The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation
Abstract
Philosophers of science typically associate the causal-mechanical view of scientific explanation with the work of Railton and Salmon. In this paper I shall argue that the defects of this view arise from an inadequate analysis of the concept of mechanism. I contrast Salmon's account of mechanisms in terms of the causal nexus with my own account of mechanisms, in which mechanisms are viewed as complex systems. After describing these two concepts of mechanism, I show how the complex-systems approach avoids certain objections to Salmon's account of causal-mechanical explanation. I conclude by discussing how mechanistic explanations can provide understanding by unification.
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Citations
Cites
Studies in the Logic of Explanation
Hempel, C. G., & Oppenheim, P. (1948) · Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1086/286983 · Cited by 3,174
Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis)
Fodor, J. A. (1974) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/bf00485230 · Cited by 1,815
Research works printed but not linked: 15
- Railton, 1978, A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation, A Deductive-Nomological Model of Probabilistic Explanation, 45, 206
- Salmon, 1984, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World
- Salmon, 1994, Causality without Counterfactuals, Causality without Counterfactuals, 61, 297
- Bechtel, 1993, Discovering Complexity: Decomposition and Localization as Strategies in Scientific Research
- Glennan, 1997, Capacities, Universality and Singularity, Capacities, Universality and Singularity, 64, 605
- Sterelny, 1996, Explanatory Pluralism in Evolutionary Biology, Explanatory Pluralism in Evolutionary Biology, 11, 193
- Railton, 1981, Probability, Explanation, and Information, Probability, Explanation, and Information, 48, 233
- Wimsatt, 1994, The Ontology of Complex Systems: Levels, Perspectives and Causal Thickets, The Ontology of Complex Systems: Levels, Perspectives and Causal Thickets, 20, 207
- Machamer, 2000, Thinking about Mechanisms, Thinking about Mechanisms, 67, 1
- Kitcher, 1989, Scientific Explanation: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 13, 410
- Glennan, Stuart (under review), “A Model of Models”.
- Kitcher, 1981, Explanatory Unification, Explanatory Unification, 48, 507
- Woodward, 2000, Explanation and Invariance in the Special Sciences, Explanation and Invariance in the Special Sciences, 51, 197
- Salmon, 1989, Scientific Explanation: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 13, 3
- Glennan, 1996, Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation, Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation, 44, 49
Cited by
Towards A Rigorous Science of Interpretable Machine Learning
Doshi-Velez, F., & Kim, B. (2017) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1702.08608 · Cited by 3,121
Keil, F. C. (2006) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.57.102904.190100 · Cited by 1,350
Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches
Piccinini, G., & Craver, C. (2011) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-011-9898-4 · Cited by 508
Processes, Relations, and Relational‐Developmental‐Systems
Overton, W. F. (2015) · Handbook of Child Psychology and Developmental Science · doi:10.1002/9781118963418.childpsy102 · Cited by 471
Gerring, J. (2010) · Comparative Political Studies · doi:10.1177/0010414010376911 · Cited by 279
Metadata
- Authors
- Glennan, S.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2002-09
- Volume
- 69
- Issue
- S3
- Pages
- S342-S353
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W1994757764
- Cited by
- 867
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 157.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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