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Cited by 196

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing Insurance Fraud through Optimal Incentive Contracts

Crocker, Keith J., Morgan, John · 1998 · Journal of Political Economy

Abstract

An incentive contracting approach is used to characterize optimal contracts when insured individuals possess private information about their losses and are able to misrepresent permanently their loss magnitudes by engaging in the falsification of claims. We demonstrate that efficient agreements necessarily induce some falsification but that the extent of such claims inflation is mitigated partially by an indemnification schedule that overcompensates small losses while overpaying larger ones. The differential costs of generating insurance claims through falsification provide an avenue by which the heterogencous insureds can credibly signal their underlying losses and are exploited in an optimal contract to implement loss‐contingent insurance payments.

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Crossref · 10.1086/250012

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Metadata

Authors
Crocker, K. J., & Morgan, J.
Venue
Journal of Political Economy
Published
1998-04
Volume
106
Issue
2
Pages
355-375
ISSN
  • 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-534X
OpenAlex
W2087119732
Cited by
196
References
3
FWCI
11.43
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing Insurance Fraud through Optimal Incentive Contracts. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/250012
The paper
Crocker, K. J., & Morgan, J. (1998). Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing Insurance Fraud through Optimal Incentive Contracts. Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/250012

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.