The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Reply to Churchland's “Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality”
Abstract
Churchland's paper “Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality“ offers empirical, semantical and epistemological arguments intended to show that the cognitive impenetrability of perception “does not establish a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge” and that the psychological account of perceptual encapsulation that I set forth in The Modularity of Mind “[is] almost certainly false“. The present paper considers these arguments in detail and dismisses them.
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Citations
Cites
Fodor, J. A. (1983) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4737.001.0001 · Cited by 7,734
Self-citationMovement-produced stimulation in the development of visually guided behavior.
Held, R., & Hein, A. (1963) · Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0040546 · Cited by 1,161
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Lupyan, G., & Ward, E. J. (2013) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1303312110 · Cited by 329
Metadata
- Authors
- Fodor, J. A.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1988-06
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 188-198
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W1987307305
- Cited by
- 189
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 2.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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