The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Theory of Marriage: Part I
Abstract
I present in this paper the skeleton of a theory of marriage. The two basic assumptions are that each person tries to do as well as possible and that the "marriage market" is in equilibrium. With the aid of several additional simplifying assumptions, I derive a number of significant implications about behavior in this market. For example, the gain to a man and woman from marrying compared to remaining single is shown to depend positively on their incomes, human capital, and relative difference in wage rates. The theory also implies that men differing in physical capital, education or intelligence (aside from their effects on wage rates), height, race, or many other traits will tend to marry women with like values of these traits, whereas the correlation between mates for wage rates or for traits of men and women that are close substitutes in household production will tend to be negative. The theory does not take the division of output between mates as given, but rather derives it from the nature of the marriage market equilibrium. The division is determined here, as in other markets, by marginal productivities, and these are affected by the human and physical capital of different persons, sex ratios (that is, the relative numbers of men and women), and some other variables.
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Citations
Cites
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Black, J. D. (1926) · University of Michigan Library Repository · Cited by 36
Cited by
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Innovative Online Platforms: Research Opportunities
Chen, Y.-J., Dai, T., Korpeoglu, C. G., Körpeoğlu, E., Sahin, O., Tang, C. S., & Xiao, S. (2018) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3098921 · Cited by 21
Does Internet Connectedness Disconnect Marriage? A Micro Empirical Analysis
Tong, Q., Chu, C.-Y., Zhou, D., & Feng, Y. (2021) · Social Indicators Research · doi:10.1007/s11205-021-02686-8 · Cited by 16
Your cheatin’ heart: joint production, joint consumption and the likelihood of extramarital sex
Brooks, T. J., & Monaco, K. (2013) · Applied Economics Letters · doi:10.1080/13504851.2012.690845 · Cited by 13
Extramarital affairs as occupational hazard: A structural, ethical (cultural) model of opportunity
Abzug, R. (2016) · Sexualities · doi:10.1177/1363460715583586 · Cited by 12
Domestic Production as a Source of Marital Power: Theory and Evidence from Malawi
Telalagic, S. (2012) · Faculty of Economics · doi:10.17863/cam.1021 · Cited by 9
Quisumbing, A. R., Maluccio, J. A., Quisumbing, A. R., & Maluccio, J. A. (2000) · Unknown · doi:10.22004/ag.econ.16460 · Cited by 350
Metadata
- Authors
- Becker, G. S.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1973-07
- Volume
- 81
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 813-846
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2029022404
- Cited by
- 3,484
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 23.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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