The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis
Abstract
In economic analyses of asymmetric information, better-informed agents are assumed capable of reproducing the judgments of less-informed agents. We discuss a systematic violation of this assumption that we call the "curse of knowledge." Better-informed agents are unable to ignore private information even when it is in their interest to do so; more information is not always better. Comparing judgments made in individual-level and market experiments, we find that market forces reduce the curse by approximately 50 percent but do not eliminate it. Implications for bargaining, strategic behavior by firms, principal-agent problems, and choice under uncertainty are discussed.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Camerer, C., Loewenstein, G., & Weber, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1989-10
- Volume
- 97
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1232-1254
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2025871550
- Cited by
- 755
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 67.25
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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