Studies in the Logic of Explanation
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Abstract
To explain the phenomena in the world of our experience, to answer the question “why?” rather than only the question “what?”, is one of the foremost objectives of all rational inquiry; and especially, scientific research in its various branches strives to go beyond a mere description of its subject matter by providing an explanation of the phenomena it investigates. While there is rather general agreement about this chief objective of science, there exists considerable difference of opinion as to the function and the essential characteristics of scientific explanation. In the present essay, an attempt will be made to shed some light on these issues by means of an elementary survey of the basic pattern of scientific explanation and a subsequent more rigorous analysis of the concept of law and of the logical structure of explanatory arguments.
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“We argue that our highlight explanations constitute as an explanation given by the definition from [34].”
From Explanations Can Reduce Overreliance on AI Systems During Decision-Making (2023) · cites this paper as [34]
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“A core principle of scientific progress is reproducibility ( 16 ).”
From Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science (2015) · cites this paper as [2]
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Sniehotta, F. F., Presseau, J., & Araújo-Soares, V. (2015) · Health Psychology Review · doi:10.1080/17437199.2015.1022902 · Cited by 35
Keiner, L., & Graulich, N. (2020) · Chemistry Education Research and Practice · doi:10.1039/d0rp00206b · Cited by 47
Ruse, M. (1970) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048407012341201 · Cited by 45
Hunt, S. D. (1994) · Journal of Management Inquiry · doi:10.1177/105649269433002 · Cited by 45
Metadata
- Authors
- Hempel, C. G., & Oppenheim, P.
- Affiliations
- Queens College, CUNY (US)
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1948-04
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 135-175
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W1983870751
- Cited by
- 3,174
- References
- 32
- Citations by year
- 2026: 118 · 2025: 179 · 2024: 116 · 2023: 160 · 2022: 195 · 2021: 132 · 2020: 144 · 2019: 197 · 2018: 124 · 2017: 100 · 2016: 82 · 2015: 104 · 2014: 91 · 2013: 94 · 2012: 99
- FWCI
- 69.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- scientific explanation, logic of explanation, concept of law, rational inquiry
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.