The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Higher-order theories do just fine
Open accessAbstract
Doerig et al. have set several criteria that theories of consciousness need to fulfill. By these criteria, higher-order theories fare better than most existing theories. But they also argue that higher-order theories may not be able to answer both the 'small network argument' and the 'other systems argument'. In response, we focus on the case of the Perceptual Reality Monitoring theory to explain why higher-order theories do just fine.
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In the citing paper
“However, PRM advocates claim that current AI systems do not meet the conditions of their theory (Michel & Lau 2021, Lau 2022).”
From Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness (2023) · cites this paper as Michel & Lau 2021
In the citing paper
“Examples in Table 1 arguably include GWT-4, which mentions 'complex tasks', and HOT-3, which refers to a 'general belief-formation and action selection system' [56].”
From Identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems (2026) · cites this paper as [56]
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Citations
Cites
Journal of Consciousness Studies
(2022) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · doi:10.53765/20512201 · Cited by 6,832
Barlow, H. B. (1983) · Journal of Mathematical Psychology · doi:10.1016/0022-2496(83)90030-5 · Cited by 5,424
Margolis, E., & Laurence, S. (1999) · The MIT Press eBooks · Cited by 1,181
What is consciousness, and could machines have it?
Dehaene, S., Lau, H., & Kouider, S. (2017) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aan8871 · Cited by 855 · cited 4×
“So, although the theory predicts that an AI system could be conscious in principle (Dehaene et al., 2017), this is not a point we insist on.”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationVector-based navigation using grid-like representations in artificial agents
Banino, A., Barry, C., Uria, B., Blundell, C., Lillicrap, T., Mirowski, P., Pritzel, A., Chadwick, M. J., Degris, T., Modayil, J., et al. (2018) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-018-0102-6 · Cited by 677
LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited
Fodor, J. A. (2008) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548774.001.0001 · Cited by 590
Understanding the Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness
Brown, R., Lau, H., & LeDoux, J. E. (2019) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2019.06.009 · Cited by 573 · cited 1×
“Our perceptual reality monitoring (PRM) theory is different from Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) view (Brown et al., 2019; Lau, 2019).”
MethodSelf-citationPolger, T. W., & Shapiro, L. A. (2016) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198732891.001.0001 · Cited by 175
Godfrey-Smith, P., & Journal of Philosophy Inc. (2016) · Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.5840/jphil20161131034 · Cited by 161
Consciousness, Metacognition, & Perceptual Reality MonitoringPreprint
Lau, H. C. (2019) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/ckbyf · Cited by 74
Self-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Michel M., 2019, Ergo, 6, 28
Cited by
Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness
Butlin, P., Long, R., Elmoznino, E., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Constant, A., Deane, G., Fleming, S. M., Frith, C., Ji, X., et al. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2308.08708 · Cited by 196
Self-citationThe Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI
Birch, J. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.001.0001 · Cited by 236
Northoff, G., & Zilio, F. (2022) · Behavioural Brain Research · doi:10.1016/j.bbr.2022.113788 · Cited by 160
Identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems
Butlin, P., Long, R., Bayne, T., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Chalmers, D., Constant, A., Deane, G., Elmoznino, E., Fleming, S. M., et al. (2026) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2025.10.011 · Cited by 56
Self-citationIntrospective psychophysics for the study of subjective experience
Peters, M. A. K. (2024) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhae455 · Cited by 14
Metadata
- Authors
- Michel, M., & Lau, H.
- Affiliations
- Université Libre de Bruxelles (BE)
- University of California, Los Angeles (US)
- Corresponding author
- Michel, Matthias
- Venue
- Cognitive Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2020-11-11
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 77-78
- ISSN
- 1758-8928 (ISSN-L)
- 1758-8936
- OpenAlex
- W3100325045
- Cited by
- 31
- References
- 12
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 27 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 1
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- philarchive.org
- Locations
- Cognitive Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- H2020 European Research Council (Foundations of Animal Sentience (ASENT))
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
- Keywords
- higher-order theories of consciousness, theory of consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, neural correlates of consciousness
- MeSH terms
- Consciousness, Humans, Models, Neurological, Dissent and Disputes
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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