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Cited by 1,268Culture, Economy, and Development StudiesLand Rights and ReformsHistorical Economic and Social Studies

History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India

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Banerjee, Abhijit, Iyer, Lakshmi·2005·American Economic Review
DOI 10.1257/0002828054825574
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Abstract

We analyze the colonial land revenue institutions set up by the British in India, and show that differences in historical property rights institutions lead to sustained differences in economic outcomes. Areas in which proprietary rights in land were historically given to landlords have significantly lower agricultural investments and productivity in the post-independence period than areas in which these rights were given to the cultivators. These areas also have significantly lower investments in health and education. These differences are not driven by omitted variables or endogeneity problems; they probably arise because differences in historical institutions lead to very different policy choices.

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Crossref · 10.1257/0002828054825574

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6 of 6 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Banerjee and Iyer (2005) have shown that areas with landlord-based revenue systems have worse long-run outcomes compared to places with cultivator-based systems.

    “Banerjee and Iyer (2005) have shown that areas with landlord-based revenue systems, where land-lords were in charge of revenue collection, have worse long-run outcomes compared to places with cultivatorbased systems, where the ruler collected the revenue directly from the cultivators.”

    From Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India: Long-Term Consequences (2010) · cites this paper as Banerjee and Iyer (2005)

  • A cultivator-based land revenue system is associated with better public goods outcomes within British areas, consistent with Banerjee and Iyer (2005), but the land revenue system does not matter within native state areas.

    “I find that a cultivator-based land revenue system is associated with better public goods outcomes within British areas, consistent with the results of Banerjee and Iyer (2005), but that the land revenue system does not matter within native state areas (table A.5, columns 1 and 2).”

    From Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India: Long-Term Consequences (2010) · cites this paper as Banerjee and Iyer (2005)

  • Adding controls for the British colonial taxation system does not affect the main estimates.

    “Using data from Banerjee and Iyer (2005), we are able to control for these features, and find that adding these controls does not affect our main estimates.”

    From Displacement and development: Long term impacts of population transfer in India (2019) · cites this paper as Banerjee and Iyer (2005)

  • Banerjee and Iyer (2005) show important long term effects of colonization in areas that were under different forms of British governance.

    “Banerjee and Iyer (2005) show important long term effects of colonization in areas that were under different forms of British governance.”

    From Displacement and development: Long term impacts of population transfer in India (2019) · cites this paper as Banerjee and Iyer (2005)

  • Owner-cultivators have superior incentives relative to tenant farmers and landless labourers.

    “Since owner-cultivators have superior incentives relative to tenant farmers and landless labourers, 35”

    From Displacement and development: Long term impacts of population transfer in India (2019) · cites this paper as Banerjee and Iyer, 2005

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Authors
Banerjee, A., & Iyer, L.
Affiliations
  • Massachusetts Institute of Technology (US)
  • Harvard University (US)
ORCID
Venue
American Economic Review
Publisher
American Economic Association
Published
2005-08-01
Volume
95
Issue
4
Pages
1190-1213
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1257/0002828054825574
OpenAlex
W1511665033
Cited by
1,268
References
6
Citations by year
2026: 57 · 2025: 69 · 2024: 60 · 2023: 55 · 2022: 49 · 2021: 85 · 2020: 81 · 2019: 82 · 2018: 57 · 2017: 60 · 2016: 47 · 2015: 62 · 2014: 76 · 2013: 63 · 2012: 53
FWCI
128.72
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Demography › Culture, Economy, and Development Studies
  • Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Soil Science › Land Rights and Reforms
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Historical Economic and Social Studies
Keywords
colonial land tenure, property rights, landlord-tenant relations, agricultural investment, agricultural productivity, health investment, education investment, historical institutions, British colonial rule, India, post-independence economic development

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