The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market
Abstract
This paper introduces the "separate spheres" bargaining model, a new model of distribution within marriage. It differs from divorce threat bargaining models (e.g., Manser-Brown, McElroy-Horney) in that the threat point is not divorce but a noncooperative equilibrium within marriage; this noncooperative equilibrium reflects traditional gender roles. The predictions of our model thus differ from those of divorce threat bargaining models; in the separate spheres model, cash transfer payments to the mother and payments to the father can--but need not--imply different equilibrium distributions in existing marriages. In the long run, the distributional effects of transfer policies may be substantially altered by changes in the marriage market equilibrium.
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Citations
Cites
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
Rubinstein, A. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912531 · Cited by 5,264
Collective Choice and Social Welfare
Myint, H., & Sen, A. (1972) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913866 · Cited by 2,565
Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis
Manser, M., & Brown, M. (1980) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2526238 · Cited by 1,972
Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach
Thomas, D. (1990) · The Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.2307/145670 · Cited by 1,948
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Simon, H. A., Luce, R. D., & Raiffa, H. (1958) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2089260 · Cited by 1,944
Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand
McElroy, M. B., & Horney, M. J. (1981) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2526280 · Cited by 1,905
Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis.
Kamecke, U., Roth, A. E., & Sotomayor, M. A. O. (1992) · Economica · doi:10.2307/2554894 · Cited by 1,625
A Transaction Cost Approach to Families and Households
Pollak, R. A. (1985) · Journal of Economic Literature · Cited by 739
Self-citationThe private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income
Warr, P. G. (1983) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/0165-1765(83)90087-3 · Cited by 655
Testing the Neoclassical Model of Family Labor Supply and Fertility
Schultz, T. P. (1990) · The Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.2307/145669 · Cited by 601
Domestic Violence: A Nonrandom Affair
Tauchen, H. V., Witte, A. D., & Long, S. K. (1991) · International Economic Review · doi:10.2307/2526888 · Cited by 374
The Allocation of Money and the Structuring of Inequality within Marriage
Pahl, J. (1983) · The Sociological Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-954x.1983.tb00389.x · Cited by 309
Labor Supply of Husbands and Wives: A Simultaneous Equations Approach
Lundberg, S. (1988) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/1928306 · Cited by 218
Self-citation
Cited by
Akerlof, G. A., & Kranton, R. E. (2000) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300554881 · Cited by 5,585
The analysis of household surveys: A microeconometric approach to development policy
Deaton, A. (1997) · doi:10.1596/0-8018-5254-4 · Cited by 4,877
The Quiet Revolution That Transformed Women's Employment, Education, and Family
Goldin, C. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282806777212350 · Cited by 1,831
''Bargaining'' and Gender Relations: Within and Beyond the Household
Agarwal, B. (1997) · Feminist Economics · doi:10.1080/135457097338799 · Cited by 1,693
When Does Gender Trump Money? Bargaining and Time in Household Work
Bittman, M., England, P., Sayer, L., Folbre, N., & Matheson, G. (2003) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/378341 · Cited by 1,352
Metadata
- Authors
- Lundberg, S., & Pollak, R. A.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1993-12
- Volume
- 101
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 988-1010
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2149812093
- Cited by
- 1,544
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 29.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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