 2020 source
- cites J. Tasserie et al., 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationSurrogate measures such as the perturbational complexity index might have originated in IIT, but their results are consistent with other theories, including GNW, which proposes that conscious processing depends on integration of differentiated processors across a network.
“Similarly, surrogate measures, such as the perturbational complexity index that have shown promise (Casali et al., 2013), might have originated in one theory (in this case, IIT), but, as noted earlier, the results are consistent with other theories, e.g., the GNW, which also proposes that conscious processing critically depends on the integration of differentiated processors across a network.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Casali et al., 2013 source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationIIT has served as a theoretical framework for the perturbational complexity index, which has been successful in differentiating levels of consciousness in physiological, pharmacological, and pathological perturbations.
“Nevertheless, IIT has served as a theoretical framework for more practical measures, such as the perturbational complexity index, which has been successful in differentiating levels of consciousness in the setting of physiological, pharmacological, and pathological perturbations (Casali et al., 2013).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Casali et al., 2013 source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationAt birth, all major long-distance fiber tracts are already in place but immature in terminal connectivity and myelination.
“At birth, all major long-distance fiber tracts are already in place (Dubois et al., 2016), although still immature in terms of both their terminal connectivity and their myelination.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Dubois et al., 2016 source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe baby brain is not a miniature adult brain; regional changes in brain connectivity and differential myelination are asynchronous and protracted.
“Importantly, the baby brain is not a miniature adult brain; regional changes of brain connectivity and differential myelination take place that are asynchronous and protracted (Dehaene-Lambertz and Spelke, 2015; Dubois et al., 2016).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationRecursion is absent or very limited in other animals; they may acquire language-like symbolic abilities slowly and to a limited level.
“Such recursion is absent or very limited in other animals; although they may acquire some language-like symbolic abilities, they do so at a very slow pace and up to a limited level (Jiang et al., 2018; Yang, 2013).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim2 of 2 sources checked- cites Jiang et al., 2018 source
- cites Yang, 2013 source
The Results report that Nim learned about 125 signs but lacked the combinatorial range of a rule-based grammar. The Discussion says chimpanzees showed patterns of imitation even after years of training. This supports limited language-like abilities in the primates discussed, but the paper does not establish that recursion is absent or limited in other animals generally, or measure the pace at which they acquire symbolic abilities. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductcitationData are insufficient to determine whether preterm infant processes correspond to preserved sensory processing in coma or whether minimal consciousness already exists in preterm infants.
“The data are insufficient to determine whether those processes correspond to the type of sensory processing that is known to be preserved in coma patients or whether a lowest level of minimal consciousness, as characterized in adult disorders of consciousness (Chennu et al., 2017), may already exist in preterm infants (Lagercrantz et al., 2010).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Chennu et al., 2017 source
- cites Lagercrantz et al., 2010
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationSocial relationships, which appear altered in autism and autism spectrum disorder, are thought to affect GNW architectures for conscious processing.
“Social relationships, which appear altered in autism and autism spectrum disorder, are thought to affect the GNW architectures for conscious processing (Bourgeron, 2015; Graziano and Kast-ner, 2011).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Bourgeron, 2015 source
- cites Graziano and Kast-ner, 2011 source
In “Awareness as a product of social perception” (page unavailable), the paper proposes that social-perception machinery contributes awareness to information in a global workspace. It does not say that social relationships alter GNW architecture or address autism or autism spectrum disorder in the passages found (searched: GNW, global workspace, autism, social relationships). (LLM, conf=0.83)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
InterpretationcitationDuring visual processing, activity from lower visual areas is fed forward to higher areas and then fed back to form recurrent loops; early loops in lower areas may correspond to VAN, while later loops involving higher areas including the frontal-parietal network produce global recurrent processing captured by the late positive component and enable report of awareness.
“The early recurrent loops occur in lower areas (Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000) and may correspond to VAN (Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010). As later recurrent loops involve higher areas, including the frontal-parietal network, global recurrent processing ensues.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThese convergent findings indicate that conscious access is not attached to early sensory processing but instead relates to a late stage whose timing is often decoupled from the timing of the actual stimulus.
“These convergent findings indicate that conscious access is not attached to early sensory processing but instead relates to a late stage whose timing is often decoupled from the timing of the actual stimulus.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisenone givenThe GNW hypothesis assigns a key role to large pyramidal cells in cortical layer II/III and also a contribution from pyramidal cells in deeper layer V.
“At the neuronal level, the GNW hypothesis postulates a key role for large pyramidal cells in cortical layer II/III (Figure 1B) but also a contribution of pyramidal cells in deeper layer V, as illustrated by recent studies (see below).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
Premiseown dataThe 1998 GNW model simulation of Stroop tasks showed increased workspace activation during acquisition of a novel task, effortful execution, and after errors, and generated predictions for spatiotemporal brain imaging patterns, especially dorsolateral prefrontal and anterior cingulate contributions.
“This simulation showed that workspace activation increased during the acquisition of a novel task, its effortful execution, and after errors.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisereasoningThe cortical areas involved in the GNW are neither identical nor redundant; each has its own functional specificity and connectivity, yet their communication is extensive and rapid, and their tight bidirectional connectivity creates the conditions for ignition.
“Note that these areas are neither identical nor redundant: each has their own functional specificity and connectivity pattern, yet the communication between them is so extensive and rapid that any information available to one is quickly made available to others.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
PremisecitationIn van Vugt et al. (2018), both perceived and unperceived weak visual stimuli caused V1 and V4 activity, but only perceived stimuli elicited sudden, strong, sustained frontal cortex activity akin to ignition; non-perceived signals could be lost at successive stages, with very weak stimuli lost from V1 to V4 and stronger stimuli reaching V4 but not propagating enough to frontal cortex; false alarm
“Both perceived and unperceived stimuli caused activity in V1 and V4, but only the perceived ones elicited a sudden, strong, and sustained activity in the frontal cortex akin to ignition.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites van Vugt et al., 2018 source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationSanchez et al. (2019) found a late sudden ignition (>200 ms) that generalized across visual, auditory, and tactile modalities, and the supramodal activity patterns included late activity in sensory regions of other modalities, compatible with global top-down broadcasting.
“Multivariate decoders trained to classify perceived versus unperceived stimuli identified a late sudden ignition (>200 ms) that generalized across modalities.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Sanchez et al., 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
InterpretationcitationIn many experiments N2 precedes P3, and their succession may index the spread of global ignition; only N2 remains when stimuli are task-irrelevant yet reported as consciously perceived, and it is unresolved whether such stimuli are truly seen or merely potentially visible but unattended.
“In many experiments, the N2 simply precedes the P3, and their succession may index the spread of global ignition as reflected in intracranial and MEG signals.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Pitts et al., 2012, 2014
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Pitts et al., 2018 source
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationTampering with NMDA receptors, for example with ketamine, may selectively affect ignition and conscious perception, mimicking the impairment of conscious perception observed in schizophrenia.
“This observation is important because tampering with NMDA receptors, by using ketamine, for instance, may selectively affect ignition and conscious perception, mimicking the impairment of conscious perception observed in schizophrenia (Berkovitch et al., 2017).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Berkovitch et al., 2017 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningModels of attentional feature integration share the GNW's aim to integrate information across distributed cortical processors.
“Thus, models of attentional feature integration share the GNW’s aim to integrate information across distributed cortical processors.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisecitationvan Vugt et al. (2018) data were explained well by a late difference in prefrontal cortex activity between reported and unreported stimuli, with only modest but significant differences in late recurrent activation of visual cortex.
“The van Vugt et al. (2018) data were explained well by a late difference in PFC activity between stimuli that were and were not reported, with only modest (but significant) differences in the late recurrent activation of visual cortex”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites van Vugt et al. (2018) source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenBinding mechanisms co-select distributed feature representations belonging to a single object and explain why object representations in conscious experience are usually coherent and integrated.
“The binding mechanisms co-select distributed feature representations that are part of a single object and explain why the object representations that become part of conscious experience are usually coherent and integrated.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationSome studies provide evidence for a causal role of top-down inputs in perception, although most experiments on conscious perception are correlational.
“Although most experiments on conscious perception are correlational in nature and merely observe neural “correlates” or “signatures” of conscious perception, some studies (Manita et al., 2015; Sachidhanandam et al., 2013) provide evidence for a causal role of top-down inputs in perception.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe initial feedforward sweep predominantly relies on AMPA glutamate receptors, whereas NMDA receptors play a dominant role in later feedback effects.
“Pharmacological studies indicate that, in agreement with the GNW hypothesis (Dehaene and Changeux, 2005), the initial feedforward sweep predominantly relies on AMPA glutamate receptors, whereas NMDA receptors play a dominant role in the later feedback effects (Self et al., 2012).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Self et al., 2012 source
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIn some attention/awareness dissociation experiments, the attended spatial location differed from the feature for which consciousness was established, implying the dissociation was incomplete: subjects presumably could not direct feature-based attention to features that failed to enter consciousness, and were most likely aware of the location to which they had to attend.
“However, we note that the spatial location that was attended to in some of these experiments differed from the feature for which consciousness was established (e.g., a grating at that location), implying that the dissociation was incomplete: subjects presumably could not direct feature-based attention to features that failed to enter consciousness, and conversely, they were most likely aware of”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisenone givenConcept cells are found in the human medial temporal lobe and activate when subjects perceive or think about specific concepts.
“These cells are found in the medial temporal lobe of humans and activate when subjects perceive or think about specific concepts.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationWorking memory operations can execute successive mental steps required to solve a task and permit mental simulations, allowing subjects to navigate sequences of working memory states to explore future consequences of actions.
“Working memory operations can thereby execute the successive mental steps required to solve a task and permit mental simulations; i.e., subjects can navigate through sequences of working memory states to explore the future consequences of actions (Pezzulo and Cisek, 2016).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Pezzulo and Cisek, 2016 source
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe critical brain regions engaging in recurrent interactions for conscious perception may be task and stimulus dependent: recurrent metastable activity in PFC and interconnected associative areas may be systematically present during conscious perception, while recurrent interactions with primary sensory areas may or may not play a role depending on task emphasis on high-resolution sensory input.
“Taken together, these findings suggest that the critical brain regions engaging in the recurrent interactions for conscious perception may be task and stimulus dependent: whereas recurrent, metastable activity in the PFC and interconnected associative areas may be systematically present during conscious perception, recurrent interactions with primary sensory areas may play a role or not, depending”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIn tasks relying on recurrent interactions between V1 and higher areas, V1 neurons become part of the global neuronal workspace, and fine-grained visual percepts can enter conscious awareness.
“In tasks that rely on recurrent interactions between V1 and higher areas, V1 neurons become part of the GNW, and the fine-grained visual percepts can enter into conscious awareness.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningAttention is a diverse set of temporal, spatial, and cognitive filters; many may operate non-consciously, with only the final one gating entry into the global workspace.
“It should be recognized that what we call “attention” is actually a diverse set of temporal, spatial, and cognitive filters; thus, many of these filters may operate non-consciously, with only the final one gating entry in the global workspace.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationFeedback from frontal cortex amplifies tactile-stimulus-elicited neuronal activity in somatosensory cortex, and this amplification predicts successful perception.
“Feedback from the frontal cortex thereby amplifies neuronal activity elicited by tactile stimuli in the somatosensory cortex, and this amplification predicts successful perception (Sachidhanandam et al., 2013; Takahashi et al., 2016).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningExperience builds associative memory networks in which activity can spread from one concept to the next, resembling the spread of activity for attentional operations.
“Thus, our experience builds associative memory networks, in which activity can spread from one concept to the next, a function that resembles the spread of activity for attentional operations described above.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationcitationvan Vugt et al. (2018) simulations described the observed visual and frontal activity as perceived stimuli igniting a self-sustained reverberating pattern between frontal and other cortices; together with a balanced amplification regime, these results suggest conscious access depends on recurrent interactions between higher cortical areas that maintain a weak stimulus as persistent activity until
“Together, these results suggest that conscious access depends on recurrent interactions between higher cortical areas (e.g., the frontal and parietal cortex) that can maintain a representation of a weak stimulus as persistent activity until a behavioral response is required by the task.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationIn a monkey texture-segregation task, initial feedforward visual cortex activity was driven by texture elements in receptive fields, whereas later activity reflected successful figure-ground perception; figures that reached awareness elicited more V1 activity than background, but subliminal figures did not.
“The initial feedforward activity elicited in the visual cortex was driven by the texture elements in the neurons’ receptive fields, whereas later activity reflected successful figure-ground perception; figures that reached awareness elicited more V1 activity than the background, but figures that stayed subliminal did not.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Supèr et al., 2001 source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationTactile perception in mice is associated with reverberation of activity between frontal and somatosensory cortex, accompanied by NMDA-receptor-driven calcium events in distal dendrites of sensory neurons.
“studies that examined tactile perception in mice revealed that it is associated with the reverberation of activity between the frontal cortex and somatosensory cortex that is accompanied by NDMA-receptor-driven calcium events in the distal dendrites of sensory neurons (Larkum, 2013).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Larkum, 2013 source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationOptogenetic silencing of feedback from mouse secondary motor cortex to somatosensory cortex selectively attenuates late amplification in somatosensory cortex and prevents perception.
“If the feedback from a higher cortical area, the mouse secondary motor cortex, back to somatosensory cortex is silenced optogenetically, the late amplification in the somatosensory cortex is selectively attenuated and perception is prevented (Manita et al., 2015).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Manita et al., 2015 source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationLong-latency evoked potentials are preferentially susceptible to general anesthesia, whereas short-latency potentials are preserved.
“In the clinical setting, for example, it is well known that long-latency-evoked potentials are preferentially susceptible to general anesthesia, whereas short-latency potentials are preserved (Banoub et al., 2003).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Banoub et al., 2003 source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationRecent experiments support the view that whenever information in working memory must be transformed, an active form of working memory is reinstated and a decodable state of activity reemerges, accompanied by classical signatures of conscious access.
“Recent experiments support this view; whenever the information in working memory must be transformed, an active form of working memory is reinstated, and a decodable state of activity reemerges, accompanied by classical signatures of conscious access (Trübutschek et al., 2019).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Trübutschek et al., 2019 source
May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenThe attended working memory item is conscious and uses the GNW for broadcasting.
“We propose that the attended working memory item is conscious and uses the GNW for broadcasting.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationMa et al. (2019) found hypersynchrony between frontal eye fields and lateral intraparietal area in monkeys anesthetized with propofol, a mechanism that would restrict information transfer.
“For example, Ma et al., (2019) found hypersynchrony, also a mechanism that would restrict information transfer, between frontal eye fields and the lateral intraparietal area in monkeys anesthetized with propofol.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ma et al., (2019)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationAdditional working memory items can be stored as short-term changes in synaptic weights so that their representation can be quickly reinstalled when useful, a form called activity-silent working memory.
“Mongillo and colleagues proposed that the additional working memory items can also be stored as short-term changes in synaptic weights so that their representation can be quickly reinstalled when useful (Mongillo et al., 2008), a form of working memory that is called “activity-silent.””
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mongillo et al., 2008 source
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningWorking memory is conscious only when coded by global, highly distributed persistent neural firing, as occurs during initial encoding, later refresh, and when the memory item influences other mental processing steps.
“Thus, we propose that working memory is conscious only when it is coded by global, highly distributed persistent neural firing, as occurs during both initial encoding, during the later refresh stage, and when the memory item influences other mental processing steps.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningPeriodic refreshing may correspond to early psychological conceptions of working memory as a decaying buffer requiring regular rehearsal.
“Such periodic refreshing may correspond to early psychological conceptions of working memory as a decaying buffer that requires regular rehearsal to be refreshed (Baddeley, 2012).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Baddeley, 2012 source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationDisruption of GNW functional interactions during general anesthesia may be partly mediated by thalamic effects; the thalamus is depressed by virtually all sedative-hypnotic drugs except ketamine.
“The disruption of functional interactions of the GNW during general anesthesia may, in part, be mediated by effects on the thalamus, which is depressed by virtually all sedative-hypnotic drugs (with the exception of ketamine) (Mashour and Alkire, 2013a).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mashour and Alkire, 2013a
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningDisruption of conscious access would reduce the probability of information being available to other cognitive systems, including working memory, which may comprehensively account for the functional outcome of general anesthesia in routine clinical care.
“Such a disruption would reduce the probability of information being available to other cognitive systems, including working memory, which may comprehensively account for the functional outcome of general anesthesia in routine clinical care.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenAnesthetics can render the brain persistently isoelectric, completely disrupting information processing.
“On one end of the spectrum, anesthetics can render the brain persistently isoelectric, thereby completely disrupting information processing.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningActivity-silent working memories, although capable of bridging delays, differ from active states: only active neural states can be mentally transformed, e.g., by mental rotation, whereas activity-silent states merely store previously computed states and should be termed short-term memory.
“Crucially, this view predicts that activity-silent working memories, although capable of bridging over delays, differ in an important way: only active neural states can be mentally transformed, e.g., by mental rotation, whereas activity-silent states merely store previously computed states (and thus should be more appropriately termed short-term memory).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenClinically, the two major therapeutic traits of the anesthetized state are hypnosis and amnesia.
“Clinically, the two major therapeutic traits of the anesthetized state are hypnosis and amnesia.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningA key correlate of REM-sleep dreaming involves GNW structures, and this correlation occurs in the absence of report.
“Thus, a key correlate of REM-sleep dreaming involves structures of the GNW, and, importantly, this correlation happens in the absence of report (which occurs only after waking).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisereasoningIIT minimizes the relevance of the prefrontal cortex and considers a posterior cortical hot zone sufficient for conscious experience.
“IIT, on the other hand, minimizes the relevance of the prefrontal cortex and, based on anatomical considerations, considers a posterior complex—the so-called posterior cortical “hot zone”—to be sufficient for conscious experience.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenGNW theory is representational and views consciousness as an evolved neurocomputational system enabling global sharing of representations.
“The GNW theory is representational in nature and views consciousness as an evolved neurocomputational system that enables the global sharing of representations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenThe effects of general anesthetics in suppressing recurrent processing, both locally and globally, are broadly consistent with all four theories.
“For example, the effects of general anesthetics in suppressing recurrent processing (both locally and globally) are broadly consistent with all four theories.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenGNW relies on well-defined neuronal architectures, including cellular and molecular mechanisms that extract, represent, and manipulate information from outside and inside the brain.
“The GNW relies upon well-defined neuronal architectures, including cellular and molecular mechanisms of information processing that extract, represent, and manipulate information originating from both outside the brain (from interactions with the environment) and inside the brain (from spontaneous activity patterns).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationDreaming during REM sleep has been argued to represent proto-consciousness, a building block for conscious experience during wakefulness.
“Indeed, it is dreaming during REM sleep that has been argued to represent “proto-consciousness,” a building block for conscious experience during wakefulness (Hobson, 2009).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Hobson, 2009 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenFor HOTs, the prefrontal cortex generates a second-order metacognitive representation of a first-order state.
“For HOTs, the role of the prefrontal cortex is to generate a second-order, metacognitive representation of a first-order state (e.g., one generated by primary sensory cortex).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisenone givenDuring sleep, the brain loses its normal level or state of conscious processing and loses the capacity to access specific sensory contents.
“During sleep, the brain not only loses its normal level or state of conscious processing (and occasionally gains access to internally generated dreams), but also loses the capacity to access specific sensory contents.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenIIT is ostensibly a theory of phenomenal consciousness, whereas GNW focuses on conscious access and processing and questions the distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness.
“Furthermore, IIT is ostensibly a theory of phenomenal consciousness, whereas the GNW theory is focused on conscious access and processing and, furthermore, brings into question the very distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenGNW proposes that conscious access requires a more extensive architecture of reverberant loops, including frontal-parietal regions enabling access of a representation to a wider array of modular processors.
“By contrast, the GNW proposes that conscious access requires a more extensive architecture of reverberant loops, including frontal-parietal regions that enable access of a given representation to a wider array of modular processors.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenIt remains difficult to draw firm conclusions about support for specific theories of conscious processing because of lesion heterogeneity and possible covert consciousness in behavioral unresponsiveness.
“Although there is an abundance of neuroimaging studies focused on pathologic disorders of consciousness, it remains difficult to draw firm conclusions regarding support for specific theories of conscious processing because of the heterogeneity of lesions and the possibility of covert consciousness in the setting of behavioral unresponsiveness.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationRPT shares with GNW the postulate that feedforward processing is not sufficient for conscious processing, whereas feedback from higher-order to lower-order areas is critical.
“The RPT of consciousness (Lamme, 2006, 2010) also shares with the GNW the postulate that, given a hierarchically ordered neurocognitive architecture, feedforward processing is not sufficient for conscious processing, whereas feedback from higher-order to lower-order areas is critical.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lamme, 2006, 2010
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisereasoningNo clear function is assigned to consciousness according to HOT.
“By contrast, there is no clear function assigned to consciousness according to HOT.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningResults from the perturbational complexity index, though inspired by IIT, are fully compatible with GNW, which predicts that the conscious state leads to deeper and more prolonged propagation of activation through long-distance connections than the unconscious state.
“Although this experiment was inspired by an alternative theory of consciousness (integrated information theory [IIT], discussed further below), the results are fully compatible with the GNW, which predicts that the conscious state leads to a deeper and more prolonged propagation of activation through long-distance connections compared to the unconscious state.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationREM-sleep dreaming is associated with metabolic deactivation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and is still associated with high-frequency activity in the prefrontal cortex.
“As noted, REM-sleep dreaming, during which there is a metabolic deactivation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Maquet et al., 1996), is still associated with high-frequency activity in the prefrontal cortex.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Maquet et al., 1996 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenGlobal broadcasting is an important function associated with consciousness according to GNW.
“Furthermore, global broadcasting is an important function associated with consciousness according to the GNW theory.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationNon-sensory thalamic nuclei play a role in working memory and facilitate coordination of cortical communication important to a functional GNW.
“In addition to its role in transmitting arousal and sensory signals, non-sensory nuclei of the thalamus are thought to play a role in working memory (outlined above) and to facilitate the coordination of cortical communication (Saalmann et al., 2012, 2014), which is important to a functional GNW.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Saalmann et al., 2012, 2014
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisereasoningFor higher-order theory, the meta-representation is the mechanism by which a first-order representation becomes conscious, so the prefrontal cortex is the ultimate source of consciousness.
“Since, for higher-order theory, the meta-representation is the mechanism by which a first-order representation becomes conscious, the prefrontal cortex is the ultimate source of consciousness.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenIn RPT, re-entrant or feedback processes within sensory processing pathways are considered sufficient for phenomenal experience.
“In RPT, which has focused primarily on the visual modality, re-entrant or feedback processes within sensory processing pathways are considered sufficient for phenomenal experience.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenGNW and IIT both require integrated neural processing beyond the level of primary sensory cortex.
“Although the GNW and IIT are superficially aligned regarding certain aspects of how conscious processes are generated—e.g., both require integrated neural processing beyond the level of primary sensory cortex—these two theories are grounded in foundationally different perspectives of brain function.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenBoth GNW and IIT ascribe importance to neural activity beyond early sensory cortices, neural information sharing, and recurrent connections as a mechanism of integration.
“Both the GNW and IIT ascribe importance to neural activity beyond early sensory cortices, neural information sharing, and recurrent connections as a mechanism of integration.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenThe prefrontal cortex is one of the nodes of the highly distributed GNW network.
“As noted, the prefrontal cortex is one of the nodes of the highly distributed GNW network.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationTranscranial direct-current stimulation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex may transiently enhance the level of consciousness in some minimally conscious state patients, and similar observations exist in normal subjects.
“Transcranial direct-current stimulation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex may also transiently enhance the level of consciousness in some patients in a minimally conscious state (Thibaut et al., 2014, 2015), and similar observations exist in normal subjects (Douglas et al., 2015).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Thibaut et al., 2014, 2015
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Douglas et al., 2015 source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationAn elevated threshold for conscious perception has been reported in patients with frontal-lobe syndrome, neglect, multiple sclerosis, or schizophrenia and related to abnormal long-distance fiber tracts measured by diffusion tensor imaging.
“Indeed, an elevated threshold for conscious perception has been reported in patients with frontal-lobe syndrome, neglect, multiple sclerosis, or schizophrenia and related to abnormal long-distance fiber tracts, as measured by diffusion tensor imaging (Del Cul et al., 2009; Pettersson-Yeo et al., 2011; Reuter et al., 2007, 2009; Thiebaut de Schotten et al., 2005).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenIIT proposes that the system is closed and non-representational, with information abstractly generated by the system and for the system.
“By contrast, IIT proposes that the system (e.g., the brain, in a biological instantiation) is closed and non-representational; information is abstractly generated by the system and for the system.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe elementary mechanisms underlying ignition are already present in infancy, though they mature and accelerate during development.
“These results therefore reveal that the elementary mechanisms underlying ignition are already present in infancy—although they undoubtedly undergo a maturation and an acceleration during development, in addition to the development of more elaborate higher-order processes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenThe GNW hypothesis is bringing considerable coherence to otherwise distant fields of research.
“Indeed, the GNW hypothesis is bringing considerable coherence to otherwise distant fields of research.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisecitation25- to 30-week preterm babies can process tactile and painful stimuli in the sensory cortex, discriminate sounds, and perceive pain.
“25- to 30-week preterm babies can already process tactile and painful stimuli in the sensory cortex (Bartocci et al., 2006), discriminate sounds (Mahmoudzadeh et al., 2013), and perceive pain (Bembich et al., 2016).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThere is currently no good theory of how the brain achieves meta-representations, though algorithmic models are beginning to be formulated within lambda calculus.
“There is currently no good theory of how the brain achieves such meta-representations, although algorithmic models are beginning to be formulated within the abstract framework of lambda calculus (Goodman and Frank, 2016).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Goodman and Frank, 2016 source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationPrimary sensorimotor areas develop earlier than adjacent unimodal associative cortices, while higher-order associative regions and their long-range connectivity develop later and slowly over decades.
“Primary sensorimotor areas develop earlier than adjacent unimodal associative cortices, whereas higher-order associative regions and their long-range connectivity further develop later and slowly over decades (Dubois et al., 2014; Lebenberg et al., 2019).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checkedProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe GNW hypothesis has thus far received substantial experimental support.
“The GNW hypothesis—even in its simple and limited original formulation—has thus far received substantial experimental support.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenThe same regions appear to be involved during self-consciousness and during representation of other people's thoughts (theory of mind).
“Interestingly, the same regions appear to be involved during self-consciousness and during the representation of other people’s thoughts (theory of mind).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationIntracranial recordings indicate that the early ERN does not predict next-trial slowing; bridging across time associated with error awareness relies on late sustained, integrative, and synchronous neural firing.
“Furthermore, intracranial recordings indicate that the early ERN is not predic-tive of whether subjects will react more slowly on the next trial but rather that such bridging across time, putatively associated with error awareness, relies on late sustained, integrative, and synchronous neural firing (Fu et al., 2019).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Fu et al., 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationAs in sensory access, the first approximately 200 ms of firing corresponding to the ERN can occur for non-conscious errors, whereas late ignition occurs only when the error is consciously detected.
“As in sensory access, the first ∼200 ms of firing, corresponding to the ERN, can occur even for non-conscious errors, whereas the late ignition occurs only when the error is consciously detected (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001 source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationWhen conscious intention and the actual ongoing response diverge, an error is detected.
“When the conscious intention and the actual ongoing response diverge, as may occur due to differential noise or conflicting stimuli, an error is detected (Charles et al., 2013, 2014).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Charles et al., 2013, 2014
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationcitationThe human brain may host an internal model of its own attention, an attention schema similar to the body schema, serving as a basis for subjective awareness.
“For instance, the human brain may also host an internal model of its own attention, an “attention schema” similar to the “body schema,” that serves as a basis for our subjective sense of awareness (Graziano et al., 2019).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Graziano et al., 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationWithin the first year of life, all GNW areas become active, including the prefrontal cortex, but lack of myelination makes them very slow to process information.
“Within the first year of life, all GNW areas quickly become active, including the prefrontal cortex, although their lack of myelination renders them very slow to process information (Dehaene-Lambertz and Spelke, 2015).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Dehaene-Lambertz and Spelke, 2015 source
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationIn simple motor tasks, erroneous responses elicit an early error-related negativity from the pre-supplementary motor area and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, followed by later ignition of a late positive response similar to the P3 wave.
“In simple motor tasks, erroneous responses elicit an early error-related negativity (ERN) arising from the pre-supplementary motor area and the dorsal anterior cingulated cortex (Fu et al., 2019), followed by a later igni-tion of a late positive response (the error-positivity [PE], similar to the P3 wave).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Fu et al., 2019
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationA multisite, preregistered, adversarial collaboration testing the main predictions of GNW versus IIT using fMRI, MEG, and intracranial recordings during passive viewing and active dual-tasking is currently underway.
“A multisite, preregistered, adversarial collaboration testing the main predictions of the GNW versus IIT using fMRI, MEG, and intracranial recordings during passive viewing and active dual-tasking is currently underway (Reardon, 2019).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reardon, 2019 source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationcitationThe current hypothesis is that error detection involves a simple consistency check between a fast non-conscious route linking perception to action and a slower conscious route computing the intended response.
“The current hypothesis is that of a simple consistency check between two simultaneous processes: a fast, non-conscious route linking perception to action and a slower, conscious route that computes the intended response.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The authors state this as an assumption.
The second stage of the simulation is mediated by slower NMDA-mediated feedback connections.
“In a second stage, assumed to be mediated by the slower NMDA-mediated feedback connections”
The paper relies on this without support.
Severe encephalitis caused by antibodies against NMDA receptors produces psychotic symptoms and then complete loss of consciousness.
“In fact, a severe form of encephalitis due to antibodies against NMDA receptors leads to psychotic symptoms followed by a complete loss of consciousness, suggesting a causal link between NMDA-mediated top-down connectivity and conscious perception.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Some degree of functional architecture among GNW nodes is preserved during anesthesia.
“Even assuming some degree of preserved functional architecture among nodes of the GNW during anesthesia (as in Figure 5)”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Social consciousness engages cortical areas including the superior temporal sulcus, temporoparietal junction, and medial prefrontal cortex, mostly in the right hemisphere.
“Social consciousness is assumed to engage cortical areas, including the superior temporal sulcus, the temporoparietal junction, and the medial prefrontal cortex, mostly in the right hemisphere (Graziano and Kastner, 2011).”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Before this study, predictions from IIT and GNWT were typically tested with one data modality at a time, leaving room for negative results to be easily attributed to the limitations of the chosen modality.
“Before this study, predictions from IIT and GNWT were typically tested with one data modality at a time23,24, leaving room for negative results to be easily attributed to the limitations of the chosen modality51.”
From Adversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness (2025) · cites this paper as [23]
The Conclusions (page unavailable) say that direct tests comparing GNW with other theories were emerging and that a study testing GNW against IIT with fMRI, MEG, and intracranial recordings was underway. They do not establish that earlier tests typically used one data modality at a time. The separate claim about attributing negative results to modality limitations is cited to another source (51). (LLM, conf=0.72)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredNow both GNWT and IIT increasingly try to explain processes, contents, and states/levels of consciousness.
“However, now both theories increasingly try to explain processes, contents, and states/levels, 28,16 a tendency shared with RPT, PP/NREP, and DIT.12,14,56”
From An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [28]
The Introduction (page unavailable) explicitly says the review addresses GNW’s relevance to both the level and content of conscious processing. Its section on other theories describes IIT’s account of conscious experience, how conscious processes are generated, and the degree of consciousness. These passages support the broad overlap, but do not establish that both theories are increasingly trying to explain all three categories. (LLM, conf=0.78)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredGlobal workspace theorists have pointed out that the high density of long-range excitatory pyramidal neurons found in the ACC could plausibly serve as a substrate for a highly integrative function, such as consciousness.
“Global workspace theorists have also pointed out that the high density of long-range excitatory pyramidal neurons found in the ACC could plausibly serve as a substrate for a highly integrative function, such as consciousness (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011;Mashour et al., 2020).”
From Does the Prefrontal Cortex Play an Essential Role in Consciousness? Insights from Intracranial Electrical Stimulation of the Human Brain (2021) · cites this paper as Mashour et al., 2020
The Introduction’s “Central Tenets and Neuroanatomical Basis” section (page not provided) describes long-range excitatory pyramidal neurons as part of the global neuronal workspace and names the anterior cingulate cortex as a potentially important hub. It attributes a greater density of neurons important for global broadcasting to the prefrontal cortex generally, but does not establish a high density of those neurons specifically in the ACC. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThere is extensive evidence for global workspace theory, drawn from many studies.
“There is extensive evidence for global workspace theory, drawn from many studies, of which we can mention only a few representative examples (see Dehaene 2014 andMashour et al. 2020 for reviews).”
From Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness (2023) · cites this paper as Mashour et al. 2020
This widespread activity seems to arise late in perceptual processing, around 250-300ms after stimulus onset, supporting the claim that global broadcast requires sustained perceptual representations.
“This widespread activity seems to arise late in perceptual processing, around 250-300ms after stimulus onset, supporting the claim that global broadcast requires sustained perceptual representations (Mashour et al. 2020).”
From Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness (2023) · cites this paper as Mashour et al. 2020
At present, examples of theories that arguably meet the two criteria include recurrent processing theory (RPT), GWT, higher-order theories (HOT), and attention schema theory (AST).
“Consequently, at present, examples of theories that arguably meet the two criteria include recurrent processing theory (RPT) [ 24 -26], GWT [ 22,23,27,28], higher-order theories (HOT) [ 29 -31], and attention schema theory (AST) [ 32,33].”
From Identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems (2026) · cites this paper as [28]
GNWT links the functional concept of a global workspace to specific brain networks and neuronal characteristics.
“A neurobiology-inspired version of the GWT was later proposed as the GNWT.6,28,59,60 It takes the same functional concept of a global workspace but links it to specific brain networks and neuronal characteristics.”
From An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [28]
GNWT implies that conscious access (AC) depends on RP, as its ignition and reverberant activity realizes access to conscious content.
“GNWT implies that conscious access (AC) depends on RP, as its ''ignition'' and reverberant activity realizes access to conscious content.28”
From An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness (2024) · cites this paper as [28]
In contemporary classical neuroscientific models, the substrate of consciousness is a pattern of membrane electrical activity across a population of distributed neurons.
“In these models (Dehaene et al. 1998, Sergent and Dehaene 2004, Tsuchiya et al. 2015, Tononi et al. 2016, Mashour et al. 2020, Albantakis et al. 2023), the substrate of consciousness is understood to be a pattern of membrane electrical activity across a population of distributed neurons.”
From A quantum microtubule substrate of consciousness is experimentally supported and solves the binding and epiphenomenalism problems (2025) · cites this paper as Mashour et al. 2020
According to global neuronal workspace theory, ignition is a non-linear process whereby a single neural representation suddenly dominates the neuronal workspace, suppressing competing patterns of activation.
“According to global neuronal workspace theory, the main development of GWT in neuroscience, 'ignition is characterized by the sudden, coherent, and exclusive activation of a subset of workspace neurons coding for the current conscious content, with the remainder of the workspace neurons being inhibited' (Mashour et al. (2020); 777). In other words, ignition is a non-linear process whereby a single”
From A Case for AI Consciousness: Language Agents and Global Workspace Theory (2024) · cites this paper as Mashour et al. 2020
GNWT has been increasingly described in terms of Bayesian inference, including in a recently proposed Predictive Global Neuronal Workspace model.
“GNWT has been increasingly described in terms of Bayesian inference (Dehaene, 2020; Mashour et al., 2020), including in a recently proposed Predictive Global Neuronal Workspace model (Whyte and Smith, 2020).”
From An Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) of Consciousness (2020) · cites this paper as Mashour et al., 2020
GNWT posits that consciousness arises from global broadcasting and late amplification (or 'ignition') of information across interconnected networks of higher-order sensory, parietal and especially prefrontal cortex (PFC).
“GNWT instead posits that consciousness arises from global broadcasting and late amplification (or ‘ignition’) of information across interconnected networks of higher-order sensory, parietal and especially prefrontal cortex (PFC)”
From Adversarial testing of global neuronal workspace and integrated information theories of consciousness (2025) · cites this paper as [23]
The PFC comprises many subregions, and various models of the PFC and consciousness often propose prominent roles for areas other than the lateral PFC.
“In any case, the PFC comprises many subregions (Fig. 2), and various models of the PFC and consciousness often propose prominent roles for areas other than the lateral PFC (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011;Brown et al., 2019;Mashour et al., 2020).”
From Does the Prefrontal Cortex Play an Essential Role in Consciousness? Insights from Intracranial Electrical Stimulation of the Human Brain (2021) · cites this paper as Mashour et al., 2020
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Experimental and theoretical approaches to conscious processing
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“…studies have dissociated attention from awareness, for example, by demonstrating that attention can be summoned to a location by a subliminal cue so that the perception of stimuli at that location is improved (for reviews and discussions, see Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationTowards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework
Dehaene, S. (2001) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00123-2 · Cited by 2,498 · cited 2× · see citing works
“what we subjectively experience as a conscious state” (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001).”
BackgroundSelf-citationSelective Attention Gates Visual Processing in the Extrastriate Cortex
Moran, J., & Desimone, R. (1985) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.4023713 · Cited by 2,433 · see citing works
The distinct modes of vision offered by feedforward and recurrent processing
Lamme, V. A. F., & Roelfsema, P. R. (2000) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/s0166-2236(00)01657-x · Cited by 2,338 · cited 3× · see citing works
“The early recurrent loops occur in lower areas (Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000) and may correspond to VAN (Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010).”
BackgroundSelf-citationSelective Attention Gates Visual Processing in the Extrastriate Cortex
Moran, J., & Desimone, R. (2003) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2834.003.0024 · Cited by 2,164 · see citing works
An information integration theory of consciousness
Tononi, G. (2004) · BMC Neuroscience · doi:10.1186/1471-2202-5-42 · Cited by 1,757 · cited 1× · see citing works
“The theory further attempted to address two key properties of consciousness: integration (the unity of a conscious experience) and differentiation (the large number of states available) (Oizumi et al., 2014; Tononi, 2004; Tononi et al., 2016).”
BackgroundIntegrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate
Tononi, G., Boly, M., Massimini, M., & Koch, C. (2016) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn.2016.44 · Cited by 1,727 · cited 3× · see citing works
“In Table 1, we summarize the main similarities and differences (for recent descriptions of those theories, see Brown et al., 2019; Lamme, 2018; Tononi et al., 2016).”
BackgroundMethodNeural correlates of consciousness: progress and problems
Koch, C., Massimini, M., Boly, M., & Tononi, G. (2016) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn.2016.22 · Cited by 1,600 · cited 1× · see citing works
“The past two decades have witnessed substantial progress in the field, which has been driven by an array of conceptual and experimental advances (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Koch et al., 2016).”
BackgroundTononi, G. (1998) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.282.5395.1846 · Cited by 1,561 · see citing works
Imaging the developing brain: what have we learned about cognitive development?
CASEY, B., TOTTENHAM, N., LISTON, C., & DURSTON, S. (2005) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.01.011 · Cited by 1,556 · see citing works
A neuronal model of a global workspace in effortful cognitive tasks
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Self-citationVisual areas exert feedforward and feedback influences through distinct frequency channels
Bastos, A. M., Vezoli, J., Bosman, C. A., Schoffelen, J.-M., Oostenveld, R., Dowdall, J. R., De Weerd, P., Kennedy, H., & Fries, P. (2015) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2014.12.018 · Cited by 1,320 · see citing works
Object perception as Bayesian inference
Kersten, D., Mamassian, P., & Yuille, A. (2004) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.55.090902.142005 · Cited by 1,269 · cited 1× · see citing works
“However, the GNW framework can be combinedwith Bayesian inference (Keller and Mrsic-Flogel, 2018; Kersten et al., 2004; Rao and Ballard, 1999), leading to a more precise functional interpretation of topdown broadcasting.”
BackgroundSynaptic theory of working memory
Mongillo, G., Barak, O., & Tsodyks, M. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1150769 · Cited by 1,253 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Mongillo and colleagues proposed that the additional working memory items can also be stored as short-term changes in synaptic weights so that their representation can be quickly reinstalled when useful (Mongillo et al., 2008), a form of working memory that is called ‘‘activity-si-lent.’’”
A theoretically based index of consciousness independent of sensory processing and behavior
Casali, A. G., Gosseries, O., Rosanova, M., Boly, M., Sarasso, S., Casali, K. R., Casarotto, S., Bruno, M.-A., Laureys, S., Tononi, G., et al. (2013) · Science Translational Medicine · doi:10.1126/scitranslmed.3006294 · Cited by 1,246 · see citing works
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“As in sensory access, the first ~200 ms of firing, corresponding to the ERN, can occur even for non-conscious errors, whereas the late ignition occurs only when the error is consciously detected (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001).”
BackgroundFunctional neuroanatomy of human rapid-eye-movement sleep and dreaming
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“As noted, REM-sleep dreaming, during which there is a metabolic deactivation of the dorsolateral PFC (Maquet et al., 1996), is still associated with high-frequency activity in the PFC. Lucid dreaming is associated with further increased gamma activity and coherence in the dorsolateral PFC relative…”
BackgroundAccess to information in working memory: Exploring the focus of attention.
Oberauer, K. (2002) · Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition · doi:10.1037//0278-7393.28.3.411 · Cited by 1,167 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Finally, there is a larger set of activated long-term memories, which are in a more dormant state and for which retrieval requires more elaborate mechanisms (Oberauer, 2002).”
BackgroundAttentional modulation of visual processing
Reynolds, J. H., & Chelazzi, L. (2004) · Annual Review of Neuroscience · doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.26.041002.131039 · Cited by 1,158 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…perceptual object, represented in one brain region, causes the co-selection of other features of the same object, represented in different brain regions (Duncan et al., 1997; O’Craven et al., 1999; Reynolds and Chelazzi, 2004; Roelfsema, 2006; Roelfsema and Houtkamp, 2011; Zylberberg et al., 2011).”
BackgroundSelective gating of visual signals by microstimulation of frontal cortex
Moore, T., & Armstrong, K. M. (2003) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature01341 · Cited by 1,156 · see citing works
Towards a true neural stance on consciousness
Lamme, V. A. F. (2006) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.09.001 · Cited by 1,149 · cited 4× · see citing works
“A related proposal is that feedback processing within sensory cortices (e.g., during figure-ground segregation) could be important for phenomenal consciousness (Lamme, 2006), whereas more global feedback (e.g., in frontal-parietal networks) is important for access consciousness (Lamme, 2018).”
BackgroundInfluentialFrom the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: integrated information theory 3.0
Oizumi, M., Albantakis, L., & Tononi, G. (2014) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588 · Cited by 1,128 · see citing works
Categorical Representation of Visual Stimuli in the Primate Prefrontal Cortex
Freedman, D. J., Riesenhuber, M., Poggio, T., & Miller, E. K. (2001) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.291.5502.312 · Cited by 1,123 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…frontal cortex, where neurons code for more abstract aspects of sensory stimuli (de Lafuente and Romo, 2005, 2006; Vergara et al., 2016), object categories (Freedman et al., 2001), motor intentions (Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; Thura and Cisek, 2014), and task instructions (Wallis et al., 2001).”
BackgroundSingle neurons in prefrontal cortex encode abstract rules
Wallis, J. D., Anderson, K. C., & Miller, E. K. (2001) · Nature · doi:10.1038/35082081 · Cited by 1,075 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…frontal cortex, where neurons code for more abstract aspects of sensory stimuli (de Lafuente and Romo, 2005, 2006; Vergara et al., 2016), object categories (Freedman et al., 2001), motor intentions (Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; Thura and Cisek, 2014), and task instructions (Wallis et al., 2001).”
BackgroundO’Reilly, R. C., & Frank, M. J. (2005) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/089976606775093909 · Cited by 1,066 · see citing works
Synaptic reverberation underlying mnemonic persistent activity
Wang, X.-J. (2001) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/s0166-2236(00)01868-3 · Cited by 1,059 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Such recurrent circuits permit ignition and persistent neuronal firing and can either be built from local cortical circuits or include neurons in different cortical areas (Wang, 2001).”
BackgroundBehavioural improvements with thalamic stimulation after severe traumatic brain injury
Schiff, N. D., Giacino, J. T., Kalmar, K., Victor, J. D., Baker, K., Gerber, M., Fritz, B., Eisenberg, B., O’Connor, J., Kobylarz, E. J., et al. (2007) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature06041 · Cited by 1,051 · cited 1× · see citing works
“A first positive result was reported by (Schiff et al., 2007), who induced a slow but long-term recovery of conscious processing in a patient with minimal conscious syndrome, following stimulation of the central thalamus (the nuclei of which target many high-level cortical regions including prefrontal cortex).”
BackgroundAttention and consciousness: two distinct brain processes
Koch, C., & Tsuchiya, N. (2007) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.10.012 · Cited by 1,046 · see citing works
Bright air, brilliant fire: on the matter of the mind
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The pulvinar regulates information transmission between cortical areas based on attention demands
Saalmann, Y. B., Pinsk, M. A., Wang, L., Li, X., & Kastner, S. (2012) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1223082 · Cited by 1,016 · cited 1× · see citing works
“In addition to its role in transmitting arousal and sensory signals, non-sensory nuclei of the thalamus are thought to play a role in working memory (outlined above) and to facilitate the co-ordination of cortical communication (Saalmann et al., 2012, 2014), which is important to a functional GNW.”
BackgroundMind reading: Neural mechanisms of theory of mind and self-perspective
Vogeley, K., Bussfeld, P., Newen, A., Herrmann, S., Happé, F., Falkai, P., Maier, W., Shah, N. J., Fink, G. R., & Zilles, K. (2001) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1006/nimg.2001.0789 · Cited by 998 · see citing works
From the genetic architecture to synaptic plasticity in autism spectrum disorder
Bourgeron, T. (2015) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn3992 · Cited by 975 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Social relationships, which appear altered in autism and autism spectrum disorder, are thought to affect the GNW architectures for conscious processing (Bourgeron, 2015; Graziano and Kastner, 2011).”
Backgroundvan Kerkoerle, T., Self, M. W., Dagnino, B., Gariel-Mathis, M.-A., Poort, J., van der Togt, C., & Roelfsema, P. R. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1402773111 · Cited by 918 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…gamma arising primarily in supragranular layers versus top-down alpha-beta arising primarily from bottom layers), which have been observed empirically across the cortical hierarchy in both human and non-human primates (Bastos et al., 2015; Michalareas et al., 2016; van Kerkoerle et al., 2014).”
BackgroundSelf-citationTiming of the brain events underlying access to consciousness during the attentional blink
Sergent, C., Baillet, S., & Dehaene, S. (2005) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn1549 · Cited by 888 · cited 1× · see citing works
“The first 200 ms of brain activity, corresponding to early perceptual processing, can be fully preserved on trials without conscious perception, particularly under inattention conditions (Marti and Dehaene, 2017; Marti et al., 2015; Sergent et al., 2005).”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe Distributed Nature of Working Memory
Christophel, T. B., Klink, P. C., Spitzer, B., Roelfsema, P. R., & Haynes, J.-D. (2017) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2016.12.007 · Cited by 882 · cited 3× · see citing works
“The effects of working memory on neuronal firing rates occur in many cortical areas (Christophel et al., 2017), ranging from primary sensory cortices that code for the memories of elementary sensory features (MendozaHalliday et al.”
BackgroundSelf-citationEmpirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness
Lau, H., & Rosenthal, D. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.009 · Cited by 869 · see citing works
What is consciousness, and could machines have it?
Dehaene, S., Lau, H., & Kouider, S. (2017) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aan8871 · Cited by 855 · cited 2× · see citing works
“In the future, it will be fascinating to see whether some of the present ideas can be made precise enough to be implemented in an actual computational device (Dehaene et al., 2017).”
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‘Activity-silent’ working memory in prefrontal cortex: a dynamic coding framework
Stokes, M. G. (2015) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.05.004 · Cited by 850 · cited 11× · see citing works
“Beyond MEG and EEG, ignition has been demonstrated in neural firing, both in human and non-human primates.”
BackgroundInfluentialfMRI evidence for objects as the units of attentional selection
O'Craven, K. M., Downing, P. E., & Kanwisher, N. (1999) · Nature · doi:10.1038/44134 · Cited by 846 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Attention is objectbased, which means that the attentional selection of one feature of a perceptual object, represented in one brain region, causes the co-selection of other features of the same object, represented in different brain regions (Duncan et al., 1997; O'Craven et al., 1999; Reynolds and Chelazzi, 2004; Roe…”
BackgroundDehaene, S., Sergent, C., & Changeux, J.-P. (2003) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1332574100 · Cited by 838 · cited 6× · see citing works
“Importantly, and in agreement with the GNW model (Dehaene et al., 2003), the feedforward signal must be strong enough to reach the prefrontal cortex, which in turn leads to the activation—or ignition—of a reverberant network involving the posterior parietal cortex.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationPredictive Processing: A Canonical Cortical Computation
Keller, G. B., & Mrsic-Flogel, T. D. (2018) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2018.10.003 · Cited by 836 · cited 1× · see citing works
“10 (Keller and Mrsic-Flogel, 2018; Kersten et al., 2004; Rao and Ballard, 1999), leading to a more precise functional interpretation of top-down broadcasting.”
BackgroundAccess to information in working memory: Exploring the focus of attention.
Oberauer, K. (2002) · Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition · doi:10.1037/0278-7393.28.3.411 · Cited by 760 · see citing works
A cellular mechanism for cortical associations: an organizing principle for the cerebral cortex
Larkum, M. (2013) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/j.tins.2012.11.006 · Cited by 755 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…this view, studies that examined tactile perception in mice revealed that it is associated with the reverberation of activity between the frontal cortex and somatosensory cortex that is accompanied by NDMA-receptor-driven calcium events in the distal dendrites of sensory neurons (Larkum, 2013).”
BackgroundBrain Dynamics Underlying the Nonlinear Threshold for Access to Consciousness
Del Cul, A., Baillet, S., & Dehaene, S. (2007) · PLoS Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0050260 · Cited by 753 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…for auditory or visual conscious perception is associated with a sudden increase in the P300 component, and only this component vanishes almost entirely under inattention conditions (Berkovitch et al., 2018; Charles et al., 2014; Del Cul et al., 2007) or during sleep (Strauss et al., 2015).”
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“, 2001), motor intentions (Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; Thura and Cisek, 2014), and task instructions (Wallis et al.”
BackgroundNeural organization for the long-term memory of paired associates
Sakai, K., & Miyashita, Y. (1991) · Nature · doi:10.1038/354152a0 · Cited by 743 · see citing works
Neural signature of the conscious processing of auditory regularities
Bekinschtein, T. A., Dehaene, S., Rohaut, B., Tadel, F., Cohen, L., & Naccache, L. (2009) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0809667106 · Cited by 738 · cited 1× · see citing works
“later prediction error (P3 wave) when the global sequence is violated only under conscious conditions (local/global paradigm) (Bekinschtein et al., 2009; Chao et al., 2018).”
BackgroundSelf-citationTwo neural correlates of consciousness
Block, N. (2005) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.12.006 · Cited by 713 · cited 1× · see citing works
“One distinction relates to ‘‘phenomenal consciousness’’ versus ‘‘access consciousness’’ (Block, 2005).”
Dysconnectivity in schizophrenia: where are we now?
Pettersson-Yeo, W., Allen, P., Benetti, S., McGuire, P., & Mechelli, A. (2011) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2010.11.004 · Cited by 712 · see citing works
The neural correlates of dreaming
Siclari, F., Baird, B., Perogamvros, L., Bernardi, G., LaRocque, J. J., Riedner, B., Boly, M., Postle, B. R., & Tononi, G. (2017) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn.4545 · Cited by 712 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Recent data suggest that reductions of low-frequency activity in posterior confluence of the sensory and association cortex (the socalled ‘‘hot zone’’ of consciousness) were associated with dreaming during rapid-eye-movement (REM) sleep and nonREM sleep (Siclari et al., 2017).”
BackgroundTopographical representations of mental images in primary visual cortex
Kosslyn, S. M., Thompson, W. L., Klm, I. J., & Alpert, N. M. (1995) · Nature · doi:10.1038/378496a0 · Cited by 701 · see citing works
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“, 2016) leads to the emergence of frequency-bandspecific patterns of causality (bottom-up gamma arising primarily in supragranular layers, versus top-down alpha-beta arising primarily from bottom layers), which have been observed empirically across the cortical hierarchy in both human and non-human primates (Bastos et…”
BackgroundDirect Evidence for a Parietal-Frontal Pathway Subserving Spatial Awareness in Humans
de Schotten, M. T., Urbanski, M., Duffau, H., Volle, E., Lévy, R., Dubois, B., & Bartolomeo, P. (2005) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1116251 · Cited by 682 · see citing works
Different states in visual working memory: when it guides attention and when it does not
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Self-citationSignature of consciousness in the dynamics of resting-state brain activity
Barttfeld, P., Uhrig, L., Sitt, J. D., Sigman, M., Jarraya, B., & Dehaene, S. (2015) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1418031112 · Cited by 670 · cited 3× · see citing works
“Recent work in non-human primates demonstrates that the functional relationships between critical nodes in the GNW— such as prefrontal, posterior parietal, and cingulate cortices— are stereotypically altered during propofol, sevoflurane, and ketamine anesthesia (Barttfeld et al., 2015; Uhrig et al., 2018).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationBoveroux, P., Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Bruno, M.-A., Noirhomme, Q., Lauwick, S., Luxen, A., Degueldre, C., Plenevaux, A., Schnakers, C., Phillips, C., et al. (2010) · Anesthesiology · doi:10.1097/aln.0b013e3181f697f5 · Cited by 630 · cited 2× · see citing works
“29 by fMRI to functionally disconnect prefrontal cortex and posterior parietal cortices (such as the precuneus) in humans (Bonhomme et al., 2016; Boveroux et al., 2010; Palanca et al., 2015).”
BackgroundREM sleep and dreaming: towards a theory of protoconsciousness
Hobson, J. A. (2009) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2716 · Cited by 625 · cited 2× · see citing works
“…in patients with frontal-lobe syndrome, neglect, multiple sclerosis, or schizophrenia and related to abnormal long-distance fiber tracts, as measured by diffusion tensor imaging (Del Cul et al., 2009; Pettersson-Yeo et al., 2011; Reuter et al., 2007, 2009; Thiebaut de Schotten et al., 2005).”
BackgroundCortical high-density counterstream architectures
Markov, N. T., Ercsey-Ravasz, M., Van Essen, D. C., Knoblauch, K., Toroczkai, Z., & Kennedy, H. (2013) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1238406 · Cited by 616 · see citing works
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Self-citationPragmatic Language Interpretation as Probabilistic Inference
Goodman, N. D., & Frank, M. C. (2016) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2016.08.005 · Cited by 594 · cited 1× · see citing works
“There is currently no good theory of how the brain achieves such meta-representations, although algorithmic models are beginning to be formulated within the abstract framework of lambda calculus (Goodman and Frank, 2016).”
BackgroundDistilling the neural correlates of consciousness
Aru, J., Bachmann, T., Singer, W., & Melloni, L. (2012) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2011.12.003 · Cited by 589 · see citing works
Understanding the Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness
Brown, R., Lau, H., & LeDoux, J. E. (2019) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2019.06.009 · Cited by 573 · cited 2× · see citing works
“In Table 1, we summarize the main similarities and differences (for recent descriptions of those theories, see Brown et al., 2019; Lamme, 2018; Tononi et al., 2016).”
BackgroundMethodBoly, M., Massimini, M., Tsuchiya, N., Postle, B. R., Koch, C., & Tononi, G. (2017) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.3218-16.2017 · Cited by 557 · see citing works
No-Report Paradigms: Extracting the True Neural Correlates of Consciousness
Tsuchiya, N., Wilke, M., Frässle, S., & Lamme, V. A. F. (2015) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.10.002 · Cited by 551 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Although non-response tasks may be a promising approach to separating neural correlates of awareness from those of post-perceptual processes (Tsuchiya et al., 2015), experimental findings so far do not resolve this discussion.”
BackgroundInternally generated reactivation of single neurons in human hippocampus during free recall
Gelbard-Sagiv, H., Mukamel, R., Harel, M., Malach, R., & Fried, I. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1164685 · Cited by 533 · cited 1× · see citing works
“24 become active when these concepts are retrieved from long-term memory (Gelbard-Sagiv et al., 2008).”
BackgroundMaintenance of persistent activity in a frontal thalamocortical loop
Guo, Z. V., Inagaki, H. K., Daie, K., Druckmann, S., Gerfen, C. R., & Svoboda, K. (2017) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature22324 · Cited by 529 · see citing works
Functional connectivity dynamics: modeling the switching behavior of the resting state
Hansen, E. C. A., Battaglia, D., Spiegler, A., Deco, G., & Jirsa, V. K. (2015) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.11.001 · Cited by 528 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Simulations indicate that the spontaneous activity patterns already present during anesthesia may undergo a sudden phase transition toward a vastly more diverse and dynamic repertoire of states in the awake state (Hansen et al., 2015).”
BackgroundIntentional relations and social understanding
Barresi, J., & Moore, C. (1996) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00041790 · Cited by 523 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…life, which is why it appears useful to distinguish a few nested levels with the development of the human brain, behavior, and consciousness (Barresi and Moore, 1996; Casey et al., 2005; Changeux, 2006; Dehaene-Lambertz and Spelke, 2015; De-haene and Changeux, 2011; Filippetti et al., 2015;…”
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“Persistent neuronal activity allows the nervous system to bridge the time between sensory stimuli, task instructions, and actions that need to take place at a later point in time (Fuster, 1997).”
BackgroundCompetitive brain activity in visual attention
Duncan, J., Humphreys, G., & Ward, R. (1997) · Current Opinion in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/s0959-4388(97)80014-1 · Cited by 515 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…perceptual object, represented in one brain region, causes the co-selection of other features of the same object, represented in different brain regions (Duncan et al., 1997; O’Craven et al., 1999; Reynolds and Chelazzi, 2004; Roelfsema, 2006; Roelfsema and Houtkamp, 2011; Zylberberg et al., 2011).”
BackgroundHuman consciousness is supported by dynamic complex patterns of brain signal coordination
Demertzi, A., Tagliazucchi, E., Dehaene, S., Deco, G., Barttfeld, P., Raimondo, F., Martial, C., Fernández-Espejo, D., Rohaut, B., Voss, H. U., et al. (2019) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.aat7603 · Cited by 513 · see citing works
Self-citationPain activates cortical areas in the preterm newborn brain
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“25-to 30-week preterm babies can already process tactile and painful stimuli in the sensory cortex (Bartocci et al., 2006), discriminate sounds (Mahmoudzadeh et al., 2013), and perceive pain (Bembich et al., 2016).”
BackgroundThe development of conscious control in childhood
Zelazo, P. D. (2003) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2003.11.001 · Cited by 501 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…development of the human brain, behavior, and consciousness (Barresi and Moore, 1996; Casey et al., 2005; Changeux, 2006; Dehaene-Lambertz and Spelke, 2015; De-haene and Changeux, 2011; Filippetti et al., 2015; Gogtay et al., 2004; Gopnik et al., 2001; Lagercrantz and Changeux, 2009; Zelazo, 2004).”
BackgroundHow neuroscience will change our view on consciousness
Lamme, V. A. F. (2010) · Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17588921003731586 · Cited by 487 · cited 1× · see citing works
“The RPT of consciousness (Lamme, 2006, 2010) also shares with the GNW the postulate that, given a hierarchically ordered neurocognitive architecture, feedforward processing is not sufficient for conscious processing, whereas feedback from higher-order to lower-order areas is critical.”
BackgroundStratification of unresponsive patients by an independently validated index of brain complexity
Casarotto, S., Comanducci, A., Rosanova, M., Sarasso, S., Fecchio, M., Napolitani, M., Pigorini, A., G. Casali, A., Trimarchi, P. D., Boly, M., et al. (2016) · Annals of Neurology · doi:10.1002/ana.24779 · Cited by 487 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Subsequent investigation revealed that the perturbational complexity index might be useful in stratifying patients with pathologic disorders of conscious access (Casarotto et al., 2016).”
BackgroundDehaene, S., Meyniel, F., Wacongne, C., Wang, L., & Pallier, C. (2015) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2015.09.019 · Cited by 478 · see citing works
Self-citationUnresponsiveness ≠ unconsciousness
Sanders, R. D., Tononi, G., Laureys, S., Sleigh, J. W., & Warner, D. S. (2012) · Anesthesiology · doi:10.1097/aln.0b013e318249d0a7 · Cited by 474 · see citing works
Two distinct modes of sensory processing observed in monkey primary visual cortex (V1)
Supèr, H., Spekreijse, H., & Lamme, V. A. F. (2001) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/85170 · Cited by 467 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Late feedback to V1 reflects conscious figure/ground segregation (from (Super et al., 2001).”
BackgroundBright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind
Tremblay, G. F. (1992) · JAMA · doi:10.1001/jama.1992.03490170112044 · Cited by 447 · cited 1× · see citing works
“The neural activity patterns that are associated with feedback projections and horizontal connections have been referred to in the literature as reafferent, recurrent, re-entrant, or reverberant processing (Edelman, 1992; Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000).”
Lucid dreaming: a state of consciousness with features of both waking and non-lucid dreaming
Voss, U., Holzmann, R., Tuin, I., & Hobson, A. J. (2009) · Sleep · doi:10.1093/sleep/32.9.1191 · Cited by 445 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Given that lucid dreaming is considered a hybrid of REM sleep and waking (Voss et al., 2009), studies demonstrating a causal role for the PFC in lucid dreaming thus also support a role for the PFC in waking consciousness.”
BackgroundProspective coding for objects in primate prefrontal cortex
Rainer, G., Rao, S. C., & Miller, E. K. (1999) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.19-13-05493.1999 · Cited by 432 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…example, if subjects learn an ordered list of concepts, neurons in the medial temporal lobe start to activate if they are tuned to an upcoming item in the list (Reddy et al., 2015) and similar ‘‘prospective coding’’ effects have been observed in the frontal cortex of monkeys (Rainer et al., 1999).”
BackgroundRapid categorization of natural face images in the infant right hemisphere
de Heering, A., & Rossion, B. (2015) · eLife · doi:10.7554/elife.06564 · Cited by 428 · see citing works
CORTICAL ALGORITHMS FOR PERCEPTUAL GROUPING
Roelfsema, P. R. (2006) · Annual Review of Neuroscience · doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.29.051605.112939 · Cited by 426 · cited 2× · see citing works
“…van Kerkoerle et al., 2017) to the frontal cortex, where neurons code for more abstract aspects of sensory stimuli (de Lafuente and Romo, 2005, 2006; Vergara et al., 2016), object categories (Freedman et al., 2001), motor intentions (Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; Thura and Cisek, 2014), and…”
BackgroundSelf-citationDisruption of frontal-parietal communication by ketamine, propofol, and sevoflurane
Lee, U., Ku, S., Noh, G., Baek, S., Choi, B., & Mashour, G. A. (2013) · Anesthesiology · doi:10.1097/aln.0b013e31829103f5 · Cited by 426 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Several lines of evidence also suggest that anesthetics preferentially affect feedback connectivity originating in frontal cortex, as might be predicted by GNW theory (Lee et al., 2013; Moon et al., 2015).”
BackgroundSelf-citationContextual Feedback to Superficial Layers of V1
Muckli, L., De Martino, F., Vizioli, L., Petro, L. S., Smith, F. W., Ugurbil, K., Goebel, R., & Yacoub, E. (2015) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2015.08.057 · Cited by 423 · see citing works
Navigating the Affordance Landscape: Feedback Control as a Process Model of Behavior and Cognition
Pezzulo, G., & Cisek, P. (2016) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2016.03.013 · Cited by 419 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Working memory operations can thereby execute the successive mental steps required to solve a task and permit mental simulations, i.e., subjects can navigate through sequences of working memory states to explore the future consequences of actions (Pezzulo and Cisek, 2016).”
BackgroundActive cortical dendrites modulate perception
Takahashi, N., Oertner, T. G., Hegemann, P., & Larkum, M. E. (2016) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aah6066 · Cited by 419 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Feed-back from the frontal cortex thereby amplifies neuronal activity elicited by tactile stimuli in the somatosensory cortex and this amplification predicts successful perception (Sachidhanandam et al., 2013; Takahashi et al., 2016).”
BackgroundA cortico-cerebellar loop for motor planning
Gao, Z., Davis, C., Thomas, A. M., Economo, M. N., Abrego, A. M., Svoboda, K., De Zeeuw, C. I., & Li, N. (2018) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-018-0633-x · Cited by 417 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Persistent neuronal activity allows the nervous system to bridge the time between sensory stimuli, task instructions, and actions that need to take place at a later point in time (Fuster, 1997).”
BackgroundSyllabic discrimination in premature human infants prior to complete formation of cortical layers
Mahmoudzadeh, M., Dehaene-Lambertz, G., Fournier, M., Kongolo, G., Goudjil, S., Dubois, J., Grebe, R., & Wallois, F. (2013) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1212220110 · Cited by 401 · see citing works
Selective Activation of the Deep Layers of the Human Primary Visual Cortex by Top-Down Feedback
Kok, P., Bains, L. J., van Mourik, T., Norris, D. G., & de Lange, F. P. (2016) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2015.12.038 · Cited by 397 · see citing works
The threshold for conscious report: Signal loss and response bias in visual and frontal cortex
van Vugt, B., Dagnino, B., Vartak, D., Safaai, H., Panzeri, S., Dehaene, S., & Roelfsema, P. R. (2018) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aar7186 · Cited by 394 · cited 7× · see citing works
“The data of van Vugt et al. (2018) indicate that ignition characterizes the transition of a weak sensory stimulus into the attended working memory state.”
BackgroundResultInfluentialSelf-citationNeural dissociation between visual awareness and spatial attention
Wyart, V., & Tallon-Baudry, C. (2008) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.4748-07.2008 · Cited by 391 · see citing works
Thalamus Modulates Consciousness via Layer-Specific Control of Cortex
Redinbaugh, M. J., Phillips, J. M., Kambi, N. A., Mohanta, S., Andryk, S., Dooley, G. L., Afrasiabi, M., Raz, A., & Saalmann, Y. B. (2020) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2020.01.005 · Cited by 391 · see citing works
The anterior cingulate gyrus and the mechanism of self-regulation
POSNER, M. I., ROTHBART, M. K., SHEESE, B. E., & TANG, Y. (2007) · Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3758/cabn.7.4.391 · Cited by 385 · cited 1× · see citing works
“A core set of brain areas involved in self-referential processing has been identified through neuroimaging studies using various modalities (Lou et al., 2017; Posner et al., 2007).”
MethodMembrane potential correlates of sensory perception in mouse barrel cortex
Sachidhanandam, S., Sreenivasan, V., Kyriakatos, A., Kremer, Y., & Petersen, C. C. H. (2013) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn.3532 · Cited by 384 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Feed-back from the frontal cortex thereby amplifies neuronal activity elicited by tactile stimuli in the somatosensory cortex and this amplification predicts successful perception (Sachidhanandam et al., 2013; Takahashi et al., 2016).”
BackgroundA Top-Down Cortical Circuit for Accurate Sensory Perception
Manita, S., Suzuki, T., Homma, C., Matsumoto, T., Odagawa, M., Yamada, K., Ota, K., Matsubara, C., Inutsuka, A., Sato, M., et al. (2015) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2015.05.006 · Cited by 365 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Although most experiments on conscious perception are correlational in nature and merely observe neural “correlates” or “signatures” of conscious perception, some studies (Manita et al., 2015; Sachidhanandam et al., 2013) provide evidence for a causal role of top-down inputs in perception.”
BackgroundInduction of self awareness in dreams through frontal low current stimulation of gamma activity
Voss, U., Holzmann, R., Hobson, A., Paulus, W., Koppehele-Gossel, J., Klimke, A., & Nitsche, M. A. (2014) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn.3719 · Cited by 340 · see citing works
Chennu, S., Annen, J., Wannez, S., Thibaut, A., Chatelle, C., Cassol, H., Martens, G., Schnakers, C., Gosseries, O., Menon, D., et al. (2017) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awx163 · Cited by 339 · see citing works
Causal role of prefrontal cortex in the threshold for access to consciousness
Del Cul, A., Dehaene, S., Reyes, P., Bravo, E., & Slachevsky, A. (2009) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awp111 · Cited by 337 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…in patients with frontal-lobe syndrome, neglect, multiple sclerosis, or schizophrenia and related to abnormal long-distance fiber tracts, as measured by diffusion tensor imaging (Del Cul et al., 2009; Pettersson-Yeo et al., 2011; Reuter et al., 2007, 2009; Thiebaut de Schotten et al., 2005).”
BackgroundSelf-citationDiscrete attractor dynamics underlies persistent activity in the frontal cortex
Inagaki, H. K., Fontolan, L., Romani, S., & Svoboda, K. (2019) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-019-0919-7 · Cited by 334 · cited 1× · see citing works
“The interactions between these brain structures enable distinct attractor states for the maintenance of different items in memory (Inagaki et al., 2019).”
BackgroundDehaene, S., & Changeux, J.-P. (2005) · PLoS Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0030141 · Cited by 329 · cited 4× · see citing works
“By contrast, the GNW hypothesis, as initially proposed by Dehaene et al. (1998) and later simulated (Dehaene and Changeux, 2005; Dehaene et al., 2003), proposes a defined brain network as the neural instantiation.”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialSelf-citationtDCS in patients with disorders of consciousness: Sham-controlled randomized double-blind study
Thibaut, A., Bruno, M.-A., Ledoux, D., Demertzi, A., & Laureys, S. (2014) · Neurology · doi:10.1212/wnl.0000000000000260 · Cited by 324 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Transcranial direct current stimulation of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex may also transiently enhance level of consciousness in some patients in a minimally conscious state (Thibaut et al., 2014; Thibaut et al., 2015), and similar observations exist in normal subjects (Douglas et al.”
ResultSaalmann, Y. B. (2014) · Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnsys.2014.00083 · Cited by 323 · cited 4× · see citing works
“Most importantly, only the N2 remains under conditions where the stimuli are task-irrelevant yet reported to be consciously perceived (Pitts et al., 2012, 2014).”
BackgroundInfluentialNeuronal correlates of subjective sensory experience
de Lafuente, V., & Romo, R. (2005) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn1587 · Cited by 319 · see citing works
A Neurodynamical cortical model of visual attention and invariant object recognition
Deco, G., & Rolls, E. T. (2003) · Vision Research · doi:10.1016/j.visres.2003.09.037 · Cited by 316 · see citing works
Should a Few Null Findings Falsify Prefrontal Theories of Conscious Perception?
Odegaard, B., Knight, R. T., & Lau, H. (2017) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.3217-16.2017 · Cited by 316 · cited 2× · see citing works
“It is important to note that the GNW hypothesis is not a local-izationist approach to conscious access, nor is conscious access posited to exist solely in a given node of the GNW (for recent discussions of localization and conscious access, see Boly et al., 2017; Odegaard et al., 2017).”
BackgroundEvent-related brain potential correlates of visual awareness
Koivisto, M., & Revonsuo, A. (2010) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2009.12.002 · Cited by 314 · cited 3× · see citing works
“VAN has been suggested as the earliest electrophysiological correlate of visual awareness (Koivisto and Grassini, 2016), and this claim has been corroborated with magnetoencephalography (MEG) (Andersen et al., 2016).”
BackgroundResidual cerebral activity and behavioural fragments can remain in the persistently vegetative brain
Schiff, N. D., Ribary, U., Moreno, D. R., Beattie, B., Kronberg, E., Blasberg, R., Giacino, J., McCagg, C., Fins, J. J., Llinás, R., et al. (2002) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awf131 · Cited by 306 · cited 1× · see citing works
“of metabolic and cognitive activity in conditions such as the vegetative state (now often referred to as unresponsive wakefulness syndrome) (Schiff et al., 2002).”
BackgroundBanoub, M., Tetzlaff, J. E., & Schubert, A. (2003) · Anesthesiology · doi:10.1097/00000542-200309000-00029 · Cited by 299 · cited 1× · see citing works
“In the clinical setting, for example, it is well known that long-latencyevoked potentials are preferentially susceptible to general anesthesia, whereas short-latency potentials are preserved (Banoub et al., 2003).”
BackgroundMeasuring information integration
Tononi, G., & Sporns, O. (2003) · BMC Neuroscience · doi:10.1186/1471-2202-4-31 · Cited by 294 · cited 1× · see citing works
“IIT is primarily a mathematical theory: it introduces a quantity called F, which quantifies the degree of consciousness of any system, biological or artificial, and suggests that at any given moment, the neural correlate of consciousness is a complex yielding a maximum of irreducible, intrinsic cause–effect power (Oiz…”
BackgroundNeural correlate of subjective sensory experience gradually builds up across cortical areas
de Lafuente, V., & Romo, R. (2006) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0605826103 · Cited by 287 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…et al., 2014; van Kerkoerle et al., 2017) to the frontal cortex, where neurons code for more abstract aspects of sensory stimuli (de Lafuente and Romo, 2005, 2006; Vergara et al., 2016), object categories (Freedman et al., 2001), motor intentions (Alexander and Crutcher, 1990;…”
BackgroundDeliberation and Commitment in the Premotor and Primary Motor Cortex during Dynamic Decision Making
Thura, D., & Cisek, P. (2014) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2014.01.031 · Cited by 284 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…frontal cortex, where neurons code for more abstract aspects of sensory stimuli (de Lafuente and Romo, 2005, 2006; Vergara et al., 2016), object categories (Freedman et al., 2001), motor intentions (Alexander and Crutcher, 1990; Thura and Cisek, 2014), and task instructions (Wallis et al., 2001).”
BackgroundA source for feature-based attention in the prefrontal cortex
Bichot, N. P., Heard, M. T., DeGennaro, E. M., & Desimone, R. (2015) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2015.10.001 · Cited by 283 · cited 1× · see citing works
“In a search task, enhanced neuronal activity spreads from shape representations in the inferotemporal and frontal cortex to the representations in the retinotopic cortices to enhance the activity of neurons that code the location of the to-be-found object (Bichot et al., 2015; Deco and Rolls, 2004; Zhou and Desimone,…”
Backgroundvan Kerkoerle, T., Self, M. W., & Roelfsema, P. R. (2017) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms13804 · Cited by 281 · see citing works
Self-citationThe Infancy of the Human Brain
Dehaene-Lambertz, G., & Spelke, E. S. (2015) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2015.09.026 · Cited by 264 · see citing works
Persistently active neurons in human medial frontal and medial temporal lobe support working memory
Kamiński, J., Sullivan, S., Chung, J. M., Ross, I. B., Mamelak, A. N., & Rutishauser, U. (2017) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn.4509 · Cited by 264 · see citing works
The Emergence of Human Consciousness: From Fetal to Neonatal Life
Lagercrantz, H., & Changeux, J.-P. (2009) · Pediatric Research · doi:10.1203/pdr.0b013e3181973b0d · Cited by 261 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…development of the human brain, behavior, and consciousness (Barresi and Moore, 1996; Casey et al., 2005; Changeux, 2006; Dehaene-Lambertz and Spelke, 2015; De-haene and Changeux, 2011; Filippetti et al., 2015; Gogtay et al., 2004; Gopnik et al., 2001; Lagercrantz and Changeux, 2009; Zelazo, 2004).”
BackgroundSelf-citationSingle-neuron correlates of subjective vision in the human medial temporal lobe
Kreiman, G., Fried, I., & Koch, C. (2002) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.072194099 · Cited by 253 · cited 1× · see citing works
“In humans, the so-called concept cells in the anterior temporal lobe, which fire after 300-400 ms to specific pictures and words such as “Bill Clinton” or “the world-trade center,” do so with stronger and longer-lasting firing rates when the corresponding stimulus is consciously perceived (Gelbard-Sagiv et al., 2018;…”
BackgroundDistinct Roles of the Cortical Layers of Area V1 in Figure-Ground Segregation
Self, M. W., van Kerkoerle, T., Supèr, H., & Roelfsema, P. R. (2013) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2013.09.013 · Cited by 249 · cited 2× · see citing works
“preserved on trials without conscious perception, particularly under inattention conditions (Marti and Dehaene, 2017; Marti et al., 2015; Sergent et al., 2005).”
BackgroundSelf-citationDisruption of hierarchical predictive coding during sleep
Strauss, M., Sitt, J. D., King, J.-R., Elbaz, M., Azizi, L., Buiatti, M., Naccache, L., van Wassenhove, V., & Dehaene, S. (2015) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1501026112 · Cited by 244 · cited 9× · see citing works
“Beyond MEG and EEG, ignition has been demonstrated in neural firing, both in human and non-human primates.”
MethodInfluentialSelf-citationTowards a comprehensive understanding of anesthetic mechanisms of action: a decade of discovery
Hemmings, H. C., Riegelhaupt, P. M., Kelz, M. B., Solt, K., Eckenhoff, R. G., Orser, B. A., & Goldstein, P. A. (2019) · Trends in Pharmacological Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tips.2019.05.001 · Cited by 244 · see citing works
Sharp emergence of feature-selective sustained activity along the dorsal visual pathway
Mendoza-Halliday, D., Torres, S., & Martínez-Trujillo, J. (2014) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn.3785 · Cited by 239 · cited 1× · see citing works
“, 2017), ranging from primary sensory cortices that code for the memories of elementary sensory features (Mendoza-Halliday et al., 2014; van Kerkoerle et al., 2017) to the frontal cortex, where neurons code formore abstract aspects of sensory stimuli (de Lafuente and Romo, 2005, 2006; Vergara et al.”
BackgroundLarge-scale cortical networks for hierarchical prediction and prediction error in the primate brain
Chao, Z. C., Takaura, K., Wang, L., Fujii, N., & Dehaene, S. (2018) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2018.10.004 · Cited by 238 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…response can be preserved in coma, sleep, or inattention; however, higher-level temporal and prefrontal regions generate a later prediction error (P3 wave) when the global sequence is violated only under conscious conditions (local/global paradigm) (Bekinschtein et al., 2009; Chao et al., 2018).”
BackgroundSelf-citationA neural marker of perceptual consciousness in infants
Kouider, S., Stahlhut, C., Gelskov, S. V., Barbosa, L. S., Dutat, M., de Gardelle, V., Christophe, A., Dehaene, S., & Dehaene-Lambertz, G. (2013) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1232509 · Cited by 235 · cited 1× · see citing works
“In all age groups, event-related potentials revealed a late non-linear slow wave that shifted from a weak and delayed response in 5-month-olds (starting around 900 ms) to a more sustained and faster response in older infants (around 750 ms as compared to ~300 ms in adults) (Kouider et al., 2013).”
BackgroundSelf-citationGamma band activity and the P3 reflect post-perceptual processes, not visual awareness
Pitts, M. A., Padwal, J., Fennelly, D., Martínez, A., & Hillyard, S. A. (2014) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.07.024 · Cited by 229 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Most importantly, only the N2 remains under conditions where the stimuli are task-irrelevant yet reported to be consciously perceived (Pitts et al., 2012, 2014).”
BackgroundFeature-Based Attention in the Frontal Eye Field and Area V4 during Visual Search
Zhou, H., & Desimone, R. (2011) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2011.04.032 · Cited by 227 · see citing works
Mejias, J. F., Murray, J. D., Kennedy, H., & Wang, X.-J. (2016) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.1601335 · Cited by 227 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Addition of layer-specific connectivity in simulations (Mejias et al., 2016) leads to the emergence of frequency-band-specific patterns of causality (bottom-up gamma arising primarily in supragranular layers versus top-down alpha-beta arising primarily from bottom layers), which have been observed…”
BackgroundHuman single-neuron responses at the threshold of conscious recognition
Quiroga, R. Q., Mukamel, R., Isham, E. A., Malach, R., & Fried, I. (2008) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0707043105 · Cited by 225 · cited 2× · see citing works
“…such as ‘‘Bill Clinton’’ or ‘‘the World Trade Center,’’ do so with stronger and longer-lasting firing rates when the corresponding stimulus is consciously perceived (Gelbard-Sagiv et al., 2018; Kreiman et al., 2002; Quiroga et al., 2008; Reber et al., 2017) or recalled (Gelbard-Sagiv et al., 2008).”
BackgroundFiltering of neural signals by focused attention in the monkey prefrontal cortex
Everling, S., Tinsley, C. J., Gaffan, D., & Duncan, J. (2002) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn874 · Cited by 224 · cited 1× · see citing works
“In this case, activity spreads in the opposite direction from regions that represent the location of the cue to the brain regions that represent the cued shape (Everling et al., 2002; Moran and Desimone, 1985).”
BackgroundA theory of working memory without consciousness or sustained activity
Trübutschek, D., Marti, S., Ojeda, A., King, J.-R., Mi, Y., Tsodyks, M., & Dehaene, S. (2017) · eLife · doi:10.7554/elife.23871 · Cited by 219 · see citing works
Self-citationHamker, F. H. (2005) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhh146 · Cited by 217 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Indeed, GNW models (Dehaene et al., 2003) share many features with models for attention and working memory (Hamker, 2005), which also require interactions between neurons in widespread networks.”
BackgroundDistinct brain mechanisms for conscious versus subliminal error detection
Charles, L., Van Opstal, F., Marti, S., & Dehaene, S. (2013) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.01.054 · Cited by 208 · cited 1× · see citing works
“button but only if the stimulus that led to the error was consciously perceived, thus allowing a conscious top-down intention signal to be compared with the ongoing action (Charles et al., 2013).”
BackgroundSelf-citationBonhomme, V., Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Demertzi, A., Bruno, M.-A., Jaquet, O., Bahri, M. A., Plenevaux, A., Boly, M., Boveroux, P., Soddu, A., et al. (2016) · Anesthesiology · doi:10.1097/aln.0000000000001275 · Cited by 207 · cited 1× · see citing works
“29 by fMRI to functionally disconnect prefrontal cortex and posterior parietal cortices (such as the precuneus) in humans (Bonhomme et al., 2016; Boveroux et al., 2010; Palanca et al., 2015).”
BackgroundBrain Mechanisms Underlying the Brief Maintenance of Seen and Unseen Sensory Information
King, J.-R., Pescetelli, N., & Dehaene, S. (2016) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2016.10.051 · Cited by 206 · cited 6× · see citing works
“In this framework, ignition is seen as a sudden, high-speed divergence of the trajectories on trials reported as consciously perceived, generating a series of metastable activity states (Baria et al., 2017; He, 2018; King et al., 2016).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationVisual processing of contour patterns under conditions of inattentional blindness
Pitts, M. A., Martínez, A., & Hillyard, S. A. (2012) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00111 · Cited by 204 · see citing works
Slow-wave activity saturation and thalamocortical isolation during propofol anesthesia in humans
Ní Mhuircheartaigh, R., Warnaby, C., Rogers, R., Jbabdi, S., & Tracey, I. (2013) · Science Translational Medicine · doi:10.1126/scitranslmed.3006007 · Cited by 202 · cited 2× · see citing works
“As in sensory access, the first ~200 ms of firing, corresponding to the ERN, can occur even for non-conscious errors, whereas the late ignition occurs only when the error is consciously detected (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001).”
BackgroundPanagiotaropoulos, T. I., Deco, G., Kapoor, V., & Logothetis, N. K. (2012) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2012.04.013 · Cited by 198 · see citing works
Collin, G., & van den Heuvel, M. P. (2013) · The Neuroscientist · doi:10.1177/1073858413503712 · Cited by 198 · see citing works
Cueing attention after the stimulus is gone can retrospectively trigger conscious perception
Sergent, C., Wyart, V., Babo-Rebelo, M., Cohen, L., Naccache, L., & Tallon-Baudry, C. (2013) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2012.11.047 · Cited by 195 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Even a ‘‘retro-cue’’ coming as late as 900 ms after a flashed stimulus can lead to the retrospective conscious perception of a stimulus that would otherwise have been too weak to be perceived (Sergent et al., 2013; Thibault et al., 2016).”
BackgroundHuman consciousness and its relationship to social neuroscience: A novel hypothesis
Graziano, M. S. A., & Kastner, S. (2011) · Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17588928.2011.565121 · Cited by 195 · see citing works
Lamme, V. A. F. (2018) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2017.0344 · Cited by 194 · cited 3× · see citing works
“A related proposal is that feedback processing within sensory cortices (e.g., during figure-ground segregation) could be important for phenomenal consciousness (Lamme, 2006), whereas more global feedback (e.g., in frontal-parietal networks) is important for access consciousness (Lamme, 2018).”
BackgroundMethodImas, O. A., Ropella, K. M., Ward, B. D., Wood, J. D., & Hudetz, A. G. (2005) · Neuroscience Letters · doi:10.1016/j.neulet.2005.06.018 · Cited by 189 · cited 1× · see citing works
“In addition to human investigations, this finding has been replicated across species, from monkey (Papadopoulou et al., 2019) to ferret (Wollstadt et al., 2017), rodent (Imas et al., 2005), and Drosophila (in which a higher-order nucleus was the source of feedback) (Cohen et al., 2018).”
BackgroundAttention but not awareness modulates the BOLD signal in the human V1 during binocular suppression
Watanabe, M., Cheng, K., Murayama, Y., Ueno, K., Asamizuya, T., Tanaka, K., & Logothetis, N. (2011) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1203161 · Cited by 187 · see citing works
Different glutamate receptors convey feedforward and recurrent processing in macaque V1
Self, M. W., Kooijmans, R. N., Supèr, H., Lamme, V. A., & Roelfsema, P. R. (2012) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1119527109 · Cited by 184 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Pharmacological studies indicate that, in agreement with the GNW hypothesis (Dehaene and Changeux, 2005), the initial feedforward sweep predominantly relies on AMPA glutamate receptors, whereas NMDA receptors play a dominant role in the later feedback effects (Self et al., 2012).”
ResultSelf-citationRapid Encoding of New Memories by Individual Neurons in the Human Brain
Ison, M. J., Quian Quiroga, R., & Fried, I. (2015) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2015.06.016 · Cited by 184 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Medial temporal neurons code for associations, i.e., the transitions between spe-cific working memories (Ison et al., 2015; Sakai and Miyashita, 1991).”
BackgroundMeasuring Integrated Information from the Decoding Perspective
Oizumi, M., Amari, S.-I., Yanagawa, T., Fujii, N., & Tsuchiya, N. (2016) · PLOS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004654 · Cited by 184 · cited 1× · see citing works
“making it difficult to test the theory (for attempts, see (Oizumi et al., 2016; Tajima et al., 2015).”
BackgroundJordan, D., Ilg, R., Riedl, V., Schorer, A., Grimberg, S., Neufang, S., Omerovic, A., Berger, S., Untergehrer, G., Preibisch, C., et al. (2013) · Anesthesiology · doi:10.1097/aln.0b013e3182a7ca92 · Cited by 180 · see citing works
Recovery of consciousness is mediated by a network of discrete metastable activity states
Hudson, A. E., Calderon, D. P., Pfaff, D. W., & Proekt, A. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1408296111 · Cited by 178 · see citing works
Differential Role of Prefrontal and Parietal Cortices in Controlling Level of Consciousness
Pal, D., Dean, J. G., Liu, T., Li, D., Watson, C. J., Hudetz, A. G., & Mashour, G. A. (2018) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2018.05.025 · Cited by 177 · see citing works
Self-citationTask-dependent changes in short-term memory in the prefrontal cortex
Warden, M. R., & Miller, E. K. (2010) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.1569-10.2010 · Cited by 171 · see citing works
The implementation of visual routines
Roelfsema, P. R., Lamme, V. A. F., & Spekreijse, H. (2000) · Vision Research · doi:10.1016/s0042-6989(00)00004-3 · Cited by 162 · cited 4× · see citing works
“The early recurrent loops occur in lower areas (Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000) and may correspond to VAN (Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010).”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationJoglekar, M. R., Mejias, J. F., Yang, G. R., & Wang, X.-J. (2018) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2018.02.031 · Cited by 153 · see citing works
The human Turing machine: a neural framework for mental programs
Zylberberg, A., Dehaene, S., Roelfsema, P. R., & Sigman, M. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.007 · Cited by 151 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Attentional signals select a particular piece of information by amplifying its activity and reducing that of other competing stimuli, whereas persistent neuronal activity keeps information online in working memory (Roelfsema, 2005; Roelfsema et al., 2000; Zylberberg et al., 2011).”
BackgroundSelf-citationEvolution of consciousness: Phylogeny, ontogeny, and emergence from general anesthesia
Mashour, G. A., & Alkire, M. T. (2013) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1301188110 · Cited by 144 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Evidence now suggests that, despite a diversity of root causes, there is possibly a common proximate cause that disrupts the reverberant networks of the GNW that have been posited to enable conscious access (Mashour, 2013).”
BackgroundSelf-citationOntogeny and phylogeny of language
Yang, C. (2013) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1216803110 · Cited by 142 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Such recursion is absent or very limited in other animals: although they may acquire some language-like symbolic abilities, they do so at a very slow pace and up to a limited level (Jiang et al., 2018; Yang, 2013).”
BackgroundRanft, A., Golkowski, D., Kiel, T., Riedl, V., Kohl, P., Rohrer, G., Pientka, J., Berger, S., Thul, A., Maurer, M., et al. (2016) · Anesthesiology · doi:10.1097/aln.0000000000001322 · Cited by 142 · cited 1× · see citing works
“symbolic transfer entropy based on EEG signals (Jordan et al., 2013; Ranft et al., 2016).”
BackgroundSelf-citationMoon, J.-Y., Lee, U., Blain-Moraes, S., & Mashour, G. A. (2015) · PLOS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004225 · Cited by 136 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Several lines of evidence also suggest that anesthetics preferentially affect feedback connectivity originating in the frontal cortex, as might be predicted by the GNW hypothesis (Lee et al., 2013; Moon et al., 2015).”
BackgroundSelf-citationKlink, P. C., Dagnino, B., Gariel-Mathis, M.-A., & Roelfsema, P. R. (2017) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2017.05.033 · Cited by 135 · cited 2× · see citing works
“The past two decades have witnessed substantial progress in the field, which has been driven by an array of conceptual and experimental advances (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Koch et al., 2016).”
BackgroundSelf-citationPitts, M. A., Lutsyshyna, L. A., & Hillyard, S. A. (2018) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2017.0348 · Cited by 135 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…stimuli are truly seen as opposed to being merely potentially visible but unattended: intermediate-latency sustained negativities may reflect a neural state of information accessibility, whereas the P3b would reflect genuine conscious access and processing (for discussion, see Pitts et al., 2018).”
BackgroundPersistent Single-Neuron Activity during Working Memory in the Human Medial Temporal Lobe
Kornblith, S., Quian Quiroga, R., Koch, C., Fried, I., & Mormann, F. (2017) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2017.02.013 · Cited by 133 · cited 2× · see citing works
“A central finding is that concept cells fire when concepts are held in working memory (Kami (cid:2) nski et al., 2017; Kornblith et al., 2017) and become active when these concepts are retrieved from long-term memory (Gelbard-Sagiv et al., 2008).”
BackgroundTowards a cognitive neuroscience of self-awareness
Lou, H. C., Changeux, J. P., & Rosenstand, A. (2017) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.04.004 · Cited by 131 · see citing works
Self-citationResting-state Dynamics as a Cortical Signature of Anesthesia in Monkeys
Uhrig, L., Sitt, J. D., Jacob, A., Tasserie, J., Barttfeld, P., Dupont, M., Dehaene, S., & Jarraya, B. (2018) · Anesthesiology · doi:10.1097/aln.0000000000002336 · Cited by 131 · cited 2× · see citing works
“…work in non-human primates demonstrates that the functional relationships between critical nodes in the GNW— such as prefrontal, posterior parietal, and cingulate cortices— are stereotypically altered during propofol, sevoflurane, and ketamine anesthesia (Barttfeld et al., 2015; Uhrig et al., 2018).”
BackgroundSelf-citationGraziano, M. S. A., Guterstam, A., Bio, B. J., & Wilterson, A. I. (2020) · Cognitive Neuropsychology · doi:10.1080/02643294.2019.1670630 · Cited by 129 · see citing works
Loss of Consciousness Is Associated with Stabilization of Cortical Activity
Solovey, G., Alonso, L. M., Yanagawa, T., Fujii, N., Magnasco, M. O., Cecchi, G., & Proekt, A. (2015) · Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.4895-14.2015 · Cited by 127 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…finding explains observations in humans of reduced frontal-parietal connectivity, as well as observations in primates that general anesthetics across multiple drug classes stabilize cortical dynamics (Solovey et al., 2015) or are associated with a deviation from critical dynamics (Lee et al., 2019).”
BackgroundDiscrete and continuous mechanisms of temporal selection in rapid visual streams
Marti, S., & Dehaene, S. (2017) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-017-02079-x · Cited by 127 · cited 1× · see citing works
“The first 200 ms of brain activity, corresponding to early perceptual processing, can be fully preserved on trials without conscious perception, particularly under inattention conditions (Marti and Dehaene, 2017; Marti et al., 2015; Sergent et al., 2005).”
BackgroundSelf-citationFu, Z., Wu, D.-A. J., Ross, I. B., Chung, J. M., Mamelak, A. N., Adolphs, R., & Rutishauser, U. (2018) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2018.11.016 · Cited by 123 · see citing works
Reappraising the relationship between working memory and conscious awareness
Soto, D., & Silvanto, J. (2014) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2014.06.005 · Cited by 121 · see citing works
Distinct cortical codes and temporal dynamics for conscious and unconscious percepts
Salti, M., Monto, S., Charles, L., King, J.-R., Parkkonen, L., & Dehaene, S. (2015) · eLife · doi:10.7554/elife.05652 · Cited by 121 · see citing works
Self-citationDisconnecting Consciousness: Is There a Common Anesthetic End Point?
Hudetz, A. G., & Mashour, G. A. (2016) · Anesthesia & Analgesia · doi:10.1213/ane.0000000000001353 · Cited by 121 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Frontal-parietal networks are of particular Neuron 105 , March 4, 2020 785 Neuron Review importance in this regard and have been found to be metabolically depressed, disrupted, or functionally disconnected by all major classes of general anesthetics (Hudetz and Mashour, 2016).”
BackgroundSelf-citationA shared cortical bottleneck underlying Attentional Blink and Psychological Refractory Period
Marti, S., Sigman, M., & Dehaene, S. (2012) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.09.063 · Cited by 120 · see citing works
Self-citationLeslie, K., Skrzypek, H., Paech, M. J., Kurowski, I., & Whybrow, T. (2007) · Anesthesiology · doi:10.1097/00000542-200701000-00010 · Cited by 117 · see citing works
Incremental grouping of image elements in vision
Roelfsema, P. R., & Houtkamp, R. (2011) · Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics · doi:10.3758/s13414-011-0200-0 · Cited by 112 · cited 3× · see citing works
“…enters consciousness, where it can use the GNW to activate all features that belong to the same object even if they are represented in different cortical areas (Roelfsema and Houtkamp, 2011), allowing conscious perception to be occupied by coherent, multifeature, and multimodal objects (Figure 4).”
BackgroundSelf-citationPalanca, B. J. A., Mitra, A., Larson-Prior, L., Snyder, A. Z., Avidan, M. S., & Raichle, M. E. (2015) · Anesthesiology · doi:10.1097/aln.0000000000000731 · Cited by 112 · see citing works
A Neural Parametric Code for Storing Information of More than One Sensory Modality in Working Memory
Vergara, J. R. A., Rivera, N., Rossi-Pool, R., & Romo, R. (2015) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2015.11.026 · Cited by 109 · cited 2× · see citing works
“, 2017) to the frontal cortex where neurons code for more abstract aspects of sensory stimuli (de Lafuente and Romo, 2005, 2006; Vergara et al., 2016), object categories (Freedman et al.”
BackgroundHuang, Z., Liu, X., Mashour, G. A., & Hudetz, A. G. (2018) · Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.2545-17.2018 · Cited by 107 · see citing works
Self-citationAndersen, L. M., Pedersen, M. N., Sandberg, K., & Overgaard, M. S. (2015) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhv108 · Cited by 104 · see citing works
Bachmann, T., & Hudetz, A. G. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00940 · Cited by 104 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Another distinction relates to the level and content of conscious processing, two dimensions that are distinct though not fully dissociable (Bachmann and Hudetz, 2014).”
BackgroundThibaut, A., Perri, C. D., Chatelle, C., Bruno, M., Bahri, M. A., Wannez, S., Piarulli, A., Bernard, C., Martial, C., Heine, L., et al. (2015) · Brain stimulation · doi:10.1016/j.brs.2015.07.024 · Cited by 102 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Transcranial direct current stimulation of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex may also transiently enhance level of consciousness in some patients in a minimally conscious state (Thibaut et al., 2014; Thibaut et al., 2015), and similar observations exist in normal subjects (Douglas et al.”
ResultNeural processing around 200 ms after stimulus-onset correlates with subjective visual awareness
Koivisto, M., & Grassini, S. (2016) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2016.02.024 · Cited by 102 · cited 4× · see citing works
“VAN has been suggested as the earliest electrophysiological correlate of visual awareness (Koivisto and Grassini, 2016), and this claim has been corroborated with magnetoencephalography (MEG) (Andersen et al., 2016).”
InfluentialLee, H., Golkowski, D., Jordan, D., Berger, S., Ilg, R., Lee, J., Mashour, G. A., Lee, U., Avidan, M. S., Blain‐Moraes, S., et al. (2018) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2018.12.011 · Cited by 97 · cited 2× · see citing works
“…finding explains observations in humans of reduced frontal-parietal connectivity, as well as observations in primates that general anesthetics across multiple drug classes stabilize cortical dynamics (Solovey et al., 2015) or are associated with a deviation from critical dynamics (Lee et al., 2019).”
BackgroundSelf-citationDisruption of corticocortical information transfer during ketamine anesthesia in the primate brain
Schroeder, K. E., Irwin, Z. T., Gaidica, M., Bentley, J. N., Patil, P. G., Mashour, G. A., & Chestek, C. A. (2016) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2016.04.039 · Cited by 95 · see citing works
Self-citationNeural Mechanisms of Body Awareness in Infants
Filippetti, M. L., Lloyd‐Fox, S., Longo, M. R., Farroni, T., & Johnson, M. H. (2014) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhu261 · Cited by 94 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…development of the human brain, behavior, and consciousness (Barresi and Moore, 1996; Casey et al., 2005; Changeux, 2006; Dehaene-Lambertz and Spelke, 2015; De-haene and Changeux, 2011; Filippetti et al., 2015; Gogtay et al., 2004; Gopnik et al., 2001; Lagercrantz and Changeux, 2009; Zelazo, 2004).”
BackgroundThe P3 component of the ERP reflects conscious perception, not confidence
Salti, M., Bar‐Haim, Y., & Lamy, D. (2012) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2012.01.012 · Cited by 93 · cited 1× · see citing works
“13 positive is correlated with awareness (Salti et al., 2012), post-perceptual processes (Andersen et al.”
BackgroundMashour, G. A. (2013) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2013.09.009 · Cited by 92 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Evidence now suggests that, despite a diversity of root causes, there is possibly a common proximate cause that disrupts the reverberant networks of the GNW that have been posited to enable conscious access (Mashour, 2013).”
BackgroundSelf-citationRetrospective Attention Gates Discrete Conscious Access to Past Sensory Stimuli
Thibault, L., van den Berg, R., Cavanagh, P., & Sergent, C. (2016) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0148504 · Cited by 91 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Even a ‘‘retro-cue’’ coming as late as 900 ms after a flashed stimulus can lead to the retrospective conscious perception of a stimulus that would otherwise have been too weak to be perceived (Sergent et al., 2013; Thibault et al., 2016).”
BackgroundTime-Resolved Decoding of Two Processing Chains during Dual-Task Interference
Marti, S., King, J.-R., & Dehaene, S. (2015) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2015.10.040 · Cited by 90 · see citing works
Self-citationChang, L., Zhang, S., Poo, M.-M., & Gong, N. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1620764114 · Cited by 90 · cited 2× · see citing works
“43 such as a rudimentary capacity to acquire mirror self-recognition (Chang et al., 2017; Mashour and Alkire, 2013b).”
BackgroundProduction of Supra-regular Spatial Sequences by Macaque Monkeys
Jiang, X., Long, T., Cao, W., Li, J., Dehaene, S., & Wang, L. (2018) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2018.04.047 · Cited by 89 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Such recursion is absent or very limited in other animals; although they may acquire some language-like symbolic abilities, they do so at a very slow pace and only up to a limited level (Jiang et al., 2018; Yang, 2013).”
BackgroundSelf-citationProbing the limits of activity-silent non-conscious working memory
Trübutschek, D., Marti, S., Ueberschär, H., & Dehaene, S. (2019) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1820730116 · Cited by 88 · see citing works
Self-citationTesting the involvement of the prefrontal cortex in lucid dreaming: a tDCS study
Stumbrys, T., Erlacher, D., & Schredl, M. (2013) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2013.08.005 · Cited by 85 · cited 1× · see citing works
“Another study showed that transcranial direct current stimulation of the dorsolateral PFC is associated with enhanced lucidity during REM sleep (analogous to the above-cited studies of minimal conscious access; Stumbrys et al., 2013).”
Background
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Seth, A. K., & Bayne, T. (2022) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4 · Cited by 880 · see citing works
Cellular Mechanisms of Conscious Processing
Aru, J., Suzuki, M., & Larkum, M. E. (2020) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2020.07.006 · Cited by 321 · see citing works
“Why? Some theories include the notion of a critical threshold of activation or ‘ignition’ level of interactions between brain areas [8,10].”
BackgroundInfluentialA Synergistic Core for Human Brain Evolution and Cognition
Luppi, A. I., Mediano, P. A. M., Rosas, F. E., Holland, N., Fryer, T. D., O’Brien, J. T., Rowe, J. B., Menon, D. K., Bor, D., & Stamatakis, E. A. (2022) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41593-022-01070-0 · Cited by 314 · see citing works
How critical is brain criticality?
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A neural correlate of sensory consciousness in a corvid bird
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The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI
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Predicting lapses of attention with sleep-like slow waves
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Hard criteria for empirical theories of consciousness
Doerig, A., Schurger, A., & Herzog, M. H. (2021) · Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17588928.2020.1772214 · Cited by 194 · see citing works
“Dehaene and collegues subsequently proposed the global neuronal workspace theory (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Mashour et al., 2020).”
BackgroundConsciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness
Butlin, P., Long, R., Elmoznino, E., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Constant, A., Deane, G., Fleming, S. M., Frith, C., Ji, X., et al. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2308.08708 · Cited by 196 · see citing works
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“Thus, conscious access is achieved by corticocortical loops and corticosubcortical loops ( 10 ).”
Self-citationMaking the hard problem of consciousness easier
Melloni, L., Mudrik, L., Pitts, M., & Koch, C. (2021) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.abj3259 · Cited by 190 · see citing works
Putting the “mental” back in “mental disorders”: a perspective from research on fear and anxiety
Taschereau-Dumouchel, V., Michel, M., Lau, H.-K. C., Hofmann, S., & LeDoux, J. E. (2022) · Molecular Psychiatry · doi:10.1038/s41380-021-01395-5 · Cited by 138 · see citing works
“Our higher-order theory is, in some sense, constructionist and conceptual in nature, but it has a broader view of the non-conscious precursors [107, 116, 118, 123, 145, 153] and it highlights the idea that the conscious experience is the emotion (also see [45]).”
BackgroundDistinguishing the Neural Correlates of Perceptual Awareness and Postperceptual Processing
Cohen, M. A., Ortego, K., Kyroudis, A., & Pitts, M. A. (2020) · Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.0120-20.2020 · Cited by 171 · see citing works
Perceptual awareness negativity: a physiological correlate of sensory consciousness
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Dynamical consequences of regional heterogeneity in the brain’s transcriptional landscape
Deco, G., Aquino, K. M., Arnatkevičiūtė, A., Oldham, S., Sabaroedin, K., Rogasch, N. C., Kringelbach, M. L., & Fornito, A. (2021) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.abf4752 · Cited by 170 · see citing works
Predictive processing as a systematic basis for identifying the neural correlates of consciousness
Hohwy, J., & Seth, A. (2020) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2020.ii.64 · Cited by 170 · see citing works
Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond
Bayne, T., Seth, A. K., Massimini, M., Shepherd, J., Cleeremans, A., Fleming, S. M., Malach, R., Mattingley, J. B., Menon, D. K., Owen, A. M., et al. (2024) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2024.01.010 · Cited by 163 · see citing works
The ConTraSt database for analysing and comparing empirical studies of consciousness theories
Yaron, I., Melloni, L., Pitts, M., & Mudrik, L. (2022) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-021-01284-5 · Cited by 147 · see citing works
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“GNWT has been increasingly described in terms of Bayesian inference (Dehaene, 2020; Mashour et al., 2020), including in a recently proposed Predictive Global Neuronal Workspace model (Whyte and Smith, 2020).”
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Information decomposition and the informational architecture of the brain
Luppi, A. I., Rosas, F. E., Mediano, P. A. M., Menon, D. K., & Stamatakis, E. A. (2024) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2023.11.005 · Cited by 128 · see citing works
“…able to perform cognitively useful computation just by having redundant copies of the same information (integration-as-oneness): computation and complex cognition demand that information should eventually be combined (integration-as-cooperation) if they are to subserve adaptive behaviour [29,30].”
All in Good Time: Long-Lasting Postdictive Effects Reveal Discrete Perception
Herzog, M. H., Drissi-Daoudi, L., & Doerig, A. (2020) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2020.07.001 · Cited by 129 · see citing works
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“Before this study, predictions from IIT and GNWT were typically tested with one data modality at a time 23,24 , leaving room for negative results to be easily attributed to the limitations of the chosen modality 51 .”
InfluentialSelf-citationCan insects feel pain? A review of the neural and behavioural evidence
(2022) · Advances in Insect Physiology · doi:10.1016/bs.aiip.2022.10.001 · Cited by 121 · see citing works
General anesthesia globally synchronizes activity selectively in layer 5 cortical pyramidal neurons
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“One view is that communication in cortico-cortical loops between distinct cortical regions underlies the generation of conscious perception (Mashour et al., 2020; Tononi et al., 2016).”
A dopamine gradient controls access to distributed working memory in the large-scale monkey cortex
Froudist‐Walsh, S., Bliss, D. P., Ding, X., Rapan, L., Niu, M., Knoblauch, K., Zilles, K., Kennedy, H., Palomero‐Gallagher, N., & Wang, X. (2021) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2021.08.024 · Cited by 115 · see citing works
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An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness
Storm, J. F., Klink, P. C., Aru, J., Senn, W., Goebel, R., Pigorini, A., Avanzini, P., Vanduffel, W., Roelfsema, P. R., Massimini, M., et al. (2024) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2024.02.004 · Cited by 114 · see citing works
“64 It has gathered support in recent years, 28 for instance, from human neurophysiological and neuroimaging studies that show a distinct divergence in brain activity around 200 to 300 millisec-onds after stimulus onset that depends on conscious perception 65,66 and has been observed across…”
InfluentialSelf-citationAnterior insula regulates brain network transitions that gate conscious access
Huang, Z., Tarnal, V., Vlisides, P. E., Janke, E., McKinney, A., Picton, P., Mashour, G. A., & Hudetz, A. G. (2021) · Cell Reports · doi:10.1016/j.celrep.2021.109081 · Cited by 122 · see citing works
“Empirical data suggest that conscious representations are constructed in the cortex (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Mashour and Hudetz, 2018; Mashour et al., 2020a) and that the entry of sensory inputs to the cortex is controlled or gated by the thalamus (Alkire et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2011;…”
InfluentialSelf-citationAnesthesia and the neurobiology of consciousness
Mashour, G. A. (2024) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2024.03.002 · Cited by 127 · see citing works
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Self-citationDeep learning and the global workspace theory
VanRullen, R., & Kanai, R. (2021) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/j.tins.2021.04.005 · Cited by 128 · see citing works
“Dehaene and colleagues [12–15] proposed a neuronal version of the theory, Global Neuronal Workspace (GNW).”
BackgroundHow does hemispheric specialization contribute to human-defining cognition?
Hartwigsen, G., Bengio, Y., & Bzdok, D. (2021) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2021.04.024 · Cited by 118 · see citing works
Recovery of consciousness and cognition after general anesthesia in humans
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Self-citationConsciousness in the cradle: on the emergence of infant experience
Bayne, T., Frohlich, J., Cusack, R., Moser, J., & Naci, L. (2023) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2023.08.018 · Cited by 106 · see citing works
“[123] predicts with respect to the emergence of consciousness.”
BackgroundThalamic contributions to the state and contents of consciousness
Whyte, C. J., Redinbaugh, M. J., Shine, J. M., & Saalmann, Y. B. (2024) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2024.04.019 · Cited by 105 · see citing works
Attention for action in visual working memory
Olivers, C. N. L., & Roelfsema, P. R. (2020) · Cortex · doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2020.07.011 · Cited by 99 · see citing works
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“2), and various models of the PFC and consciousness often propose prominent roles for areas other than the lateral PFC (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Brown et al., 2019; Mashour et al., 2020).”
BackgroundInfluentialFrancken, J. C., Beerendonk, L., Molenaar, D., Fahrenfort, J. J., Kiverstein, J. D., Seth, A. K., & van Gaal, S. (2022) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niac011 · Cited by 102 · see citing works
Global Workspace Theory (GWT) and Prefrontal Cortex: Recent Developments
Baars, B. J., Geld, N., & Kozma, R. (2021) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.749868 · Cited by 99 · see citing works
“GWT started in the 1980s as a purely psychological theory of conscious cognition, and has become a prominent approach in scientific studies of consciousness (Mashour et al., 2020).”
BackgroundConsciousness depends on integration between parietal cortex, striatum, and thalamus
Afrasiabi, M., Redinbaugh, M. J., Phillips, J. M., Kambi, N. A., Mohanta, S., Raz, A., Haun, A., & Saalmann, Y. B. (2021) · Cell Systems · doi:10.1016/j.cels.2021.02.003 · Cited by 93 · see citing works
“In GNW, consciousness depends on an “ignition” process through which information becomes globally available via top-down signaling from frontal cortex to specialized processors in more posterior cortex (Figure S1B) (Mashour et al., 2020; Sergent and Dehaene, 2004).”
BackgroundThe feasibility of artificial consciousness through the lens of neuroscience
Aru, J., Larkum, M. E., & Shine, J. M. (2023) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/j.tins.2023.09.009 · Cited by 98 · see citing works
The Architecture of Human Memory: Insights from Human Single-Neuron Recordings
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“Also, this long latency is what is expected from a stimulus that has risen into awareness (Mashour et al., 2020) and is concordant with the known response latencies of memory-related ERPs (Mormann et al., 2005).”
ResultColombo, M., & Piccinini, G. (2023) · doi:10.1017/9781009183734 · Cited by 102 · see citing works
Rare long-range cortical connections enhance human information processing
Deco, G., Perl, Y. S., Vuust, P., Tagliazucchi, E., Kennedy, H., & Kringelbach, M. L. (2021) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2021.07.064 · Cited by 93 · see citing works
“The high-efficiency cortical core has been speculated to provide the structural underpinnings of the globalworkspace hypothesis,(58,59) which proposes that recurrent processing in the core allows amplification and globalization of conscious states.(2,47,60) These results also provide important underpinnings for other…”
BackgroundMinimal physicalism as a scale-free substrate for cognition and consciousness
Fields, C., Glazebrook, J. F., & Levin, M. G. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab013 · Cited by 93 · see citing works
“2020), in particular, implement state-broadcasting functions analogous, at the cellular level, to the broadcasting functions of long-distance connections between network hubs in global neuronal workspace (GNW) models (Dehaene and Naccache 2001; Baars and Franklin 2003; Wallace 2005; Baars et al. 2013; Dehaene et al. 2…”
BackgroundEmergent reliability in sensory cortical coding and inter-area communication
Ebrahimi, S., Lecoq, J. A., Rumyantsev, O., Tasci, T., Zhang, Y., Irimia, C., Li, J., Ganguli, S., & Schnitzer, M. J. (2022) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-022-04724-y · Cited by 91 · see citing works
The predictive global neuronal workspace: a formal active inference model of visual consciousness
Whyte, C. J., & Smith, R. (2021) · Progress in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.pneurobio.2020.101918 · Cited by 84 · see citing works
Explanatory profiles of models of consciousness - towards a systematic classification
Signorelli, C. M., Szczotka, J., & Prentner, R. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab021 · Cited by 91 · see citing works
“Some authors interpret these results as evidence of posterior zones for phenomenal consciousness and support of IIT, while others view them as a clear evidence of the role of prefrontal cortex and GNW (Mashour et al. 2020).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialThe mnemonic basis of subjective experience
Lau, H. C., Michel, M., LeDoux, J. E., & Fleming, S. M. (2022) · Nature Reviews Psychology · doi:10.1038/s44159-022-00068-6 · Cited by 91 · see citing works
An adversarial collaboration to critically evaluate theories of consciousness
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Self-citationNeural Organoids and the Precautionary Principle
Birch, J., & Browning, H. (2021) · The American Journal of Bioethics · doi:10.1080/15265161.2020.1845858 · Cited by 88 · see citing works
Confidence in consciousness research
Michel, M. (2022) · Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Cognitive Science · doi:10.1002/wcs.1628 · Cited by 86 · see citing works
“…are outputs of largely overlapping (meta)cognitive systems in prefrontal cortex (Dehaene et al. 2001; Del Cul et al. 2009; Fleming et al. 2014; Mashour et al. 2020; Mazor et al. 2021; Michel & Morales, 2019; Rahnev et al., 2016; Rounis et al. 2010; Shekhar & Rahnev, 2018; van Vugt et al.…”
BackgroundTheory of the Multiregional Neocortex: Large-Scale Neural Dynamics and Distributed Cognition
Wang, X.-J. (2022) · Annual Review of Neuroscience · doi:10.1146/annurev-neuro-110920-035434 · Cited by 83 · see citing works
“The unexpectedly observed threshold for access to the PFC in the model resembles the so-called ignition phenomenon postulated by the theory of GNW for access consciousness (Baars 1988, Dehaene et al. 2003, Mashour et al. 2020) (Figure 6c).”
BackgroundFarnes, N., Juel, B. E., Nilsen, A. S., Romundstad, L. G., & Storm, J. F. (2020) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0242056 · Cited by 78 · see citing works
“Unlike “typical” general anaesthetics, ketamine also preserves wake-like levels of PCI [13], and alternating wake-like and low levels of signal diversity [5].”
BackgroundInfluentialDebunking a myth: plant consciousness
Mallatt, J. M., Blatt, M. R., Draguhn, A., Robinson, D. G., & Taiz, L. (2020) · PROTOPLASMA · doi:10.1007/s00709-020-01579-w · Cited by 90 · see citing works
“The consensus of opinion among those who study consciousness in animals is that it depends on information integration that involves extensive feedback, or reciprocal (recurrent) communication, between the conductive neurons (Lamme 2006; Feinberg and Mallatt 2018; Koch 2019; Mashour et al. 2020).”
BackgroundEvidence accumulation relates to perceptual consciousness and monitoring
Pereira, M., Mégevand, P., Tan, M. X., Chang, W., Wang, S., Rezai, A. R., Seeck, M., Corniola, M. V., Momjian, S., Bernasconi, F., et al. (2021) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-021-23540-y · Cited by 102 · see citing works
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“This conjecture would explain why we consciously perceive integrated object representations rather than disconnected feature sets (recently reviewed by Mashour et al. 151 ).”
BackgroundSelf-citationDellert, T., Müller-Bardorff, M., Schloßmacher, I., Pitts, M. A., Hofmann, D., Bruchmann, M., & Straube, T. (2021) · Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.2799-20.2021 · Cited by 85 · see citing works
“Critically, most previous research on NCCs has systematically confounded consciousness with processes that precede or follow the experience, for example, introspection, self-monitoring, and reporting (Aru et al., 2012).”
InfluentialUnpacking the complexities of consciousness: Theories and reflections
Mudrik, L., Boly, M., Dehaene, S., Fleming, S. M., Lamme, V., Seth, A., & Melloni, L. (2025) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2025.106053 · Cited by 81 · see citing works
“…Debate," featuring proponents of four theories: Stanislas Dehaene presented the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT; Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Mashour et al., 2020), Melanie Boly presented the Integrated Information Theory (IIT; Albantakis et al., 2023; Tononi, 2008), Stephen Fleming…”
Self-citationPrefrontal cortex as a key node in arousal circuitry
Mashour, G. A., Pal, D., & Brown, E. N. (2022) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/j.tins.2022.07.002 · Cited by 78 · see citing works
“By contrast, frameworks such as the global neuronal workspace theory posit a critical role for the PFC not as the source of consciousness per se (as in some higher-order thought theories [4]), but as a key node that activates a reverberant cortical–cortical network that sustains, amplifies, and makes sensory represent…”
MethodSelf-citationApical drive-A cellular mechanism of dreaming?
Aru, J., Siclari, F., Phillips, W. A., & Storm, J. F. (2020) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2020.09.018 · Cited by 74 · see citing works
Park, B., de Wael, R. V., Paquola, C., Larivière, S., Benkarim, O. M., Royer, J., Tavakol, S., Rodríguez‐Cruces, R., Li, Q., Valk, S. L., et al. (2020) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2020.117429 · Cited by 76 · see citing works
“Contemporary perspectives on brain wide information processing often focus on the process through which sensorimotor inputs gain access to a global workspace that allows these information to be processed in an explicit conscious manner (Dehaene et al., 1998; Mashour et al., 2020).”
BackgroundVisual mental imagery in typical imagers and in aphantasia: A millimeter-scale 7-T fMRI study
Liu, J., Zhan, M., Hajhajate, D., Spagna, A., Dehaene, S., Cohen, L., & Bartolomeo, P. (2025) · Cortex · doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2025.01.013 · Cited by 94 · see citing works
Self-citationFrom Generative Models to Generative Passages: A Computational Approach to (Neuro) Phenomenology
Ramstead, M. J. D., Seth, A. K., Hesp, C., Sandved-Smith, L., Mago, J., Lifshitz, M., Pagnoni, G., Smith, R. S., Dumas, G., Antoine Lutz, A., et al. (2022) · Review of Philosophy and Psychology · doi:10.1007/s13164-021-00604-y · Cited by 89 · see citing works
“Of note is that the present approach and target of explanation should be thought of as distinct from the target of explanation in other, closely related research on the neural correlates of consciousness (e.g., Mashour et al. 2020).”
ResultA Connectomic Hypothesis for the Hominization of the Brain
Changeux, J., Goulas, A., & Hilgetag, C. C. (2020) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhaa365 · Cited by 78 · see citing works
“Its experimental predictions have been recently reviewed and compared with those of the IIT (Mashour et al. 2020).”
BackgroundResultSelf-citationNobre, A. C., & van Ede, F. (2023) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2023.02.032 · Cited by 76 · see citing works
Nonequilibrium brain dynamics as a signature of consciousness
Perl, Y. S., Bocaccio, H., Pallavicini, C., Ipiña, I. P., Laureys, S., Laufs, H., Kringelbach, M. L., Deco, G., & Tagliazucchi, E. (2021) · Physical review. E · doi:10.1103/physreve.104.014411 · Cited by 73 · see citing works
“For example, the global workspace theory posits that consciousness is equivalent to the nonlinear and flexible percolation of sensory information throughout an anatomical connectivity backbone [25].”
BackgroundPerl, Y. S., Pallavicini, C., Ipiña, I. P., Athena Demertzi, A., Bonhomme, V. L., Martial, C., Panda, R., Annen, J., Ibáñez, A. M., Kringelbach, M. L., et al. (2021) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009139 · Cited by 69 · see citing works
Decoding perceptual awareness across the brain with a no-report fMRI masking paradigm
Hatamimajoumerd, E., Murty, N. A. R., Pitts, M. A., & Cohen, M. A. (2022) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2022.07.068 · Cited by 75 · see citing works
“For example, cognitive theories can easily account for the lack of neural response in the no-report paradigm using univariate measurements (Figures 3 and 4) by claiming that such measurements are simply not sensitive enough to highlight the critical role of the frontal lobe in conscious processing.”
Luppi, A. I., Golkowski, D., Ranft, A., Ilg, R., Jordan, D., Menon, D. K., & Stamatakis, E. A. (2021) · Human Brain Mapping · doi:10.1002/hbm.25405 · Cited by 61 · see citing works
Distinct EEG signatures differentiate unconsciousness and disconnection during anaesthesia and sleep
Casey, C. P., Tanabe, S., Farahbakhsh, Z., Parker, M., Bo, A., White, M., Ballweg, T., Mcintosh, A., Filbey, W., Saalmann, Y., et al. (2022) · British Journal of Anaesthesia · doi:10.1016/j.bja.2022.01.010 · Cited by 66 · see citing works
Blum, L., & Blum, M. (2022) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2115934119 · Cited by 70 · see citing works
“Turing’s simple computer model led neuroscientist Warren S. McCulloch and mathematician Walter Pitts to define their formal neuron, itself a simple model of a neuron (McCulloch & Pitts, 1943).”
MethodDynamic changes in brain lateralization correlate with human cognitive performance
Wu, X., Kong, X., Vatansever, D., Liu, Z., Zhang, K., Sahakian, B. J., Robbins, T. W., Feng, J., Thompson, P. M., & Zhang, J. (2022) · PLoS Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.3001560 · Cited by 72 · see citing works
Where’s My Consciousness-Ometer? How to Test for the Presence and Complexity of Consciousness
Hunt, T., Ericson, M., & Schooler, J. W. (2022) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/17456916211029942 · Cited by 68 · see citing works
“Note that in a recent review article, Dehaene addressed this debate: “It remains unclear whether P3b is correlated with awareness . . . , post-perceptual processes . . . , or both” (Mashour et al., 2020, p. 780).”
BackgroundPanda, R., Thibaut, A., López‐González, A., Escrichs, A., Bahri, M. A., Hillebrand, A., Deco, G., Laureys, S., Gosseries, O., Annen, J., et al. (2022) · eLife · doi:10.7554/elife.77462 · Cited by 69 · see citing works
Dendritic integration theory: A thalamo-cortical theory of state and content of consciousness
Bachmann, T., Suzuki, M., & Aru, J. (2020) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2020.ii.52 · Cited by 61 · see citing works
“Perhaps this change of perspective was caused by the fact that with microelectrode recordings and fMRI much evidence could be gathered about the role of cortical areas in consciousness (for review see Koch et al., 2016; Mashour et al., 2020).”
BackgroundInfluentialDuerler, P., Brem, S., González, G. F., Neef, T., Allen, M., Zeidman, P., Stämpfli, P., Vollenweider, F. X., & Preller, K. H. (2021) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhab202 · Cited by 66 · see citing works
“Our results showing that Psi alters activity primarily in frontal brain areas but not somatosensory brain regions during tactile deviancy processing are also in line with recent formulations of the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory suggesting that higher-level areas such as the PFC play a key role for global broadcasti…”
ResultHuman high-order thalamic nuclei gate conscious perception through the thalamofrontal loop
Fang, Z., Dang, Y., Ping, A., Wang, C., Zhao, Q., Zhao, H., Xiaoli Li, A., & Zhang, M. (2025) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.adr3675 · Cited by 65 · see citing works
The human visual system differentially represents subjectively and objectively invisible stimuli
Stein, T., KAISER, D. H., Fahrenfort, J. J., & van Gaal, S. (2021) · PLoS Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.3001241 · Cited by 61 · see citing works
“Whether activity in this posterior occipito–temporo–parietal “hot zone” [80] is sufficient for awareness, or whether awareness requires additional activity in prefrontal cortex [7,81], is subject of ongoing debate.”
BackgroundDifferential mechanisms underlie trace and delay conditioning in Drosophila
Grover, D., Chen, J., Xie, J. L., Li, J., Changeux, J., & Greenspan, R. J. (2022) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-022-04433-6 · Cited by 63 · see citing works
Self-citationConsciousness as a memory system.
Budson, A. E., Richman, K. A., & Kensinger, E. A. (2022) · Cognitive and Behavioral Neurology · doi:10.1097/wnn.0000000000000319 · Cited by 66 · see citing works
Schwitzgebel, E. (2023) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-023-02042-1 · Cited by 64 · see citing works
“Global Workspace Theories (Baars, 1988; Dehaene, 2014; Mashour et al., 2020) similarly treat consciousness as a matter of information sharing and availability across the brain.”
BackgroundMetastability demystified — the foundational past, the pragmatic present and the promising future
Hancock, F., Rosas, F. E., Luppi, A. I., Zhang, M., Mediano, P. A. M., Cabral, J., Deco, G., Kringelbach, M. L., Breakspear, M. J., Kelso, J. A. S., et al. (2024) · Nature reviews. Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-024-00883-1 · Cited by 80 · see citing works
Learning and the Evolution of Conscious Agents
Jablonka, E., & Ginsburg, S. (2022) · Biosemiotics · doi:10.1007/s12304-022-09501-y · Cited by 61 · see citing works
Towards a pluralistic neurobiological understanding of consciousness
He, B. J. (2023) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2023.02.001 · Cited by 71 · see citing works
“Like RPT, the global neuronal workspace (GNW) theory [9] has focused on visual awareness in its empirical investigation.”
BackgroundLawn, T., Howard, M. A., Turkheimer, F., Mišić, B., Deco, G., Martins, D., & Dipasquale, O. (2023) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105193 · Cited by 63 · see citing works
“…ignition capacity (i.e., the capacity for a sensory stimulus to trigger self-supporting, transient, metastable, and distributed activity across a network, which is thought to be necessary for it to be consciously experienced (Deco et al., 2021; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Mashour et al., 2020)).”
Müller, E. J., Munn, B., Redinbaugh, M. J., Lizier, J. T., Breakspear, M. J., Saalmann, Y. B., & Shine, J. M. (2023) · Cell Reports · doi:10.1016/j.celrep.2023.112844 · Cited by 62 · see citing works
Visual mental imagery: Evidence for a heterarchical neural architecture
Spagna, A., Heidenry, Z., Miselevich, M., Lambert, C. J., Eisenstadt, B. E., Tremblay, L., Liu, Z., Liu, J., & Bartolomeo, P. (2023) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2023.12.012 · Cited by 66 · see citing works
How Do Living Systems Create Meaning?
Fields, C., & Levin, M. G. (2020) · Philosophies · doi:10.3390/philosophies5040036 · Cited by 57 · see citing works
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Materialism and the Moral Status of Animals
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Do Nicotinic Receptors Modulate High-Order Cognitive Processing?
Koukouli, F., & Changeux, J. (2020) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/j.tins.2020.06.001 · Cited by 61 · see citing works
“Mashour and colleagues suggested that LOC is the primary therapeutic action of GA [15].”
InfluentialSelf-citationLocal neuronal relational structures underlying the contents of human conscious experience
Malach, R. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab028 · Cited by 53 · see citing works
“This theme is of course most prominent, as its name implies, in the Global Workspace Theory, positing the activation of a global fronto-parietal network as a precondition for conscious experience (Mashour et al. 2020) and in a similar vein high-order thought theories, invoking high-order frontal”
BackgroundCortical and subcortical signatures of conscious object recognition
Levinson, M., Podvalny, E., Baete, S. H., & He, B. J. (2021) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-021-23266-x · Cited by 56 · see citing works
A relational approach to consciousness: categories of level and contents of consciousness
Tsuchiya, N., & Saigo, H. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab034 · Cited by 52 · see citing works
Bellet, J., Gay, M., Dwarakanath, A., Jarraya, B., van Kerkoerle, T., Dehaene, S., & Panagiotaropoulos, T. I. (2022) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niac005 · Cited by 57 · see citing works
“2017; Marti and Dehaene 2017) and the ignition postulated in the GNW theory of consciousness (Mashour et al. 2020).”
BackgroundSelf-citationDifferential effects of propofol and ketamine on critical brain dynamics
Varley, T. F., Sporns, O., Puce, A., & Beggs, J. M. (2020) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008418 · Cited by 54 · see citing works
- Authors
- Mashour, G. A., Roelfsema, P., Changeux, J.-P., & Dehaene, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Michigan (US)
- Netherlands Institute for Neuroscience (NL)
- Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
- Université Paris-Sud (FR)
- Corresponding author
- Changeux, Jean-Pierre
- Dehaene, Stanislas
- Venue
- Neuron
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2020-03
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 776-798
- ISSN
- 0896-6273 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC8770991
- OpenAlex
- W3009555114
- Cited by
- 1,164
- References
- 260
- Citations by year
- 2026: 269 · 2025: 197 · 2024: 209 · 2023: 163 · 2022: 159 · 2021: 107 · 2020: 58 · 2019: 2
- FWCI
- 17.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Neuron (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- KNAW research portal (Royal Academy of Art and Sciences (KNAW)) (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- HAL (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Pure Amsterdam UMC (submittedVersion)
- VU Research Portal (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Funders
- National Institutes of Health
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural dynamics and brain function
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
- Keywords
- consciousness, conscious processing, recurrent processing, neural representations, general anesthesia, attention, working memory, neural correlates of consciousness
- MeSH terms
- Anesthesia, General, Attention, Brain, Cognition, Consciousness, Humans, Memory, Short-Term, Neurons, Psychological Theory
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-09-28.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-09-28.
Cited sources are checked by gpt-6-sol.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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