The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Trade Wars and Trade Talks
Open accessAbstract
When governments meet in the international arena, their actions reflect the political situations at home. Previous studies of trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political pressures and that act as benevolent servants of the public interest. Here we introduce domestic politics into the analysis of international economic relations. We study the interactions between national leaders who are concerned with both providing a high standard of living to the general electorate and collecting campaign contributions from special-interest groups. Our analysis sheds light on the determinants of the structure of protection in noncooperative and cooperative policy equilibria.
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Cites
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Cited by
Insecurity and the Pattern of Trade: An Empirical Investigation
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Bagwell, K., & Staiger, R. W. (1999) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.215 · Cited by 1,022
The Political Economy of the World Trading System: WTO and Beyond
Hoekman, B., & Kostecki, M. (2001) · doi:10.1093/019829431x.001.0001 · Cited by 544
Interdependent preferential trade agreement memberships: An empirical analysis
Egger, P., & Larch, M. (2008) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2008.08.003 · Cited by 505
Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?
JACOBS, L. R., & PAGE, B. I. (2005) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s000305540505152x · Cited by 465
Metadata
- Authors
- Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1995-08
- Volume
- 103
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 675-708
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2153515976
- Cited by
- 689
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 29.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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