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Cited by 551

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives for Collective Action: Theoretical Investigations

Oliver, Pamela·1980·American Journal of Sociology

Abstract

Positive and negative selective incentives are shown analytically to have different structural implications when used to induce collective action. Positive selective incentives are effective for motivating small numbers of cooperators and generate pressures toward smaller, more "elite" actions, unless the incentives have jointness of supply. Negative selective incentives are effective for motivating unanimous cooperation, but their use is often uneven and cyclical and may generate hostilities which disrupt the cooperation they enforce. Examples of these dynamics are found in many arenas of collective action and social movements.

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Metadata

Authors
Oliver, P.
Venue
American Journal of Sociology
Published
1980-05
Volume
85
Issue
6
Pages
1356-1375
ISSN
  • 0002-9602 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5390
OpenAlex
W2082097596
Cited by
551
References
19
FWCI
9.48
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives for Collective Action: Theoretical Investigations. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/227168
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Oliver, P. (1980). Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives for Collective Action: Theoretical Investigations. American Journal of Sociology. https://doi.org/10.1086/227168

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.