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Wage Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market
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“We conjecture that, in addition to purely selfish subjects, there is a nonnegligible number of subjects who are (i) conditionally cooperative and (ii) willing to engage in the costly punishment of free riders.”
From Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments (2000) · cites this paper as Fehr and Falk 1999
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“Bilateral trust-or gift exchange games (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995; Fehr and Falk 1999) indicate that many subjects are conditionally cooperative, i.e., they are willing to cooperate to some extent if others cooperate, too.”
From Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments (2000) · cites this paper as Fehr and Falk 1999
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Research works printed but not linked: 21
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556151 · Cited by 11,264
Self-citationCooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Self-citationIntrinsic and extrinsic motivation
Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00253 · Cited by 2,913
Falk, A., & Fischbacher, U. (2006) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.001 · Cited by 2,416
Self-citationPsychological foundations of incentives
Fehr, E., & Falk, A. (2002) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(01)00208-2 · Cited by 1,240
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Falk, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1999-02
- Volume
- 107
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 106-134
- ISSN
- 0022-3808
- 1537-534X
- Cited by
- 325
- References
- 0
- Language
- en
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