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The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance

Klein, Benjamin, Leffler, Keith B. · 1981 · Journal of Political Economy

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

The conditions under which transactors can use the market (repeat-purchase) mechanism of contract enforcement are examined. Increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance. A necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance. This will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm-specific assets. Advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1086/260996

Cites

19 of 19 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

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Citations

Cites

Cited by

See all 3,653

Metadata

Authors
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B.
Venue
Journal of Political Economy
Published
1981-08
Volume
89
Issue
4
Pages
615-641
ISSN
  • 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-534X
OpenAlex
W2066557547
Cited by
3,653
References
19
Citations by year
2026: 48 · 2025: 56 · 2024: 51 · 2023: 64 · 2022: 76 · 2021: 96 · 2020: 88 · 2019: 108 · 2018: 122 · 2017: 111 · 2016: 126 · 2015: 106 · 2014: 132 · 2013: 120 · 2012: 152
FWCI
62.46
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Journal of Political Economy (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
Keywords
contract enforcement, market forces, contract performance, firm-specific assets, advertising expenditure

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.