The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The conditions under which transactors can use the market (repeat-purchase) mechanism of contract enforcement are examined. Increased price is shown to be a means of assuring contractual performance. A necessary and sufficient condition for performance is the existence of price sufficiently above salvageable production costs so that the nonperforming firm loses a discounted steam of rents on future sales which is greater than the wealth increase from nonperformance. This will generally imply a market price greater than the perfectly competitive price and rationalize investments in firm-specific assets. Advertising investments thereby become a positive indicator of likely performance.
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In the citing paper
“When buyers trust sellers as a result of an improved perception, they allow sellers to obtain premium prices and yield above-average profits (Klein and Leffler 1981; Shapiro 1983) to compensate seller transaction risks (Ba and Pavlou 2002).”
From Buyers' trust and mistrust in e-commerce platforms: a synthesizing literature review (2022) · cites this paper as Klein and Leffler 1981
In the citing paper
“A similar idea dominates recent theories of product-quality assurance, in which firms buy inefficient gifts of advertising (Klein and Leffler 1981) or give gifts of high-quality goods sold at low-quality prices (Shapiro 1983) to signal their intention to produce high-quality goods.”
From Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols (1988) · cites this paper as Klein and Leffler 1981
Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Spence, M. (1973) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1882010 · Cited by 19,518
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations
Williamson, O. E. (1979) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466942 · Cited by 10,190
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process
Klein, B., Crawford, R. G., & Alchian, A. A. (1978) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466922 · Cited by 5,791
Self-citationInformation and Consumer Behavior
Nelson, P. (1970) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259630 · Cited by 5,758
Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud
Darby, M. R., & Karni, E. (1973) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466756 · Cited by 3,947
The Theory of Monopolistic Competition
Fouraker, L. E., & Chamberlin, E. H. (1957) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1054428 · Cited by 2,122
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study
Macaulay, S. (2018) · The Sociology of Economic Life · doi:10.4324/9780429494338-12 · Cited by 2,026
Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey.
Simon, H. A., Luce, R. D., & Raiffa, H. (1958) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2089260 · Cited by 1,944
Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers
Becker, G. S., & Stigler, G. J. (1974) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/467507 · Cited by 1,843
Principles of Economics: An Introductory Volume
Marshall, A. (1949) · Cited by 1,402
A theory of self-enforcing agreements
(1987) · A Theory of Efficient Cooperation and Competition · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511528378.007 · Cited by 599
A Model of Advertising and Product Quality
Schmalensee, R. (1978) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260683 · Cited by 437
Some Consequences of the Habit of Judging Quality by Price
Scitovszky, T. (1944) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296093 · Cited by 353
The Competitive Supply of Money
Klein, B. (1974) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.2307/1991457 · Cited by 303 · cited 3×
“…of firm output leads to quality depreciation via a standard exter-nality argument; i.e., supply by a particular firm of lower than anticipated quality imposes a cost through the loss of future sales not solely on that firm but on all firms in the industry (see Akerlof 1970; Klein 1974).”
InfluentialSelf-citationThe Nature of Equilibrium in Monopolistic Competition
Demsetz, H. (1959) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/258127 · Cited by 48 · cited 1×
“Demsetz (1959, 1968) made the contrary assumption that average quality does fall as sales increase, holding Finally, even when consumers systematically underestimate the quality-assuring price because of downward-biased estimates of production or marketing costs or upward-biased estimates of…”
The Role of Price in Guaranteeing QualityPreprint
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1979) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 35
Self-citationDo Competition and Monopolistic Competition Differ?
Demsetz, H. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259390 · Cited by 31
Mishan, E. J. (1970) · Praeger eBooks · Cited by 28
Cited by
Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage
Barney, J. (1991) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/014920639101700108 · Cited by 48,334
“In addition, positive firm reputations can be thought of as informal social relations between firms and key stakeholders (Klein & Leffler, 1981 ).”
BackgroundFirm resources and sustained competitive advantage
Barney, J. B. (2004) · Advances in Strategic Management · doi:10.1016/s0742-3322(00)17018-4 · Cited by 38,152
Opinion Mining and Sentiment Analysis
Pang, B., & Lee, L. (2008) · now publishers, Inc. eBooks · doi:10.1561/9781601981516 · Cited by 6,720
Opinion mining and sentiment analysis
Pang, B., & Lee, L. (2008) · Foundations and Trends® in Information Retrieval · doi:10.1561/1500000011 · Cited by 6,372
“Ever since the classic “market for lemons” paper [6] demonstrating some problems for makers of high-quality goods, economists have looked at the value of maintaining a good reputation as a means to overcome these problems [77, 162, 269, 270], among other strategies.”
BackgroundAuditor size and audit quality
DeAngelo, L. E. (1981) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(81)90002-1 · Cited by 5,813
“, Baiman (1979), Dopuch and Simunic (1979), Kaplan (1978), Magee (1979), and Ng (1978)] that audit quality is unobservable, i.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1981-08
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 615-641
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2066557547
- Cited by
- 3,653
- References
- 19
- Citations by year
- 2026: 48 · 2025: 56 · 2024: 51 · 2023: 64 · 2022: 76 · 2021: 96 · 2020: 88 · 2019: 108 · 2018: 122 · 2017: 111 · 2016: 126 · 2015: 106 · 2014: 132 · 2013: 120 · 2012: 152
- FWCI
- 62.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Political Economy (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Auction Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- contract enforcement, market forces, contract performance, firm-specific assets, advertising expenditure
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