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The Multiple Realization Book
Abstract
Since Hilary Putnam offered multiple realization as an empirical hypothesis in the 1960s, philosophical consensus has turned against the idea that mental processes could be identified with brain processes, and multiple realization has become the keystone of the “antireductive consensus” across philosophy of science broadly. Polger and Shapiro offer the first book-length investigation of multiple realization. Their analysis of multiple realization serves as a starting point to a series of philosophically sophisticated and empirically informed arguments that cast doubt on the abundance of multiple realization in the cognitive sciences. In the course of making their case, they respond to classic defenses of multiple realization that Jerry Fodor, Ned Block, and other prominent philosophers of psychology have offered. Polger and Shapiro conclude that the identity theory, once left for dead, remains a viable theory of mind—one that, when suitably framed, enjoys the benefits typically thought to accrue only to theories of mind that presuppose the truth of multiple realization. As Polger and Shapiro see matters, mind-brain identities have played an important role in the growth and achievements of the cognitive sciences, and they see little prospect—or need—for multiple realization in an empirically based theory of mind. This leads Polger and Shapiro to offer an alternative framework for understanding explanations in the cognitive sciences, as well as in chemistry, biology, and other non-basic sciences.
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Citations
Cited by
Understanding artificial agency
Dung, L. (2025) · The Philosophical Quarterly · doi:10.1093/pq/pqae010 · Cited by 69
Multiple realizability and the spirit of functionalism
Cao, R. (2022) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03524-1 · Cited by 58
On the dangers of conflating strong and weak versions of a theory of consciousness
Lau, H., & Michel, M. (2019) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/hjp3s · Cited by 52
Fish and microchips: on fish pain and multiple realization
Michel, M. (2019) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1133-4 · Cited by 51
Higher-order theories do just fine
Michel, M., & Lau, H. (2021) · Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17588928.2020.1839402 · Cited by 31
Metadata
- Authors
- Polger, T. W., & Shapiro, L. A.
- Venue
- Oxford University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press
- Published
- 2016-06-30
- OpenAlex
- W2274279958
- Cited by
- 175
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 13.07
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Polger, T. W., & Shapiro, L. A. (2016). The Multiple Realization Book. Oxford University Press eBooks. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof%3Aoso/9780198732891.001.0001
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