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Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana

Besley, Timothy · 1995 · Journal of Political Economy

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

This paper examines the link between property rights and investment incentives. I develop three theoretical arguments based on security of tenure, using land as collateral and obtaining gains from trade. The paper then presents empirical evidence from two regions in Ghana. I investigate the possibility that rights are endogenous, with farmers making improvements to enhance their land rights. Finally, I suggest tests for which of the theories might explain the results.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1086/262008

Cites

15 of 15 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Citations

Cites

Cited by

See all 2,016

Metadata

Authors
Besley, T.
Corresponding author
Besley, Timothy
Venue
Journal of Political Economy
Published
1995-10
Volume
103
Issue
5
Pages
903-937
ISSN
  • 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-534X
OpenAlex
W2159244471
Cited by
2,016
References
15
Citations by year
2026: 91 · 2025: 69 · 2024: 61 · 2023: 88 · 2022: 99 · 2021: 94 · 2020: 120 · 2019: 102 · 2018: 96 · 2017: 93 · 2016: 69 · 2015: 94 · 2014: 73 · 2013: 95 · 2012: 79
FWCI
19.25
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Journal of Political Economy (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Soil Science › Land Rights and Reforms
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
  • Life Sciences › Agricultural and Biological Sciences › General Agricultural and Biological Sciences › Agricultural Innovations and Practices
Keywords
property rights, investment incentives, tenure security, land as collateral, gains from trade, land improvement, farmers, Ghana

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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.