The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions
Abstract
The problem of eliciting honest preferences from individuals who must be assigned to a set of positions is considered. Individuals know that they will be charged for the positions to which they are assigned. A set of prices that provide no incentive for the individual to misrepresent his preferences is suggested. It is shown that these prices constitute an element of the optimal solution to the dual of a linear programming assignment problem. Both the optimal allocation and the prices to be charged can be derived by solving two linear programming problems once preferences have been elicited. The procedure can usefully be viewed as a simulation of a competitive market under conditions where such a market cannot be expected to function well. It results in an efficient allocation where all resources are valued at their opportunity costs and "consumer surplus" is maximized; its outcome thus has the desirable properties of competitive market equilibria.
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Citations
Cites
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
Linear Programming and Extensions
Dantzig, G. (1963) · RAND Corporation eBooks · doi:10.7249/r366 · Cited by 5,755
Introduction to Operations Research
Leimkuhler, F. F. (1968) · Technometrics · doi:10.1080/00401706.1968.10490578 · Cited by 3,405
Groves, T. (1973) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914085 · Cited by 3,284
Multipart pricing of public goods
Clarke, E. H. (1971) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/bf01726210 · Cited by 3,246
Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities
Koopmans, T. C., & Beckmann, M. (1957) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1907742 · Cited by 2,308
The assignment game I: The core
Shapley, L. S., & Shubik, M. (1971) · International Journal of Game Theory · doi:10.1007/bf01753437 · Cited by 1,682
Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
Groves, T., & Ledyard, J. (1977) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912672 · Cited by 823
Incentives in Public Decision-Making.
Hammond, P. J., Green, J. R., & Laffont, J.-J. (1980) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2231809 · Cited by 609
The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions
Hylland, A., & Zeckhauser, R. (1979) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260757 · Cited by 549
A New and Superior Process for Making Social Choices
Tideman, T. N., & Tullock, G. (1976) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260505 · Cited by 306
Cited by
Edelman, B., Ostrovsky, M., & Schwarz, M. (2007) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.97.1.242 · Cited by 1,567
The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: A case study in game theory
Roth, A. E. (1984) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261272 · Cited by 1,219
Varian, H. R. (2007) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.10.002 · Cited by 757
A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem
Bogomolnaia, A., & Moulin, H. (2001) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.2000.2710 · Cited by 726
Walrasian Equilibrium with Gross Substitutes
Gul, F., & Stacchetti, E. (1999) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1999.2531 · Cited by 622
Metadata
- Authors
- Leonard, H. B.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1983-06
- Volume
- 91
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 461-479
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2024694589
- Cited by
- 352
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 7.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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