The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation
Abstract
It has been the dominant view that probabilistic explanations of particular facts must be inductive in character. I argue here that this view is mistaken, and that the aim of probabilistic explanation is not to demonstrate that the explanandum fact was nomically expectable, but to give an account of the chance mechanism(s) responsible for it. To this end, a deductive-nomological model of probabilistic explanation is developed and defended. Such a model has application only when the probabilities occurring in covering laws can be interpreted as measures of objective chance, expressing the strength of physical propensities. Unlike inductive models of probabilistic explanation, this deductive model stands in no need of troublesome requirements of maximal specificity or epistemic relativization.
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Citations
Cites
Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance
Salmon, W. C. (1971) · doi:10.2307/j.ctt6wrd9p · Cited by 543
Maximal Specificity and Lawlikeness in Probabilistic Explanation
Hempel, C. G. (1968) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/288197 · Cited by 121
Cited by
Kane, R. (1999) · doi:10.1093/0195126564.001.0001 · Cited by 1,316
Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation
Woodward, J. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0195155270.001.0001 · Cited by 1,302
Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation
Glennan, S. (2002) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/341857 · Cited by 867
A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance
Lewis, D. (1980) · IFS · doi:10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_14 · Cited by 799
The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences
Mahoney, J. (2012) · Sociological Methods & Research · doi:10.1177/0049124112437709 · Cited by 577
Metadata
- Authors
- Railton, P.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1978-06
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 206-226
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W2086889208
- Cited by
- 299
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 22.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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