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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 96 of the 96 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 9 of the 130 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

What is consciousness, and could machines have it?

Open access

Abstract

The controversial question of whether machines may ever be conscious must be based on a careful consideration of how consciousness arises in the only physical system that undoubtedly possesses it: the human brain. We suggest that the word "consciousness" conflates two different types of information-processing computations in the brain: the selection of information for global broadcasting, thus making it flexibly available for computation and report (C1, consciousness in the first sense), and the self-monitoring of those computations, leading to a subjective sense of certainty or error (C2, consciousness in the second sense). We argue that despite their recent successes, current machines are still mostly implementing computations that reflect unconscious processing (C0) in the human brain. We review the psychological and neural science of unconscious (C0) and conscious computations (C1 and C2) and outline how they may inspire novel machine architectures.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

The paper argues that “consciousness” conflates two computations—C1 global availability/broadcasting and C2 self-monitoring—while most current AI implements only unconscious C0 processing. It proposes that machines endowed with C1 and C2 would behave as though conscious, though philosophical questions about subjective experience remain beyond its scope.

Key findings

  • Unconscious C0 processing is computationally deep: subliminal primes support invariant face/word recognition, semantic violations produce an N400 response as late as 400 ms, and unconscious mechanisms contribute to cognitive control, evidence accumulation, and reinforcement learning; nonconscious information decays quickly (~1 s), though sometimes slower than expected.
  • C1 consciousness is an all-or-none, capacity-limited global workspace: conscious access to item A prevents or delays perception of item B in attentional blink/refractory-period paradigms, and conscious percepts correlate with “ignition” in high-level cortical networks.
  • C2 self-monitoring includes confidence, error detection, metamemory, and reality monitoring, linked especially to prefrontal cortex; it appears early, with 1-year-old infants showing an error-related negativity and 1.5-year-olds using opt-out/help and persistence measures.
  • Current machines mostly implement C0 computations; possible routes toward C1/C2 include blackboard systems, Pathnet, Bayesian confidence models, second-order networks that predict a first network’s performance, and adversarial learning for reality monitoring.

Methods

  • Review/conceptual article; no new experiments or primary data are reported.
  • Synthesizes cognitive neuroscience, psychology, and AI evidence, including behavioral, fMRI, single-neuron, EEG, and infant studies, to propose the C0/C1/C2 taxonomy.
  • Main analysis is theoretical: it maps unconscious, globally available, and self-monitoring computations onto brain systems and discusses how machine architectures might implement C1 and C2.

Limitations

  • The paper states that it does not deal with vigilance/wakefulness because of space, that philosophical questions about the experiential component (“what it is like”) lie beyond its scope, and that a purely functional definition of consciousness may leave some readers unsatisfied.
  • Evident from the text: as a review, it presents no new empirical tests of its machine proposals; the C1/C2 framework is functional and does not resolve subjective experience.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1126/science.aan8871

Cites

96 of 96 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

8 Valid · 7 Not valid · 65 Not checked · 42 Own results and interpretations

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  • Probably not a substantial claim. 22

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Citations

Cites

Show all 96 references

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. J. Dunlosky J. Metcalfe Metacognition (Sage Publications 2008).
  2. C. Fernando D. Banarse C. Blundell Y. Zwols D. Ha A. A. Rusu A. Pritzel D. Wierstra arXiv:170108734 [cs.NE] (2017).

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Dehaene, S., Lau, H., & Kouider, S.
Affiliations
  • Université Paris-Sud (FR)
  • University of California, Los Angeles (US)
  • Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (FR)
Corresponding author
Dehaene, Stanislas
Venue
Science
Published
2017-10-27
Volume
358
Issue
6362
Pages
486-492
ISSN
  • 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
  • 1095-9203
OpenAlex
W2765831433
Cited by
855
References
96
Citations by year
2026: 92 · 2025: 76 · 2024: 153 · 2023: 124 · 2022: 60 · 2021: 82 · 2020: 96 · 2019: 81 · 2018: 85 · 2017: 6
FWCI
11.56
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Science (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • eScholarship (California Digital Library) (submittedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (award348207, R01NS088628)
  • Air Force Office of Scientific Research (award348208, FA9550-15-1-0110)
  • Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (award348203)
  • European Research Council (award348204, NeuroConsc, award348205, Metaware)
  • Agence Nationale de la Recherche (award348206, ANR-10-LABX-0087 and ANR-10-IDEX-0001-02)
  • Institut national de la santé et de la recherche médicale (award348200)
  • Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique et aux Énergies Alternatives (award348201)
  • Collège de France (award348202)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Psychiatry, Mental Health, Neuroscience
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
consciousness, artificial consciousness, unconscious processes, self-monitoring, subjective certainty, brain information processing, computer architecture, neural basis of consciousness
MeSH terms
Machine Learning, Brain, Computer Simulation, Consciousness, Humans, Models, Neurological, Robotics

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: What is consciousness, and could machines have it? https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1126/science.aan8871
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Dehaene, S., Lau, H., & Kouider, S. (2017). What is consciousness, and could machines have it? Science. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aan8871

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.