The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Collectivization and China's Agricultural Crisis in 1959-1961
Abstract
The agricultural crisis in China in 1959-61, after the initial success of the collectivization movement, resulted in 30 million extra deaths. In this paper, a game theory hypothesis proposes the main cause of this catastrophe. I argue that, because of the difficulty in supervising agricultural work, the success of an agricultural collective depends on a self-enforcing contract, in which each one promises to discipline oneself. A self-enforcing contract, however, can be sustained only in a repeated game. In the fall of 1958, the right to withdraw from a collective was deprived. The nature of the collectivization was thus changed from a repeated game to a one-time game. As a result, the self-enforcing contract could not be sustained and agricultural productivity collapsed. The empirical evidence is consistent with this hypothesis.
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Citations
Cites
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A theory of self-enforcing agreements
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Cited by
The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development
Xu, C. (2011) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.49.4.1076 · Cited by 2,623
History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India
Banerjee, A., & Iyer, L. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054825574 · Cited by 1,268
Kanbur, R., & Zhang, X. (2005) · Review of Development Economics · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9361.2005.00265.x · Cited by 755
The long-term health and economic consequences of the 1959–1961 famine in China
Chen, Y., & Zhou, L.-A. (2007) · Journal of Health Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2006.12.006 · Cited by 601
Success and Failure of Reform: Insights from the Transition of Agriculture
Rozelle, S., & Swinnen, J. F. M. (2004) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/0022051041409048 · Cited by 443
Metadata
- Authors
- Lin, J. Y.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1990-12
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1228-1252
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2086078954
- Cited by
- 357
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 19.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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