The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth: Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries?
Abstract
We analyze a differential game in which all interest groups have access to a common capital stock. We show that the introduction of a technology that has inferior productivity but enjoys private access may ameliorate the tragedy of the commons. We use this model to analyze capital flight: in many poor countries, property rights are not well defined; since "safe" bank accounts in rich countries (the inferior technology) are available to citizens of these countries, they engage in capital flight. We show that the occurrence of capital flight does not imply that opening the capital account reduces growth and welfare.
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Cites
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Cited by
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Metadata
- Authors
- Tornell, A., & Velasco, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1992-12
- Volume
- 100
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1208-1231
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W1999769146
- Cited by
- 359
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 7.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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