How does the brain encode epistemic reliability? Perceptual presence, phenomenal transparency, and counterfactual richness.
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Seth develops a convincing and detailed internalist alternative to the sensorimotor-contingency theory of perceptual phenomenology. However, there are remaining conceptual problems due to a semantic ambiguity in the notion of "presence" and the idea of "subjective veridicality." The current model should be integrated with the earlier idea that experiential "realness" and "mind-independence" are determined by the unavailability of earlier processing stages to attention. Counterfactual richness and attentional unavailability may both be indicators of the overall processing level currently achieved, a functional property that normally correlates with epistemic reliability. Perceptual presence as well as phenomenal transparency express epistemic reliability on the level of conscious processing.
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Whether an experience has the marker of epistemic reliability is independent of whether the experienced content is veridical.
“Note, however, that whether an experience has this marker of epistemic reliability (i.e., it feels real) is independent of whether or not the experienced content is veridical”
From 'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference (2018) · cites this paper as Metzinger, 2014
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- Authors
- Metzinger, T.
- Affiliations
- Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Metzinger, Thomas
- ORCID
- Metzinger, Thomas
- Venue
- Cognitive Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2014-04-03
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 122-124
- ISSN
- 1758-8928 (ISSN-L)
- 1758-8936
- OpenAlex
- W2010358983
- Cited by
- 37
- References
- 21
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 4 · 2018: 3 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 2
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Cognitive Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- epistemic reliability, perceptual presence, phenomenal transparency, phenomenology of perception, conscious processing, mind-independence
- MeSH terms
- Synesthesia, Humans, Perception, Perceptual Disorders, Photic Stimulation
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