The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Theory of Rational Addiction
Abstract
We develop a theory of rational addiction in which rationality means a consistent plan to maximize utility over time. Strong addiction to a good requires a big effect of past consumption of the good on current consumption. Such powerful complementarities cause some steady states to be unstable. They are an important part of our analysis because even small deviations from the consumption at an unstable steady state can lead to large cumulative rises over time in addictive consumption or to rapid falls in consumption to abstention. Our theory also implies that "cold turkey" is used to end strong addictions, that addicts often go on binges, that addicts respond more to permanent than to temporary changes in prices of addictive goods, and that anxiety and tensions can precipitate an addiction.
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Cites
De gustibus non est disputandum
Stigler, G. J., & Becker, G. S. (2010) · Idées économiques et sociales · doi:10.3917/idee.159.0054 · Cited by 2,282
Self-citationHabit Formation and Dynamic Demand Functions
Pollak, R. A. (1970) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259667 · Cited by 822
The Effect of Liquor Taxes on Heavy Drinking
Cook, P. J., & Tauchen, G. (1982) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003461 · Cited by 318
Farrell, P., Fuchs, V. R., & Fuchs, V. R. (1982) · Journal of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/0167-6296(82)90001-7 · Cited by 311
Notes on endogenous change of tastes
von Weizsäcker, C. C. (1971) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(71)90037-8 · Cited by 231
Winston, G. C. (1980) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(80)90009-8 · Cited by 220
Governmental Regulation of Cigarette Health Information
Schneider, L., Klein, B., & Murphy, K. M. (1981) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467001 · Cited by 181
Self-citationJuvenile delinquents then and now: Comparison of findings from 1959 and 1974.
DAVIDS, A., & Falkof, B. B. (1975) · Journal of Abnormal Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0076986 · Cited by 18
Cited by
Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review
Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G. F., & O’Donoghue, T. (2002) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/002205102320161311 · Cited by 6,381
O'Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.103 · Cited by 3,121
Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior
Loewenstein, G. (1996) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1006/obhd.1996.0028 · Cited by 2,610
Agency Relationships in Family Firms: Theory and Evidence
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., Dino, R. N., & Buchholtz, A. K. (2001) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.12.2.99.10114 · Cited by 2,332
Habit Formation: A Resolution of the Equity Premium Puzzle
Constantinides, G. M. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261693 · Cited by 2,126
Metadata
- Authors
- Becker, G. S., & Murphy, K. M.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1988-08
- Volume
- 96
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 675-700
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2027182904
- Cited by
- 3,823
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 17.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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