Studies in the Logic of Explanation
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
To explain the phenomena in the world of our experience, to answer the question “why?” rather than only the question “what?”, is one of the foremost objectives of all rational inquiry; and especially, scientific research in its various branches strives to go beyond a mere description of its subject matter by providing an explanation of the phenomena it investigates. While there is rather general agreement about this chief objective of science, there exists considerable difference of opinion as to the function and the essential characteristics of scientific explanation. In the present essay, an attempt will be made to shed some light on these issues by means of an elementary survey of the basic pattern of scientific explanation and a subsequent more rigorous analysis of the concept of law and of the logical structure of explanatory arguments.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“We argue that our highlight explanations constitute as an explanation given by the definition from [34].”
From Explanations Can Reduce Overreliance on AI Systems During Decision-Making (2023) · cites this paper as [34]
In the citing paper
“A core principle of scientific progress is reproducibility ( 16 ).”
From Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science (2015) · cites this paper as [2]
Citations
Cites
The Semantic Conception of Truth: and the Foundations of Semantics
Tarski, A. (1944) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2102968 · Cited by 1,640
Behavior, Purpose and Teleology
Rosenblueth, A., Wiener, N., & Bigelow, J. (1943) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/286788 · Cited by 1,565
The Function of General Laws in History
Hempel, C. G. (1942) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2017635 · Cited by 1,062
Self-citationPopper, K. (1935) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-7091-4177-9 · Cited by 982
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science.
Ballantine, C., Neurath, O., Bohr, N., Dewey, J., Russell, B., Carnap, R., & Morris, C. W. (1939) · The American Mathematical Monthly · doi:10.2307/2302467 · Cited by 766
I.—STUDIES IN THE LOGIC OF CONFIRMATION (I.)
HEMPEL, C. G. (1945) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/liv.213.1 · Cited by 559
Self-citationThe Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals
Goodman, N. (1947) · The Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.2307/2019988 · Cited by 462
The Two Concepts of Probability: The Problem of Probability
Carnap, R. (1945) · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · doi:10.2307/2102817 · Cited by 338
Melton, A. W., & Harriman, P. L. (1947) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1417883 · Cited by 208
I.—THE CONTRARY-TO-FACT CONDITIONAL1
CHISHOLM, R. M. (1946) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/lv.219.289 · Cited by 205
Research works printed but not linked: 5
- Beard, Charles A. , and Hook, Sidney . [Terminology] Problems of terminology in historical writing. Chapter IV of Theory and practice in historical study: A report of the Committee on Historiography. Social Science Research Council, New York, 1946.
- Carnap, 1942, [Semantics] Introduction to semantics
- Reichenbach, 1944, [Quantum mechanics] Philosophic foundations of quantum mechanics
- McKinsey, 1946, [Review] Review of Helmer and Oppenheim, [Probability], Mathematical reviews, vol. 7, 45
- Grelling, Kurt and Oppenheim, Paul . [Functional Whole] Logical Analysis of “Gestalt” as “Functional whole”. Preprinted for distribution at Fifth Internat. Congress for the Unity of Science, Cambridge, Mass., 1939.
Cited by
Items 201–300 of 1,004
On the role of theory and modeling in neuroscience
Levenstein, D., Alvarez, V. A., Amarasingham, A., Azab, H., Chen, Z. S., Gerkin, R. C., Hasenstaub, A., Iyer, R., Jolivet, R. B., Marzen, S., et al. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2003.13825 · Cited by 93
Erasmus, A., Brunet, T. D. P., & Fisher, E. (2021) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-020-00435-2 · Cited by 80
“Philosophers have reflected on the nature of explanation since before Socrates, but the modern discussion began in the late 1940s with Hempel and Oppenheim (1948).”
BackgroundWeslake, B. (2010) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/651316 · Cited by 118
“…debate over the nature of scientific explanation justifiably begins with the deductive-nomological (DN) view of explanation defended by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), according to which to explain is to provide a sound deductive argument for some explanandum, with at least one essential premise…”
BackgroundSensible AI: Re-imagining Interpretability and Explainability using Sensemaking Theory
Kaur, H., Adar, E., Gilbert, E., & Lampe, C. (2022) · 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness Accountability and Transparency · doi:10.1145/3531146.3533135 · Cited by 92
Radical behaviorism and scientific frameworks: From mechanistic to relational accounts.
Chiesa, M. (1992) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037//0003-066x.47.11.1287 · Cited by 106
“…began their classic "Studies in the Logic of Explanation" with precisely this assertion: "scientific research in its various branches strives to go beyond a mere description of its subject matter by providing an explanation of the phenomena it investigates" (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1960, p. 135).”
BackgroundDesired Risk: Broadening the Social Amplification of Risk Framework1
Machlis, G. E., & Rosa, E. A. (1990) · Risk Analysis · doi:10.1111/j.1539-6924.1990.tb01030.x · Cited by 126
Novaco, R. W., & Monahan, J. T. (1980) · American Journal of Community Psychology · doi:10.1007/bf00912656 · Cited by 91
From Wide Cognition to Mechanisms: A Silent Revolution
Miłkowski, M., Clowes, R. W., Rucińska, Z., Przegalińska, A., Zawidzki, T. W., Krueger, J. W., Gies, A., McGann, M., Afeltowicz, Ł., Wachowski, W. M., et al. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02393 · Cited by 105
Critical realism and qualitative research in psychology
Willis, M. E. H. (2022) · Qualitative Research in Psychology · doi:10.1080/14780887.2022.2157782 · Cited by 106
Schiller, D., Yu, A. N. C., Alia‐Klein, N., Becker, S., Cromwell, H. C., Dolcos, F., Eslinger, P. J., Frewen, P., Kemp, A. H., Pace-Schott, E. F., et al. (2023) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105450 · Cited by 101
“While these theories may assume metaphysical claims about what emotion is, they ultimately gravitate in their central explanandum—the phenomenon they aim to explain—toward how emotion unfolds mechanistically (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1948).”
BackgroundPrediction in Psychiatry: An Example of Misplaced Confidence in Experts
Cocozza, J. J., & Steadman, H. J. (1978) · Social Problems · doi:10.2307/800064 · Cited by 90
Cabitza, F., Campagner, A., Malgieri, G., Natali, C., Schneeberger, D., Stoeger, K., & Holzinger, A. (2023) · Expert Systems with Applications · doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2022.118888 · Cited by 89
Theorizing as Engaged Practice
Zundel, M., & Kokkalis, P. (2010) · Organization Studies · doi:10.1177/0170840610374405 · Cited by 116
The architecture of grammar and the division of labour in exponence
Bermúdez-Otero, R. (2012) · Research Explorer (The University of Manchester) · Cited by 104
The empirical content of theories in judgment and decision making: Shortcomings and remedies
Glöckner, A., & Betsch, T. (2011) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500004149 · Cited by 87
“.2 Scientific advantage (III): Empirical content, universality and precision Popper argues in favor of replacing inductive with deductive testing of theories (later on elaborated by Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948).”
BackgroundEstimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Science
Nosek, B. A., Cohoon, J., Kidwell, M., & Spies, J. R. (2016) · doi:10.31219/osf.io/447b3 · Cited by 88
Lösel, F. (2018) · Journal of Experimental Criminology · doi:10.1007/s11292-017-9297-z · Cited by 76
“In philosophy of science, this is known as Bexhaustion^, that is, further conditions are added to the deductivenomological model of explanation (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948).”
BackgroundExplanation, Prediction, and Meaning Variance: An Assessment of Distance Interaction Models
Olsson, G. (1970) · Economic Geography · doi:10.2307/143140 · Cited by 87
Understanding, explanation, and unification
Gijsbers, V. (2012) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A · doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2012.12.003 · Cited by 96
On the Emergence of Oligarchy in Human Interaction
Mayhew, B. H., & Levinger, R. L. (1976) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/226184 · Cited by 85
How could models possibly provide how-possibly explanations?
Verreault-Julien, P. (2018) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A · doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.06.008 · Cited by 84
Moore, J. (2011) · The Psychological Record · doi:10.1007/bf03395771 · Cited by 84
Verbal explanations given by science teachers: Their nature and implications
Dagher, Z. R., & Cossman, G. W. (1992) · Journal of Research in Science Teaching · doi:10.1002/tea.3660290405 · Cited by 84
The Deductive-Nomological Account of Metaphysical Explanation
Wilsch, T. (2015) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2015.1033637 · Cited by 97
Kemeny, J. G. (1953) · Journal of Symbolic Logic · doi:10.2307/2266553 · Cited by 83
A Field Guide to Mechanisms: Part I
Andersen, H. (2014) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12119 · Cited by 82
A continuum model of multi-phase reactive transport in igneous systems
Keller, T., & Suckale, J. (2019) · Geophysical Journal International · doi:10.1093/gji/ggz287 · Cited by 81
The Genetic‐Causal Tradition and Modern Economic Theory
Cowan, R., & Rizzo, M. J. (1996) · Kyklos · doi:10.1111/j.1467-6435.1996.tb01398.x · Cited by 88
Emergence in exact natural sciencePreprint
Primas, H. (1998) · PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) · Cited by 82
Philosophical History and the Problem of Consciousness
Livingston, P. M. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511497957 · Cited by 86
Scientific Explanation: Three Basic Conceptions
Salmon, W. C. (1984) · PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association · doi:10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1984.2.192510 · Cited by 127
Re-orienting discussions of scientific explanation: A functional perspective
Woody, A. I. (2015) · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A · doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.03.005 · Cited by 89
Bridewell, W. B., Langley, P., Todorovski, L., & Džeroski, S. (2007) · Machine Learning · doi:10.1007/s10994-007-5042-6 · Cited by 90
“In a deeper sense, we appeal to Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), who view an explanation as a collection of general laws and situation specific conditions that support the deduction of observations.”
BackgroundRieppel, O. C. (2003) · Systematic Biology · doi:10.1080/10635150309338 · Cited by 87
A Critique of Friedman's Methodological Instrumentalism
Caldwell, B. (1980) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1057529 · Cited by 100
“That the covering law models cannot be used to justify Friedman's instrumentalism is clear once one notes that one of Hempel and Oppenheim's "conditions of adequacy," which all sound explanations must meet, states that "the sentences constituting the explanans must be true" [13, 138].”
BackgroundCan We Generalize from Case Studies?
Steinberg, P. F. (2015) · Global Environmental Politics · doi:10.1162/glep_a_00316 · Cited by 93
Kulgemeyer, C., Borowski, A., Buschhüter, D., Enkrott, P., Kempin, M., Reinhold, P., Riese, J., Schecker, H. P., Schröder, J., & Vogelsang, C. (2020) · Journal of Research in Science Teaching · doi:10.1002/tea.21632 · Cited by 85
Gale, G. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/chol9780521591041.052 · Cited by 77
Explanation and the Nature of Scientific Knowledge
McCain, K. (2015) · Science & Education · doi:10.1007/s11191-015-9775-5 · Cited by 93
“…a sampling of some of the major theories of the nature of explanation see Braithwaite (1953), Friedman (1974), Gardiner (1959), Hempel (1942, 1965), Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), Kitcher (1981, 1989), Nagel (1961), Popper (1959), Salmon (1971, 1984, 1990), Strevens (2008), and Woodward (2003). of…”
BackgroundTang, K. (2016) · International Journal of Science Education · doi:10.1080/09500693.2016.1192309 · Cited by 85
“N) model, was the first model of scientific explanation proposed by philosophers of science (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948).”
MethodCausality tests and observationally equivalent representations of econometric models
BASMANN, R. L. (1988) · Journal of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/0304-4076(88)90041-3 · Cited by 85
Judgments Over TimeThe Interplay of Thoughts, Feelings, and Behaviors
Sanna, L. J., & Chang, E. C. (2006) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195177664.001.0001 · Cited by 74
On a Straw Man in the Philosophy of Science: A Defense of the Received View
Lutz, S. (2012) · HOPOS The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/664460 · Cited by 75
“One such analysis is given by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) and subsequent authors, who developed increasingly sophisticated and general explications of ‘explanation’ on the basis of the Received View.”
How can computer simulations produce new knowledge?
Beisbart, C. (2012) · European Journal for Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1007/s13194-012-0049-7 · Cited by 87
“54 Explanations are arguments according to the DN-model of explanation (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948).”
BackgroundUnderstanding contexts: how explanatory theories can help
Davidoff, F. (2019) · Implementation Science · doi:10.1186/s13012-019-0872-8 · Cited by 85
Are ecological and evolutionary theories scientific?
Murray, B. G. (2001) · Biological reviews/Biological reviews of the Cambridge Philosophical Society · doi:10.1017/s146479310100567x · Cited by 84
Metaphysically explanatory unification
Kovacs, D. M. (2019) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-019-01279-z · Cited by 80
“3 I will raise a trivialization challenge for this statement, offer a refined formulation to address it, and along the way also introduce the conceptual tools 7 Hempel and Oppenheim (1948).”
BackgroundFunctional explaining: a new approach to the philosophy of explanation
Wilkenfeld, D. A. (2014) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0452-z · Cited by 86
“(Hempel and Oppenheim 1948, p. 17) The dilemma Hempel and Oppenheim present is telling: understanding is either merely a feeling, or else it is the derivation of the phenomenon from some general law.23 In the 21 Note that the point is not that speakers would need a concept of e.g. argument…”
BackgroundFlis, I. (2019) · Theory & Psychology · doi:10.1177/0959354319835322 · Cited by 74
Werlen, B. (2003) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203298763 · Cited by 74
Dispositional Explanations of Behavior
Vanderbeeken, R., & Weber, E. (2002) · Ghent University Academic Bibliography (Ghent University) · Cited by 73
Haplological dissimilation at distinct stages of exponence
Nevins, A. I. (2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573721.003.0003 · Cited by 84
Styles of Causal Thought: An Empirical Investigation
Abend, G., Petre, C., & Sauder, M. (2013) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/675892 · Cited by 78
Aydınonat, N. E. (2007) · Journal of Economic Methodology · doi:10.1080/13501780701718680 · Cited by 85
“@If we know that the explanans of a partial explanation is true, then having a partial explanation may be better than having nothing – for we can develop the explanation by plugging in the other necessary elements. Yet some explanations may also fail to satisfy this truth condition, or the empirical adequacy condition…”
BackgroundInfluentialLogical empiricism and psychiatric classification
SCHWARTZ, M. A., & Wiggins, O. P. (1986) · Comprehensive Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/0010-440x(86)90019-2 · Cited by 73
Laws, Systems, and Research Designs: A Discussion of Explanation in Archaeology
Tuggle, H. D., Townsend, A. H., & Riley, T. J. (1972) · American Antiquity · doi:10.2307/278882 · Cited by 73
“We realize that "uniqueness" entails a number of theoretical nettles (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948; Hempel 1965), but some of these may be avoided if it is clear that the emphasis is upon evolving systems, and not upon "events" which is what Hempel has largely concerned himself with: When we spoke of…”
BackgroundCognitive Design for Artificial Minds
Lieto, A. (2021) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315460536 · Cited by 119
Schatz, T., Feldman, N. H., Goldwater, S. J., Cao, X.-N., & Dupoux, E. (2021) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2001844118 · Cited by 86
Talanquer, V. (2013) · Journal of Chemical Education · doi:10.1021/ed400311x · Cited by 79
The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument
Pruss, A. R. (2009) · The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology · doi:10.1002/9781444308334.ch2 · Cited by 70
“…statistical relevance theories of explanation deny (28), and, more broadly, (28) may be a manifestation of the mistaken confl ation of explanation with prediction that plagued both the deductive–nomological (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948) and inductive–statistical (Hempel 1962) models of explanation.”
BackgroundExplanation and Confirmation: A Bayesian Critique of Inference to the Best Explanation
Salmon, W. C. (2001) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-015-9731-9_3 · Cited by 89
“EXPLANATION AND CONFIRMATION 91 [Hempel 1966] [Hempel and Oppenheim 1948] [Howson and Urbach 1989] [Irving and Harrington 197~] [Lipton 1991] [Mayo 1996] [Mill 1843] [Nyc 1972] [Perrin 1913] [Popper 193 5] [Reichenbach 1949] [Reichenbach 1956] [M. Salmon 1982] [W. Salmon 1984] [W. Salmon 1990] [W.…”
Finding New Facts; Thinking New Thoughts
Schulz, L. (2012) · Advances in child development and behavior · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-397919-3.00010-1 · Cited by 82
“…subsume specific relations under an abstract kind of relation, an appeal to plausible causal, mechanistic relations; Bonawitz & Lombrozo, in press; Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948; Keil & Wilson, 2000; Keleman, 1999; Kitcher, 1989; Legare, Gelman, & Wellman, 2010; Lombrozo, 2006, 2007, 2012; Lombrozo &…”
A Multi-Component Framework for the Analysis and Design of Explainable Artificial Intelligence
Kim, M.-Y., Atakishiyev, S., Babiker, H. K. B., Farruque, N., Goebel, R., Zaïane, O. R., Motallebi, M.-H., Rabelo, J., Syed, T., Yao, H., et al. (2021) · Machine Learning and Knowledge Extraction · doi:10.3390/make3040045 · Cited by 57
Why Ask, ‘Why?’? An Inquiry Concerning Scientific Explanation
Salmon, W. C. (1979) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9404-1_15 · Cited by 70
Paradigm Development in the Social Sciences: A Proposed Research Strategy
Mackenzie, K. D., & House, R. J. (1978) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1978.4296297 · Cited by 70
Friedman and Machlup on the Significance of Testing Economic Assumptions
Melitz, J. (1965) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/258991 · Cited by 70
From symbols to icons: the return of resemblance in the cognitive neuroscience revolution
Williams, D., & Colling, L. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1578-6 · Cited by 69
“…the 20th century—namely, the “covering law” or “deductivenomological model”—according to which the primary goal of explanation is to uncover universal or statistical laws and then derive statements of phenomena from statements of such laws and initial conditions (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948, 1953).”
BackgroundDesigns for explaining intelligent agents
Haynes, S. R., Cohen, M. A., & Ritter, F. E. (2008) · International Journal of Human-Computer Studies · doi:10.1016/j.ijhcs.2008.09.008 · Cited by 81
“In between are probabilistic (Hempel and Oppenheim, 1988), inductivestatistical (Salmon, 1993), and functional (Cummins, 1975) theories, all providing arguments for what constitutes a generally ideal, or context-appropriate explanation.”
BackgroundTowards a framework for effective instructional explanations in science teaching
Kulgemeyer, C. (2018) · Studies in Science Education · doi:10.1080/03057267.2018.1598054 · Cited by 79
The Spirit of Logical Empiricism: Carl G. Hempel's Role in Twentieth-Century Philosophy of Science
Salmon, W. C. (1999) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/392691 · Cited by 68
Alvarez, M. (2009) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869790902838514 · Cited by 68
“See, for example, Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) and Hempel (1965).”
BackgroundFunctionalism and Logical Analysis
Livingston, P. M. (2005) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199272457.003.0002 · Cited by 70
Using a mechanistic framework to characterise chemistry students' reasoning in written explanations
Moreira, P., Marzábal, A., & Talanquer, V. (2018) · Chemistry Education Research and Practice · doi:10.1039/c8rp00159f · Cited by 68
From Theoretical Concept to Survey Question
Hox, J. J. (1997) · Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics · doi:10.1002/9781118490013.ch2 · Cited by 66
Steinmetz, G. (2005) · Duke University Press eBooks · doi:10.1215/9780822386889-009 · Cited by 108
Polarity and constraints on paradigmatic distinctness
Wunderlich, D. (2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573721.003.0006 · Cited by 70
What is cultural evolution anyway?
Micheletti, A. J. C., Brandl, E., & Mace, R. H. (2022) · Behavioral Ecology · doi:10.1093/beheco/arac011 · Cited by 67
Lehman, H. (1972) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/288471 · Cited by 67
Economic Theory, Statistical Inference, and Economic History
Meyer, J. R., & Conrad, A. H. (1957) · The Journal of Economic History · doi:10.1017/s0022050700079092 · Cited by 67
Modes of Explanation in Organization Theory
Scherer, A. G. (2009) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199275250.003.0012 · Cited by 83
“like the IS-explanation which covers particular events, Hempel (1965) proposed also a deductive-”
BackgroundInkelas, S. (2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573721.003.0011 · Cited by 68
Philosophy of science at sea: Clarifying the interpretability of machine learning
Beisbart, C., & Räz, T. (2022) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12830 · Cited by 58
Earman, J. (1978) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/288795 · Cited by 66
“342), ([6], Sec.”
The dominance-contiguity theory of the acquisition of classical conditioning.
Razran, G. (1957) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/h0047215 · Cited by 66
Probleme evidenzbasierter bzw. -orientierter pädagogischer Praxis
Stark, R. (2017) · Zeitschrift für Pädagogische Psychologie · doi:10.1024/1010-0652/a000201 · Cited by 66
Ontic Explanation Is either Ontic or Explanatory, but Not Both
Wright, C., & van Eck, D. (2018) · Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.3998/ergo.12405314.0005.038 · Cited by 78
The Science of Phylogenetic Systematics: Explanation, Prediction, and Test
Kluge, A. G. (1999) · Cladistics · doi:10.1006/clad.1999.0123 · Cited by 73
Semantic Information and Inductive Logic
Hintikka, J., & Pietarinen, A. (1966) · Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics · doi:10.1016/s0049-237x(08)71665-3 · Cited by 65
Papineau, D. (2002) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9780470996362.ch11 · Cited by 66
Operational, Representational, and Explanatory Models
Caws, P. (1974) · American Anthropologist · doi:10.1525/aa.1974.76.1.02a00020 · Cited by 65
Background Independence in Classical and Quantum Gravity
Read, J. A. M. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192889119.001.0001 · Cited by 85
Downing, L. J., & Barbara, S. (2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573721.003.0012 · Cited by 68
Criteria of progress for information systems design theories
Aier, S., & Fischer, C. (2010) · Information Systems and e-Business Management · doi:10.1007/s10257-010-0130-8 · Cited by 63
“For the conceptualization of science by Logical Empiricism, the deductivenomological model for scientific explanations by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) is central.”
MethodLogic-Based Explainability in Machine Learning
Marques-Silva, J. P. (2023) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-31414-8_2 · Cited by 122
Cornelissen, J. (2023) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2022.0297 · Cited by 76
The Good Cause: Theoretical Perspectives on Corruption
de Graaf, G., von Maravić, P., & Wagenaar, F. (2010) · Verlag Barbara Budrich eBooks · doi:10.3224/86649263 · Cited by 92
Explicativity: a mathematical theory of explanation with statistical applications
Good, I. J. (1977) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London A Mathematical and Physical Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspa.1977.0069 · Cited by 73
Logical empiricism and the study of human communication
O’Keefe, D. J. (1975) · Speech Monographs · doi:10.1080/03637757509375892 · Cited by 67
Pseudo‐mechanistic Explanations in Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience
Hommel, B. (2019) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/tops.12448 · Cited by 62
“According to Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), this research strategy amounts to “explanation as subsumption under natural law."”
BackgroundPhysicalism Deconstructed: Levels of Reality and the Mind–Body Problem
Morris, K. F. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108662178 · Cited by 77
Metadata
- Authors
- Hempel, C. G., & Oppenheim, P.
- Affiliations
- Queens College, CUNY (US)
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1948-04
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 135-175
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W1983870751
- Cited by
- 3,174
- References
- 32
- Citations by year
- 2026: 118 · 2025: 179 · 2024: 116 · 2023: 160 · 2022: 195 · 2021: 132 · 2020: 144 · 2019: 197 · 2018: 124 · 2017: 100 · 2016: 82 · 2015: 104 · 2014: 91 · 2013: 94 · 2012: 99
- FWCI
- 69.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- scientific explanation, logic of explanation, concept of law, rational inquiry
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.