The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design
Abstract
When changing jobs is costly, efficient employment contracts usually fail to compensate workers for the effects of posthiring events and decisions. Then, when there are executives and managers with authority to make discretionary decisions, affected employees will be led to waste valuable time trying to influence their decisions. Efficient organization design counters this tendency by limiting the discretion of decisions makers, especially for those decisions that have large distributional consequences but that are otherwise of little consequence to the organization.
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Citations
Cites
Coase, R. H. (1937) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x · Cited by 23,972
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
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The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society
Krueger, A. O. (2008) · 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_8 · Cited by 5,272
The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft
TULLOCK, G. (1967) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1967.tb01923.x · Cited by 2,963
Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913238 · Cited by 2,859
Self-citationAn Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1992) · Huebner International Series on Risk, Insurance and Economic Security · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-7957-5_16 · Cited by 1,913
A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship
Simon, H. A. (1951) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1906815 · Cited by 1,314
The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation
Posner, R. A. (1975) · 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_2 · Cited by 1,303
Directly Unproductive, Profit-Seeking (DUP) Activities
Bhagwati, J. N. (1982) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261104 · Cited by 1,206
Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor Market
(1986) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511559594 · Cited by 1,000
Harris, M., & Holmstrom, B. (1982) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297359 · Cited by 812
Managerial Incentives and Capital Management
Holmstrom, B., & Costa, J. R. I. (1986) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1884180 · Cited by 671
The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation
Posner, R. A. (2001) · The Economics of Public Law · doi:10.4337/9781035303533.00024 · Cited by 213
Bargaining and Influence Costs and the Organization of Economic ActivityPreprint
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. T. (1987) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 203
Self-citationGreen, J., & Kahn, C. M. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885379 · Cited by 143
Involuntary Unemployment and Implicit Contracts
Chari, V. V. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885376 · Cited by 91
A model of work effort and productive consumption
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Cited by
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
Self-citationFirms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Hart, O. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 · Cited by 4,672
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized versus Hierarchical Firms
Stein, J. C. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00483 · Cited by 2,421
Holmstrom, B. (1989) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(89)90025-5 · Cited by 1,648
Metadata
- Authors
- Milgrom, P. R.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1988-02
- Volume
- 96
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 42-60
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W3020920339
- Cited by
- 633
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 20.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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