The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Theories
Abstract
This paper explores a new reason for preferring a model-theoretic approach to understanding the nature of scientific theories. Identifying the models in philosophers' model-theoretic accounts of theories with the concepts in cognitive scientists' accounts of categorization suggests a structure to families of models far richer than has commonly been assumed. Using classical mechanics as an example, it is argued that families of models may be “mapped” as an array with “horizontal” graded structures, multiply hierarchical “vertical” structures, and local “radial” structures. These structures promise important implications for how scientific theories are learned and used in actual scientific practice.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Kuhn, T. S., & Schlegel, R. (1963) · Physics Today · doi:10.1063/1.3050879 · Cited by 35,538
Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things
Lakoff, G. (1987) · University of Chicago Press eBooks · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226471013.001.0001 · Cited by 12,386
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Hall, M. B., & Kuhn, T. S. (1963) · The American Historical Review · doi:10.2307/1847040 · Cited by 7,479
Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind
Odlin, T., & Lakoff, G. P. (1988) · The Journal of Higher Education · doi:10.2307/1982238 · Cited by 7,367
Family resemblances: Studies in the internal structure of categories
Rosch, E., & Mervis, C. B. (1975) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(75)90024-9 · Cited by 5,933
Basic objects in natural categories
Rosch, E., Mervis, C. B., Gray, W. D., Johnson, D. M., & Boyes-Braem, P. (1976) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(76)90013-x · Cited by 5,643
D., C. P., Rosch, E., & Loyd, B. B. (1979) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1421578 · Cited by 5,264
Categorization and Representation of Physics Problems by Experts and Novices*
Chi, M. T. H., Feltovich, P. J., & Glaser, R. (1981) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1207/s15516709cog0502_2 · Cited by 5,248
Fraassen, B. C. V. (1980) · doi:10.1093/0198244274.001.0001 · Cited by 4,682
Conceptual Change in Childhood
Carey, S. E. (1985) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 4,609
Cited by
Model-Based Reasoning in Conceptual Change
Nersessian, N. J. (1999) · Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery · doi:10.1007/978-1-4615-4813-3_1 · Cited by 352
An agent-based conception of models and scientific representation
Giere, R. N. (2010) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9506-z · Cited by 316
Self-citationThe cognitive basis of model-based reasoning in science
Nersessian, N. J. (2002) · The Cognitive Basis of Science · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511613517.008 · Cited by 313
The Cognitive Basis of Science
(2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511613517 · Cited by 276
The influence of prior belief on scientific thinking
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2002) · The Cognitive Basis of Science · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511613517.011 · Cited by 22
Metadata
- Authors
- Giere, R. N.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1994-06
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 276-296
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W2053048409
- Cited by
- 496
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 22.73
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Theories. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/289800
- The paper
- Giere, R. N. (1994). The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Theories. Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1086/289800
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.