Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols

May combine two claims.

In courtship, gift giving will often be reciprocal, though not always, because gifts are meant to spur reciprocal investments.

“Furthermore, gift giving will often be reciprocal (though not always), because gifts are meant to spur investments that are reciprocal.”

May combine two claims.

With entry costs, an unwilling player can be deterred from participating if e1 < T1/(G2P2) for player 1 and e2 < T2/(G1P1) for player 2.

“The unwilling player 1 can be deterred from participating at all (though willing players are not deterred; see App.), thus saving player 2 the cost of a wasted gift, if e1 < T11G2P2 and, for player 2, e2 < T21G1Pl.”

May combine two claims.

A suitor will give larger gifts if he is more confident that the courted player loves him or if he has more to gain by giving a gift and then cheating.

“A suitor will give larger gifts if he (a) is more confident that the courted player is in love with him or (b) has more to gain by giving a gift and then cheating.”

May combine two claims.

If one player's chance of investing is low and another's is sufficiently high, only the low-probability player should give a gift to the high-probability player, and investment will then take place.

“(iii) if one player's chance of investing is low and another's is sufficiently high, then only the low-probability player should give a gift to the highprobability player, and investment will then take place;”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

In the simple investment game, unwilling players never invest, and willing players invest if and only if their expected values from investing exceed those from not investing.

“In this simple investment game, unwilling players never invest (by definition), and both willing players invest if and only if their expected values from investing are above their expected values from not investing”

May combine two claims.

If prior probabilities P1 and P2 are small, inefficient gift giving does more good through deterrence than harm through opportunity cost; if they are large, it does more harm than good and players prefer efficient gifts.

“If the prior probabilities P1, P2 are small, then inefficient gift giving does more good (deterrence) than harm (opportunity cost), but, if the probabilities are large, as when a relationship is mature, giving inefficient gifts does more harm than good, and players prefer to exchange efficient gifts.”

May combine two claims.

Players will not invest early in a relationship when either P1 or P2 is low, or before an important commitment when Q(W) is especially large.

“Players will not invest early in a relationship, when either P1 or P2 is low (and below the investment threshold), or before an important commitment, when Q(W) is especially large (so that the probability threshold is large).”

May combine two claims.

Assuming C(W) < C(U), the threshold in (A7) is higher than t2, so there is a range of P2 in which a willing player 1 is willing to invest but unwilling to pay the signaling cost to convince player 2 to invest.

“Now, assuming C(W) < C(U),19 the threshold in (A7) is higher than the threshold t2, so there is a range of P2 in which a W-type player 1 is willing to invest but unwilling to pay the signaling cost to convince player 2 to invest.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: C(W) is less than C(U).

May combine two claims.

The investment threshold t1 for player 1 is -Q(W)/[R(W)-Q(W)-C(W)], and player 1 invests iff P2 > t1.

“If we define the right-hand side as an”

May combine two claims.

In that solution, players exchange perfectly efficient gifts, but the sizes of the gifts they give distinguish their willingness.

“Thus, players exchange perfectly efficient gifts, but the sizes of the gifts players give distinguish their willingness.”

May combine two claims.

Dishonest signaling cannot be an equilibrium: if it were, failure to signal would reveal a willing player and elicit investment, causing unwilling players to behave like willing players and not signal to elicit investment.

“First, we can rule out”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

There are a variety of pure-strategy equilibria depending on the exact values of probabilities and utilities.

“There are a variety of purestrategy equilibria, depending on the exact values of the probabilities and utilities.”

May combine two claims.

If the efficiency thresholds are enforced and an unwilling player 2 does not enter, a willing player 1 earns expected net gift receipts P2(-G1 + e1G2) - T1 and expected relationship gains P2R(W); these net gains are positive, so willing types are not discouraged from entering.

“if the efficiency thresholds in (8) and ( 9) are enforced and a U-type player 2 does not enter the game, then a W-type player 1 earns expected net gift receipts of P2(-G1 + elG2) -T1 and expected relationship gains of P2R(W).(These net gains are always positive, so Wtypes are not discouraged from entering the game as U-types are, assuming e's are chosen to make [8] and [9] bind.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

All the equilibria described in the paper are sequential.

“All the equilibria described above are sequential.”

May combine two claims.

The two-sided gift-giving solution is incentive efficient for any probabilities in the cooperative game, while it is only an equilibrium for certain probabilities in the noncooperative game.

“Otherwise, the two games are exactly the same, except the two-sided gift-giving solution is incentive efficient for any probabilities in the cooperative game, while it is only an equilibrium for certain probabilities in the noncooperative game.”

May combine two claims.

In two-sided signaling equilibria, if both prior probabilities are below thresholds, a separating equilibrium results if both players choose (W,G;U,0), and conditional on observing a signal players infer partner is W-type, so W-types invest in the second period.

“Two-sided Signaling Equilibria (table A2) First, suppose that both prior probabilities P1 and P2 are below their thresholds, t, and t2, so that if players do nothing to change their partners' beliefs, then no investment will result in the second period.A separating equilibrium results if both players choose (W, G; U, 0)-only willing players invest in the signal, so players can be separated by”

May combine two claims.

A willing player 1 has net expected value -T1 - G1 + e1G2P2 + P2R(W), which is positive if e1 just satisfies threshold (8) and is less than P2R(W) because R(W) exceeds C(U).

“However, a W-type player 1 has a net expected value of -T- G1 + elG2P2 + P2R(W).This expression is positive if el just satisfies the threshold (8) because then the first and third terms cancel out, and, since G1 = P2C(U), it is less than P2R(W) (because R[W] > C[U] by assumption).”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: R(W) is greater than C(U).

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Combining the inequality for willing player 2 with an analogous condition for player 1 yields condition (10) in the text.

“Combining this inequality for W-type player 2 with an analogous condition for player 1 yields condition (10) in the text.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The feasibility constraints form a system of eight inequalities: four individual rationality constraints and four incentive-compatibility constraints.

“The feasibility constraints form a system of eight inequalities-four individual rationality (IR) constraints, one for each possible player type, and four incentive-compatibility (IC) constraints.”

May combine two claims.

If both priors are above their thresholds, players invest in the second period even without learning the partner's type, so neither type has an incentive to signal, producing a no-signaling equilibrium with investment.

“If both priors P1 and P2 are above their thresholds, t1 and t2, then players will invest in the second period even if they have learned nothing about their partner's type from the signaling.As a result, both types of players have no incentive to signal, and the result is a no-signaling equilibrium in which players do invest in the second period.”

May combine two claims.

That solution is incentive efficient and feasible; no solution makes all players better off, and every other feasible solution makes some players worse off.

“This solution is incentive efficient as well as feasible.(That is, there is no solution that makes all players better off.Indeed, every other feasible solution makes some players worse off.)”

May combine two claims.

For player 1 to signal his true type when gift costs are identical, P2R(W) > G2(eu - ew) > P2C(U) must hold, which implies eu > ew.

“For player 1, for instance, this implies P2R(W) > G2(eu -ew) > P2C(U),(A12)”

• Also stated in: § The Efficiency of Equilibrium Gifts · plain

  “and, since both expressions on the right and the left of the inequality are positive, this implies eu must be greater than ew.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The costs C(U) and C(W) are comparable across unwilling and willing types.

May combine two claims.

The signaling equilibria restrict how costly gift signals G1 and G2 must be, but no natural limits on gift efficiency emerge.

“The signaling equilibria, if they exist, restrict how costly gift signals G1 and G2 must be (to satisfy inequalities [A4] and [A5]), but no natural limits on gift efficiency emerge.”

May combine two claims.

In that region, no signaling and subsequently no investment take place, and there is a symmetric region in which player 2 would like to signal but cannot afford to.

“In this region (see fig. 1), no signaling (and, subsequently, no investment) takes place, and there is a symmetric region in which player 2 would like to signal but cannot afford to.”

May combine two claims.

One can show formally that inefficiency is necessary because the value of gifts received subsidizes the cost of gifts given, and inefficient gifts deter partners unwilling to invest from simply collecting gifts.

“One can show formally that inefficiency is necessary because the value of gifts received subsidizes the cost of gifts given, and inefficient gifts deter partners who are unwilling to invest from simply collecting gifts.”

May combine two claims.

There are no mixed-strategy equilibria; W-types always prefer I to mixed play conditional on partner's probability above threshold, and U-types sometimes playing I is not a Nash equilibrium.

“18 There are no mixed-strategy equilibria.W-types will always prefer I to any mixedstrategy play of I and N, conditional on their partner's probability being above its threshold.Intuitively, it seems that U-types might sometimes play I, if their probabilities are below their threshold, to coax their partner into playing L. However, U-types' sometimes playing I is not a Nash equilibrium, since, if”

May combine two claims.

The unique Bayesian Nash equilibria are: if both probabilities are above their thresholds, players choose (W,I;U,N); if either probability is below its threshold, both choose (W,N;U,N), and signaling is needed.

“The unique Bayesian Nash equilibria are these:18 (1) If both probabilities are above their thresholds t, and t2, players choose (W, I; U, N). ( 2) If either probability is below its threshold, then one W-type player will not invest, so the other W-type player will not invest either, and the players both choose (W, N; U, N).If equilibrium (2) results, then signaling is needed.”

May combine two claims.

The signaling explanation is not especially helpful for gift giving between groups or for charitable giving by individuals or organizations.

“helpful in explaining gift giving between groups of people or charitable gift giving by individuals or organizations”

May combine two claims.

The model implies a life cycle of gift giving: on meeting, couples with low willingness probabilities prefer inexpensive, inefficient gifts with sentimental value; as they become more certain of willingness, they give more expensive, more practical gifts; eventually they may simply buy themselves what they want with partners' money.

“On meeting, a nervous couple (with low probabilities of willingness) initially prefer to exchange inexpensive, inefficient gifts that have only sentimental value.”

• Also stated in: § Equilibria in the Two-Stage Gift-giving Game · plain

  “they gradually give more expensive, more practical gifts.”

• Also stated in: § Equilibria in the Two-Stage Gift-giving Game · hedged

  “Eventually, perhaps, they simply buy themselves what they want with their partners' money.”

May combine two claims.

The game accounts for some basic stylized facts because conclusion (iii) shows reciprocity is not essential and conclusion (iv) rationalizes inefficient gift giving.

“The game, while simple, begins to account for some of the basic stylized facts, since conclusion (iii) shows that reciprocity is not essential and conclusion (iv) provides a rationalization for inefficient gift giving.”

May combine two claims.

Because such resources are nonsalvageable, they make gift giving inefficient unless they substitute for the receiver's normal shopping.

“Since such resources are nonsalvageable, they make gift giving inefficient (unless they substitute for the receiver's normal shopping).”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Anecdotal evidence suggests that courtship of top executives, often with material gift giving, is an important precursor to a successful corporate marriage.

“suggests that courtship of top executives, often with material gift giving, is an important precursor to a successful corporate”

• cites Wall Street Journal 1982Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The conventional exchange of token gifts on initial dates may institutionalize the two-sided signaling equilibrium when willingness is unlikely.

“The conventional exchange of token gifts (flowers, special efforts in grooming or fashion) on initial dates may be an institutionalization of the two-sided signaling equilibrium when willingness is unlikely.”

May combine two claims.

Accepting an overpriced dinner instead of its cash equivalent imposes an opportunity cost on the receiver, and incurring that cost signals both the giver's and the receiver's intentions.

“Accepting an overpriced dinner instead of its cash equivalent has an opportunity cost to the receiver; so, incurring that cost is simultaneously a signal of the giver's intentions and of the receiver's intentions.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

A DeBeers diamond ad stating that two months' salary showed the future Mrs. Smith what the future would be like is a clear statement of the signaling view.

“A DeBeers diamond ad reads,”

• cites DeBeersNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

Cigars distributed by a proud father to signal a child's birth are probably not smoked nowadays but are unmistakable signals.

“The cigars a proud father might distribute to signal the birth of a child are probably not smoked, nowadays, but they are unmistakable signals.”

May combine two claims.

In game-theoretic models, players are assumed to signal simultaneously, but they actually prefer to signal last to avoid wasting gifts on a partner found to be unwilling.

“In the game-theoretic models, players are assumed to signal simultaneously, but they actually prefer to signal last (to avoid wasting gifts on a partner found to be unwilling).”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The signaling view, common to all four explanations, begins with the notion that gifts are signals of some characteristic of the gift giver.

“All these explanations begin with the simple notion that gifts are signals of some characteristic of the gift giver.”

May combine two claims.

Good gift giving involves guessing the receiver's tastes, which often produces inefficiency.

“Good gift giving thus involves guessing a gift receiver's tastes, which often produces inefficiency.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Keeping the price unknown may cushion the giver or receiver against disappointment if the gift cost much more or less than prescribed.

“Perhaps keeping the price unknown cushions either the giver or receiver against disappointment if the gift cost much more or much less than we would prescribe (cf.Sabini and Silver [1982, pp. 107-23] on the protective ambiguity of flirting).”

• cites Sabini and Silver [1982Not checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Because biological predictors and verbal pleas are unreliable and easy to fake, partners need an indicator that is too costly to fake, a signal.

“Biological predictors and verbal pleas are notoriously unreliable (because they are not hard to fake), so partners need an indicator that is too costly to fake-a signal.”

May combine two claims.

The degree of inefficiency from guessing tastes need not be large, but there will often be some inefficiency.

“The degree of inefficiency here need not be large, but there will often be some inefficiency.”

May combine two claims.

Long-term business or political relationships are often economically identical to personal relationships, which explains the development of fictive friendships.

“Often, long-term business or political relationships16 are economically identical to personal relationships, so we are not surprised by the”

• cites Moore 1973 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Caplow notes strict compliance with the rule that a Christmas gift should be scaled in economic value to the emotional value of the relationship.

“For example, Caplow (1984) notes strict compliance with the rule that”

• cites Caplow 1984 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Conventions, like language, are self-enforcing: an English speaker has no incentive to deviate if others speak English because English communicates best; similarly gift giving is a language using objects instead of words.

“Conventions, like language, are”

• cites Caplow 1984 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Any net cost of time, energy, or imagination is part of the signaling cost of a gift, so the thought counts.

“Any net cost of time, energy, or imagination is part of the signaling cost of a gift: the thought does count.”

May combine two claims.

Conventions arise to coordinate behavior among people who cannot communicate easily, so when a more efficient signaling convention becomes available, it is difficult to coordinate change from the old convention to a new one.

“However, conventions arise to coordinate behavior among people who cannot communicate with one another easily (Lewis 1969), so when things change and a more efficient signaling convention becomes available, it is difficult, by the nature of conventions, to coordinate change from the old convention to a new one.”

• cites Lewis 1969Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

The appropriate rate of signaling occasions should be as fast or slow as the rate of change in a partner's willingness.

“Holidays occur regularly, but the appropriate rate of signaling occasions should be as fast or slow as the rate of change in a partner's willingness.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Caplow notes that at Christmas employers routinely give money gifts to employees.

“Caplow (1982) notes that, at Christmas, employers routinely give money gifts to employees.”

• cites Caplow (1982) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Since the courted player knows whom he loves better than suitors do, the only information gifts convey in competitive gift giving is about the gains suitors would get from cheating.

“Since the courted player is assumed to know whom he is in love with better than the suitors do, the only information that gifts convey is about the gains suitors would get from cheating.”

• AssumptionThe authors state this as an assumption: The courted player knows whom he is in love with better than the suitors do.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

These employer money gifts are more like bonuses serving as incentive devices than personal gifts.

“These”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Gifts work well as signals because gift givers are known to recipients and gifts clearly mark the informational purpose and target of the signal.

“gifts will work very well because the gift givers are known to the recipients (unless they are given by secret admirers), as we require in our analysis of the game, and gifts clearly mark the informational purpose and target of the signal.”

May combine two claims.

Inefficient gift giving is double-edged: it protects the giver from gift collectors but also costs the willing giver the opportunity to receive gifts he really enjoys.

“Inefficient gift giving is a double-edged sword, however: it protects the giver from gift collectors, but it also costs the willing giver the opportunity to receive gifts he really enjoys.”

May combine two claims.

In a class of gifts that all signal $50 of willingness, each gift signals willingness equally well but each also signals something else, such as tastes, listening, or appreciation.

“Each gift in this class signals willingness equally well ($50's worth), but each gift signals something else-tastes the giver has or hopes the receiver develops (Spin); how carefully the giver was listening when the receiver discussed food or wine (sushi, wine); or how much the giver appreciates the receiver's bodily (underwear) or intellectual (poetry) charms or thinks those bodily charms need”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Etiquette rules that prescribe one-sided gift giving correspond to one-sided gift-giving equilibria.

“Other rules of etiquette dictate when it is appropriate form for only one person to give a gift (as in my one-sided gift-giving equilibria).”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

There may be reasons besides historical accident why generic gifts became conventional.

“Although I argued above that these gifts are simply conventional, there may be some reasons (besides historical accident) why these gifts, rather than others, became conventional.”

May combine two claims.

We might expect a decline in the traditional premarriage exchange of gifts from men to women, though important gifts like diamonds will still be useful to signal intentions on nonmarriage occasions.

“Therefore, we might expect to see a decline in the traditional premarriage exchange of gifts from men to women, though important gifts (like diamonds) will still be useful to signal intentions on nonmarriage occasions.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: In modern times, marriage no longer obligates a woman socially or physically to bear children because of changing mores, modern birth control, and legalized abortion.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Akerlof suggests that hard work and above-market wages, which result in a shortage of jobs, are like an exchange of gifts between employers and employees who develop sentiment for each other.

“To explain involuntary labor-market unemployment, Akerlof (1982Akerlof ( , 1984) ) suggests that hard work and above-market wages (which result in a shortage of jobs) are like an exchange of gifts between employers and employees who”

• cites Akerlof (1982 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites [1984]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

Exchanging hostages in business settings is precisely inefficient gift giving, except that the cost of gifts needed to ensure each side's investment can be so huge that permanent gift exchange is extremely inefficient.

“This is precisely inefficient gift giving, except that in business settings the cost of gifts needed to ensure each side's investment can be so huge that exchanging gifts permanently is extremely inefficient.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Holidays do not always occur when simultaneous gift giving is needed, which explains the function of engagement rings, lavish wedding expenses, and graduation gifts.

“Of course, holidays serve other purposes too, and holidays do not always conveniently occur when simultaneous gift giving is needed-hence, the function of engagement rings, lavish wedding expenses, graduation gifts, and so on.”

May combine two claims.

If gift giving is cooperative, simultaneity is assumed; if noncooperative, it is useful to have occasions commonly known for gift exchange to avoid the problem of who gives first.

“If gift giving is cooperative, simultaneity is assumed, but, if gift giving is noncooperative, it is useful to have some occasions on which it is commonly known that gifts should be exchanged to avoid the problem of who gives the gift first.”

May combine two claims.

Many gifts signal things by convention or custom, and conventional gifts are often inefficient.

“Many gifts signal things by convention (Lewis 1969) or custom (Akerlof 1980), and these conventional gifts are often inefficient.”

• cites Lewis 1969Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites Akerlof 1980 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

When vacationers bring back trinkets or send postcards to loved ones, they remind receivers that the giver is thinking about them, signaling by their thoughts and possibly taking advantage of international price differences.

“When vacationers bring back trinkets or send postcards to loved ones, they remind receivers at home that the giver is thinking about them, thus signaling by their thoughts (and possibly taking advantage of international price differences as well).”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Recent theories of product-quality assurance hold that firms buy inefficient gifts of advertising or give gifts of high-quality goods sold at low-quality prices to signal their intention to produce high-quality goods.

“A similar idea dominates recent theories of product-quality assurance, in which firms buy inefficient gifts of advertising (Klein and Leffler 1981) or give gifts of high-quality goods sold at low-quality prices (Shapiro 1983) to signal their intention to produce high-quality goods.”

• cites Klein and Leffler 1981 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source
• cites Shapiro 1983 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Because it is costly for women to bear children alone and men are tempted to desert after conception, premarriage gifts men give, such as an engagement ring, are like nests male birds build to pledge fidelity.

“Since it is very costly for women to bear children alone, and men are always tempted to desert the marriage after conception (arguing by anal-ogy, remember), the premarriage gifts men give, such as an engagement ring, are like the nests that male birds build to pledge their fidelity to female birds.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Men are always tempted to desert the marriage after conception.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

The cooperation assumption is probably best suited to mature relationships where both priors are above their thresholds and signaling does not take place noncooperatively.

“Furthermore, the assumption of cooperation is probably best suited to mature relationships where P1 and P2 are presumably above their thresholds (else, the relationship would not have lasted) and where signaling does not take place noncooperatively.”

May combine two claims.

Familial gift giving is more like primitive premarket exchange, where gifts provide social insurance, than like signaling during courtship, so signaling inefficiencies need not be present in family gift giving.

“In general, familial gift giving is more like primitive premarket exchange-as in the anthropological accounts, where gifts provide social insurance-than like signaling during courtship, so the inefficiencies that are important for signaling purposes need not be present in gift giving in the family.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

A third explanation for inefficiency is that the meaning of gifts is often conventional and arbitrary; because convention is hard to change, inefficient gift giving could persist once established.

“A third explanation for inefficiency is that the meaning of gifts is often conventional and arbitrary.Since convention is hard to change, once established, inefficient gift giving could persist.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

By avoiding comparison, whether by removing price tags or making photographic comparison taboo, givers and receivers can believe their relationships are better than they are.

“Perhaps, by avoiding such comparison, whether by removing price tags or by making taboo the photographic comparison among gifts, givers and receivers can believe their relationships (as signaled by the gift) are better than they are.”

May combine two claims.

Inefficient gifts help deter unwilling types but can hurt willing players.

“Inefficient gifts help deter, but they can hurt willing players.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Caplow observed that parents rarely photograph their children with all gifts unwrapped because doing so invites invidious comparison of gifts and relationships.

“In this regard, note Caplow's (1984) observation that parents rarely photograph their children with all their gifts unwrapped (though they often photograph children surrounded by wrapped gifts), because to do so”

• cites Caplow's (1984) sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

Adding investment gives a noninvesting player something to gain from riding free, provides a motive for some players to lie about their investment plans, and creates an information problem that signaling can solve.

“By adding investment, we give a noninvesting player something to gain from riding free, so we provide a motive for some players to lie about their investment plans, and we create an information problem that signaling can solve.”

May combine two claims.

The signaling view accounts for some stylized facts about modern gift giving, such as that the thought counts and that holidays coordinate gift giving that is not naturally simultaneous.

“The signaling view accounts for some stylized facts about modern practices of gift giving-the thought counts, holidays coordinate gift giving that is not naturally simultaneous, and so on.”

May combine two claims.

Lowering any player's gift efficiency makes that player worse off and either does not improve the other type or makes that player worse off because incentive-compatibility constraints keep utilities close.

“The intuition behind this result is that, by lowering any player's gift efficiency, we certainly make that player worse off, and we either make the other-type player no better off, or we make that player worse off because the IC constraints force player's utilities to be not far apart.”

May combine two claims.

Children's gifts to parents, often homemade and ugly with no direct utility value, signal the child's affection but not exactly as in courtship.

“Children's gifts to parents-often charmingly homemade and ugly, with no direct utility value to parents-signal the child's affection but not exactly as in courtship.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Usually the amounts of memorial contributions are not publicized, perhaps for the same reasons price tags are removed from gifts.

“Usually, the amounts are not publicized, perhaps for the same reasons that price tags are removed from gifts.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Caplow noted that at Christmas nearly all money gifts between kin were intergenerational and downward.

“(Caplow [1982, p. 386] noted that at Christmas”

• cites Caplow [1982 sourceNot checked — no full text of the source

May combine two claims.

When parents give cash as a wedding present, that cold gift draws attention to the end of the parent-child relationship, because an inefficient gift would be more appropriate if the relationship were intended to endure.

“When efficient gifts are appropriate.-Whenparents give cash as a wedding present to their children, that strikingly cold gift draws attention to the end of the parent-child relationship (for, if the relationship were intended to endure, an inefficient gift would be more appropriate).”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Overt pricing of a relationship taints affection with marketplace values and denies gift receivers the chance to believe their relationships are priceless.

“Put differently, the overt pricing of a relationship”

• cites Hemenway 1984Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

A fourth explanation is that gifts are signals of how much a gift giver knows about the receiver's tastes; if so, gifts are necessarily guesses about tastes that are sometimes wrong, so gifts are sometimes inefficient.

“A fourth explanation is that gifts are signals of how much a gift giver knows about the receiver's tastes.If so, gifts are necessarily guesses about tastes that are sometimes wrong; therefore, gifts are sometimes inefficient.”

May combine two claims.

Gifts from parents may shape or educate a child's tastes, or serve as control mechanisms to reward or punish children.

“Instead, gifts from parents may shape or educate a child's tastes, or they may be control mechanisms to reward or punish children.”

May combine two claims.

The analysis is especially appropriate for simple gift giving during courtship and in some business settings, but not well suited to gift giving in families or to explaining pure charity.

“While the analysis seems especially appropriate for simple gift giving during courtship and in some business settings, it is not well suited to gift giving in families or to explaining pure charity.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

A second explanation for inefficiency is that gifts might serve multiple signaling purposes simultaneously-signaling willingness to invest while conveying meaning about the giver's tastes, identity, or beliefs about the receiver.

“The variety of sociological explanations for gift giving suggests a second explanation, that gifts might serve multiple signaling purposes simultaneouslysignaling”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

Adding within- or between-player utility interdependencies, such as gifts having less utility cost when in love with the receiver, makes it easy to explain inefficient gift giving.

“Adding within-or between-player utility interdependencies-such as gifts' having less utility cost when you are in love with the gift receiver-makes it easy to explain inefficient gift giving.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Gift giving is puzzling from an economic perspective because it is inefficient-givers spend money on gifts differently from the way receivers would-and it seems necessarily so.

“Gift giving is puzzling from an economic perspective because it is inefficient-givers spend money on gifts differently from the way receivers would-and it seems to be necessarily so.”

May combine two claims.

In the one-sided signaling equilibrium, the player more likely to be an unwilling type must signal to the partner; the sincere player must convince the skeptic.

“(Intuitively, the player who is most likely to be a U-type must signal to his partner.The sincere must convince the skeptic, not the other way around.)”

May combine two claims.

Without an investment-theoretic definition of the relationship, players have no incentive to lie, so no signals are needed.

“While the role of investment may seem contrived and artificial, without an investment-theoretic definition of the relationship, players have no incentive to lie, so no signals are needed.”

May combine two claims.

Since families are voluntary organizations formed by parents and children necessarily belong, there is no courtship process implying that gifts are signals.

“Sincefamilies are voluntary organizations formed by parents and having children who necessarily belong, there is no process of courtship to imply that gifts are signals.”

• AssumptionRests on an assumption: Families are voluntary organizations formed by parents and having children who necessarily belong.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

A cash wedding gift may bless the marriage by signaling trust in the child's new spouse and acknowledging the validity of the child's new family.

“Perhaps this gesture blesses the marriage, signaling trust in the child's new spouse and acknowledging the validity of the child's new family.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

Cooperation seems realistic in many gift-giving situations because partners talk about gift giving, including gift costs and whether gifts should be efficient.

“Cooperation-defined in game theory as the ability to communicate about and enforce the strategy choices of players-seems realistic in many gift-giving situations: partners do talk about gift giving in relation-ships, including discussions of gift costs and whether gifts should be efficient or not.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Gifts in memory of the dead are often deliberately efficient, such as contributions to a specified charity, perhaps because the forward-looking relationship signaled by inefficient gifts has ended.

“Gifts Gifts in memory of the dead are often deliberately efficient as well (such as contributions to a specified charity), perhaps because the forwardlooking relationship, signaled by inefficient gifts, is ended.”