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Cited by 111Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceVisual perception and processing mechanismsCognitive Science and Education Research

Awareness as inference in a higher-order state space

Open access
Fleming, Stephen M·2020·Neuroscience of Consciousness
DOI 10.1093/nc/niz020PMC PMC7065713
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Abstract

Humans have the ability to report the contents of their subjective experience—we can say to each other, ‘I am aware of X’. The decision processes that support these reports about mental contents remain poorly understood. In this article, I propose a computational framework that characterizes awareness reports as metacognitive decisions (inference) about a generative model of perceptual content. This account is motivated from the perspective of how flexible hierarchical state spaces are built during learning and decision-making. Internal states supporting awareness reports, unlike those covarying with perceptual contents, are simple and abstract, varying along a 1D continuum from absent to present. A critical feature of this architecture is that it is both higher-order and asymmetric: a vast number of perceptual states is nested under ‘present’, but a much smaller number of possible states nested under ‘absent’. Via simulations, I show that this asymmetry provides a natural account of observations of ‘global ignition’ in brain imaging studies of awareness reports.

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  • Since experiments seem to show that performance and consciousness are dissociable, it is possible that ignition is neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness.

    “But since experiments seem to show that performance and consciousness are dissociable, it is possible that ignition is neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness (Fleming 2020, Lau 2022).”

    From Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness (2023) · cites this paper as Fleming 2020

    In ‘Psychological Basis of Awareness Reports’ (page unavailable), Fleming describes experiments in which words were processed despite being invisible and notes that ignition might reflect reporting or performance rather than awareness. This supports a dissociation between performance and awareness and casts doubt on ignition’s sufficiency, but the paper does not establish that ignition is unnecessary for consciousness. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Fleming suggests that higher-order awareness states are necessary for consciousness.

    “but Fleming suggests that higher-order awareness states are necessary for consciousness.”

    From Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness (2023) · cites this paper as Fleming 2020

    In “Relationship to Other Theories of Consciousness” (page unavailable), Fleming says higher-order inference is necessary for awareness. But the “Hypothesis” section limits the model to reportable awareness and leaves open whether non-reportable contents may be conscious, so the paper does not establish that higher-order awareness states are necessary for consciousness generally. (LLM, conf=0.87)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

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Cited by

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Authors
Fleming, S. M.
Affiliations
Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging (GB)
Corresponding author
Fleming, Stephen M
ORCID
Fleming, Stephen M
Venue
Neuroscience of Consciousness
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2020-01-01
Volume
2020
Issue
1
Pages
niz020-niz020
ISSN
2057-2107 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1093/nc/niz020
PMC
PMC7065713
OpenAlex
W2977093961
Cited by
111
References
9
Citations by year
2026: 16 · 2025: 28 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 20 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 10
FWCI
12.29
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Neuroscience of Consciousness (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Funders
Wellcome Trust (206648/Z/17/Z)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Visual perception and processing mechanisms
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
Keywords
metacognition, higher-order representation, perceptual content, conscious perception

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